Richard Perle's faux pas

Ever since the nine-eleven tragedy a section of Bush administration officials have been trying to damage US-Saudi relations which have stood the test of time since 1945 when bilateral relations were established by King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud. Despite the series of pronouncements by Saudi ulemas (after nine-eleven terrorist attacks) that neither suicide nor killing of non-combatants is permissible in Islam, many in the US had reached the conclusion that some Saudis including possibly Saudi leaders had either supported or condoned the terrorists. This belief of some Americans was strengthened by the fact that majority of the terrorists responsible for nine-eleven tragedy were Saudi nationals which was compounded by another fact that Osama bin Laden was also Saudi though of Yemeni origin. It was lost on many that most Saudis were shocked to learn that the terrorists were their compatriots. Saudi political elite tend to believe that this was deliberately designed to undermine the Saudi regime and to damage US-Saudi relations. To mute the crescendo of anti-Saudi sentiment among American hawks Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal was constrained to deny the existence of any difference with the US. Reiterating the importance of the two countries to each other Prince Saud al Faisal emphasized "we are building our relations on reality, transparency, and facts. The matter will be catastrophic in case we build our relations on rumours and lies". Concerning criticism leveled by American conservatives that Saudi Arabia was a 'nucleus for terrorism' he chronicled the efforts undertaken by the Saudi regime to defeat Al-Qaida terrorism in KSA and of the cooperative bilateral actions being taken with the US on its war on terror.

In this context the remarks such as those of Richard Perle who till recently was Chairman of the US Defence Policy Board are not only unfortunate but are also ill advised. Robert Hefner of Boston University has rightly pointed out that "it would be a shame if the focus on threats to our own freedom led us to overlook the fact that the violence was directed at not merely against the United States but against moderate and democratic minded Muslims around the world". Regardless of the unconfirmed reports that Pakistani cooperation on war on terror was due to a sort of Hobson's Choice given by Richard Armitage that Pakistan could cooperate or be bombed to Stone Age, one has to recognise the personal risk borne by President Musharraf every day because of his crucial cooperation extended to the Americans which is disliked not only by the fundamentalist elements of Pakistani society but perhaps by a section of the establishment. It is reported that apart from Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan President Musharraf is the only other foreign head of state the burden of whose personal security has been taken over by the Americans. During these days when things are not very clear in Pakistan on the heels of two successive assassination attempts on the life of President Musharraf, the Americans would be well advised to ensure his personal security and thereby the continuance of both predictability and consistency of Pakistani cooperation on the war on terror.

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While the Muslims would be the first to admit the existence of 'democracy deficit' in some of the Muslim countries, the arrogance of the Western hawks' pronouncements as to how realistic it is to get democracy in Islamic countries is astounding. In one of his interviews with Ben Wattenberg (Richard Perle: The Making of a Neoconservative) Perle condescended that "there is a potential civic culture in Arab countries that can lead to democratic institutions and I think Iraq is probably the best place to put that proposition to test". If the last US Presidential election is to be taken as a stellar example of democracy in practice, then perhaps many Muslim countries could offer themselves as better models to emulate.

In the Western anxiety to usher in 'democratic moment' among the Muslims one tends to overlook that the clash of civilizations is not between Islam and the West; but within Muslim civilization where ultra-conservatives compete with the moderates for the soul of the Muslim people. Therefore the convulsions one can see in some Muslim societies today reflect the essence of observation by Arab historian Ibn Khaldun that popular religion in Muslim societies tends to oscillate between strict religious observance and others of devotional laxity. Michael Doran of Princeton University (the Saudi Paradox Foreign Affairs Jan/Feb 2004) has attempted to explain the stress and strain with reference to Saudi society. He posits that Saudi Arabia is a fragmented entity, in the throes of crisis where the Saudi monarchy functions as an intermediary between two distinct political communities: a Westernised elite that looks to Europe and the US as models of political development, and a Wahabi religious establishment that holds up its interpretation of Islam's golden age as a guide. Doran sees the Kingdom as divided into two rival camps -- one standing on the principle of Tawhid or 'monotheism', while on the other side of the political spectrum stands the doctrine of Taqarub advocating rapprochement between Muslims and non-Muslims and promoting peaceful coexistence with the non-believers.

Doran's long thesis on Saudi Paradox is as disputable as historian Bernard Lewis' essay on The Roots of Muslim Rage. Both appear to absolve the West of ignoring the root causes of terrorism (notwithstanding the repeated claim by many that terrorism cannot be explained away by any means and therefore it cannot have root causes), the genocidal occupation of Palestine by Israel, tolerance of despotic rules in some Muslim countries because of assured supply of oil and/or facilities for military bases. Bernard Lewis quarrels with Islam for not rendering "unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the things which are God's" or in other words the separation of the Church and the State. Lewis adamantly believes that from its very inception Islam regarded Christianity as a genuine rival, a competing world religion, a distinct civilisation. But for the past three hundred years Islam has been on the defensive since the failure of the Turkish seize of Vienna in the late 17th century which has periodically found expression in Muslim rebellion against Western paramountcy in order to reassert Muslim values and restore Muslim greatness. Lewis firmly believes that Islam was never prepared, either in theory or in practice, to accord full equality to those holding other beliefs and hence its fight is also extended to contain secularism and modernism. In his vast discourse on Islam Lewis fails to recognise what Stephen Zunes (US policy towards political Islam -- University of San Francisco) had pointed out repeatedly that from the time of the Crusades through the European colonial era to the war on Iraq, Western Christians had killed far more Muslims than the reverse.

Given this sense of history among the Muslims, President Bush's Doctrine of Preemption applied in Afghanistan (albeit justifiably to throw out the despicable Taliban regime) and then in Iraq (characterised as a strategic error in a report by the US Army War College and in the light of the revelation by former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neil of Bush's intent to get rid of Saddam Hussein long before the nine-eleven tragedy) does not inspire confidence among the Muslims about the honest intentions of the US. Irresponsible comments about Saudi Arabia add to this existing unease. The West could be well advised to remember that there is only one country in the Arab and the Muslim world that has been endowed with: religious leadership, wealth and good relations with the West and would be overwhelmingly accepted by the Islamic world to be the only interlocutor with the West should such a need arise. Besides, women and younger generation of Saudis are getting increasingly vocal in their criticism of US policy with regard to Palestine. They have been supportive of a boycott of retail products perceived to be American icons like McDonald's and Coca Cola. Such boycott reflective of disapproval and anger may find expression in ways detrimental to Western interests.

Application of 'hard command power' through military and economic means (as defined by Joseph Nye of Kennedy School of Government at Harvard) may not always be possible or desirable. Additionally, any significant deterioration of US-Saudi relationship could affect both regional stability and global energy security. With so much at stake moderation in deeds and words of powerful people would be far more constructive than mindless expressions which are bound to have negative impacts.

Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former Secretary and Ambassador.