Transparency is the word

Talking of nuclear technology, especially a centrefuge assembly (with its protective covers and accessories) weighs several tons . If one or more of them could be secretly sold, so could other nuclear "assets". The fear of their falling into undesirable hands is therefore a reasonable proposition. And such hands can have more than one connotation or context. In addition to the terrorists buying the bomb or bomblets from nuclear black marketeers, these could, and apparently did, go to other governments also that were intent on acquiring these fashionable weapons. After such a stunning development, which government can believe Islamabad's assertions of innocence; and such a loss of credibility is not easily made good.

But one is not so much concerned with the state or the government losing credibility and being embarrassed. The people of this country are now bewildered and feel betrayed that the supervision of the Army and the government in general was so lax as to permit such huge-scale pilferage. Also the spectacle of those who were projected for so long and so much as national heroes stealing high value nuclear know-how and technology and selling them to either the new-found black market (underworld) or foreign governments for personal gain is traumatic. The thought that these gentlemen could be so unpatriotic as to amass crores of dollars in their foreign accounts, in addition to possessing massive amounts of real estate, at the cost of the nation is appalling and painful.

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The rightwing, including the government's veritable ally the MMA, is going hammer and tong for the government being run by the Army chief. The campaign is however misconceived. Insofar as the specific decisions of Gen. Pervez Musharraf -- in taking two major U turns on Taliban and Kashmir's Jihad and now arresting the thieving nuclear scientists and their proposed trial -­ are concerned, they were simply unavoidable as well as right. Given the huge dimensions of these decisions and their suddenness, it can be said that the status and stature of the general was not equal to the big task. But this is now in the past tense; it is perhaps too late for him to acquire the requisite stature through legitimacy and experience.

This aspect of the matter is not unrelated to the rights and wrongs of what the international situation and pressures forced him to do, perhaps against his own inclination. Policy reversals of this order require a statesman with impeccable legitimacy. Otherwise, an unpredictable backlash from various opponents can build up over time. Now, Gen. Musharraf is already a marked man, with several attempts on his life having been made in the recent past. As one who still questions his legitimacy, he is forced to pray for his long life -­ in office for the immediate future. The reason is the stern necessity as well as justification of his decisions that are being opposed by the rightwing. So long as his stature and legitimacy remain controversial, the national situation will remain vulnerable and dicey.

It is however still possible for him to acquire legitimacy. Stature is an ineffable phenomenon. It is conferred on the beneficiary by common people on the basis of widely held perception that what he has done was right and the direction he gave the country was a history-making event. It can't be had by asking or buying or through mere propaganda. It is gained only by acting right and convincing others of it. A course can still be recommended through which legitimacy, a stern prerequisite for possible eventual stature, can be obtained.

Only two related steps are crucially important: first, let Mr. Musharraf withdraw his LFO along with National Security Council proposal as an earnest

of Army's withdrawal from politics; it will be credible after it has happened or when a change is seen: emergence of a truly autonomous PM with a non-rubber stamp Cabinet and a sovereign Parliament. Section 58(2)(b), the mother of all ills and the guarantee of Army's supremacy, must go forthwith and the President should be ready to do what Parliament may demand -­ after necessary measures of national reconciliation: arresting the Accountability Bureau in its tracks and for reorienting it; a general amnesty for all politics-related prisoners and detainees; and allowing PPP's and PML(N)'s leaders to return safely as a preliminary to forming a government of national consensus. Such a government, with all powers, is necessary to tackle the difficult situation facing the nation. If Mr. Musharraf lets such a government function freely and takes a dignified backseat, he would become a statesman after a while. One does not expect such a necessary change to take place. Army as the most powerful political party with a stranglehold on power is unlikely to let go; it now needs so much of national resources that their availability requires its effective control over the government or its decision-making by one means or another to ensure a growing share for itself. If this remains true, none of what one has recommended here will be acceptable to the officer corps of the Army ­- and to Mr. Musharraf. In which case, nothing will change at Islamabad and its vulnerability to foreign pressures will grow. As will its loss of credibility. In the immediate future the determinant of all, or most, policies will remain foreign powers. One tends to feel totally helpless and forced to say what will be will be.

But one cannot stay silent, even though there is simply no effect of what one says. Two issues have come at the head of national agenda. One is the crucial question of the place of nuclear weapons in the so-called national security. The people should examine whether they promote Pakistan's security or detract from it. This matter cannot be tackled as a sort of ancillary to other issues. It must be coolly examined by keeping all pros and cons in view. One aspect can however be mentioned in passing. The idea of developing nuclear weapons in earnest had arisen after the 1971 defeat: two strands were woven into it: One was the notion that exigencies of Kashmir dispute will occasion a war with India which cannot be faced without having a nuclear deterrent. The second un-avowed idea was to get even with India somehow; the honour of Pak Army was tarnished by 1971 defeat; therefore, one way or another, the bomb was to redeem this honour. Well, none of it is applicable after the experience of 2002's grand confrontation with India, the sequel to which crisis was the joint statement of Jan 6 this year and the paradigm shift that has been forced on this country. The bomb is now irrelevant to either Kashmir or to the relations with India in general.

The second major issue is immediate. It is by no means simply a question of half a dozen or so scientists, engineers and an odd administrator of KRL having stolen crucially-important technology and selling it along with their knowledge abroad. No one has accepted this account in Pakistan. Nor will anyone abroad be satisfied with this narrative. Everyone knows that the security surrounding KRL personnel was provided by the Army and it was said to have been many-layered. So many and such criminal activities over a fair amount of time could not have taken place without some involvement of high-ups, indeed very high-ups. The crisis that has hit Islamabad is neither simple nor short-term. There is already an uproar in the country against a few scientists and engineers of KRL being made scapegoats. What foreign governments are likely to do now and later (after Pakistan's utility concerning Afghanistan is over) is anybody's guess.

But one guess can be made. Like many Pakistanis, the major powers, led by the US, will not close this account when Islamabad formally arrests these accused and tries them under the antiquated Official Secrets Act of 1923. They will want Pakistan to adequately atone for this offence of having actually proliferated the nuclear know-how and technology. It does not matter whether a few persons did it and remained uncaught until Iran blew the whistle or Islamabad officially did it. They will want to both punish Islamabad for this 'crime' as well as to plug all possibilities of repetition. Major powers can enforce such unbearable sanctions as may convince Islamabad that getting rid of this useless deterrent is necessary that is the cause of so much pain. Anyhow, the winning of the trust and goodwill of major powers will be difficult, not to mention the political cost to today's rulers. But having a national government and constitutional reforms would help in coping with the pressures.

Pakistan is in treacherous waters. Trying to be clever by half will have dangerous consequences. The safest course is to come clean with all the facts. Transparency should be the operative word. This hush-hush debriefing, with suggestions of usual military ham-handedness and political myopia, will not do. It is necessary to have a truly high-powered judicial commission to inquire into the whole affair. It should have the power to subpoena anyone, no matter who, or any document, no matter from which department. The inquiry should be open to foreign as well as local media. All those found guilty of conspiracy not only to sell the knowledge and technology for personal profit but also to knowingly indulge in nuclear proliferation need to be punished severely through due process of law.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.