L'affaire Qadeer Khan
- in Kashmir, arms race, nuclear field, Afghanistan and near total reliance on the US support Â- were devised accordingly. The PPP and various PMLs, whenever in power, have always acted in accordance with Army's assessment of national interest. MMA's case is bewildering. It was always allied to the military and while JUI was earlier for nonaligned foreign policy and Jamaate Islami was solidly pro-west until 2001. JUI had been active in support of the west in its anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan alongside JI. After the defeat of the Taliban regime and Pakistan's U turn, all the religious parties affect to be anti-American. But they remain in the good books of Musharraf. There has been a clear division in the political life. On the one side are Pakistan Army, various PMLs, and pro-American policy formulations. On the other side of the fence are smaller, secular regional nationalist parties and groups, most of which also have claimed to be leftists. These today happen to describe much of the civil society. The politics of this generic school always disapproved of total reliance on the west for security and economic aid; their political preference began with love of unadulterated democracy, nonaligned foreign policy, self- reliance, opposing the unending arms race with India and predicating the realisation of the Kashmiris right of self-determination to be on Pakistan's military prowess.
These groups invariably opposed military's frequent incursions into politics, describing military's rule to be a worse sort of One Unit. Needless to say these groups have stayed out in the cold. The US advice helped undermine democracy in Pakistan and also the self-sustaining kind of economic development. The US encouraged the arms race which in the end has made both India and Pakistan eat out of the Americans' hands. It engendered in Pakistan a dependency syndrome and led it into heavy indebtedness. Pakistani generals' hubris and lack of clear sightedness has led them into a long line of unsuccessful military adventures. The current military regime has tried to deflect the pressure of the US and UN to take punitive action, by formally parading Dr. Khan as the fall guy while the case of his seven associates hangs fire for engaging in the business of buying and selling the nuclear contraband in international black market. While Musharraf was doing what seemed unavoidable, he was angry and bad-tempered with the national press during his famous Feb 5 briefing of Editors and columnists. He berated his audience for being too critical and unpatriotic in reporting what foreign newspapers published on 'sensitive' subjects which action was against the national interest. This is not the first time that this charge has been levied on Pakistan press. The latter is used to this. It is perhaps a curse on Pakistan that few Ministers or dictators can resist the temptation to lecture newsmen on morality and patriotism. What Mr. Musharraf did was excessive; it was an equivalent of the shooting of the messenger of bad news. He should have been thankful for the press for educating both the government and the people of things they ought to know and think and decide, especially what the powerful US and UK press were writing. In this age of internet how does Musharraf think that he can prevent his hapless country remain ignorant of what Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, New York Times, Guardian or Economist think of the Musharraf pardon to Qadeer Khan.
Journalists' first commitment is to facts as they may be. Patriotism is an innate characteristic of every citizen and as such is no big deal while truth-telling is. As for politicians basing their politics on patriotic appeals, well, it shows they have nothing moral, necessary or desirable bases to inform their political conduct. A government may have reasons to shun limelight on some of its actions, journalists are duty bound Â- ordinary morality and professional ethics so ordain Â
- to publish facts without fear or favour. One would go along with Musharraf insofar as (some) Pakistani journalists fail the test of professional honesty -Â but no further.
Insofar as the one aspect of the matter, viz. how could Qadeer and co do all that and for all that long without the Army and government bosses knowing it, is concerned, virtually the whole of world media have automatically zeroed in on this question. Who could escape it? They did not wait for Pakistani press' or politicians' wondering over it. This was their first reaction. Pakistan's military rulers have the odd desire to shut out facts they do not like. Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, has appreciated the difficulties that Musharraf faces but could not resist terming his pardon 'odd'. Does the Pakistan President expect local press to shut out this 'odd'?
High American officials are descending on Islamabad in droves. They are sure to demand many things like US supervision of the new enhanced security of this country's nuclear assets as well as further strengthening of the C3 that is in place; they would want to further debrief the eight or some more KRL-related people; they are also likely to investigate the role of other government agencies or of the top echelon of the government or Army.
Let no one forget that this is a proven case of nuclear proliferation -Â to Iran, Libya and North Korea, all members of Mr. Bush's Axis of Evil Â
- by the government employees of a satellite state that is so dependent on the munificence of Mr. Bush or his successors. They would naturally want to get to the bottom of the affair. No foreigner will take Qadeer's mea culpa and Musharraf's pardon at face value. They may not reject the affair out of diplomatic etiquette, but would want new probes, ostensibly on other aspects of the matter. It is unlikely to remain a closed chapter -- unless of course the Musharraf regime can do the unimaginable thing: defy the US, UN and all others.
One way or another Islamabad will be forced to reopen many aspects of the case, though not necessarily making the pardon legally invalid. It might still be in the best interests of Pakistan to uncover all aspects of this proliferation black market through an open judicial inquiry. This is a subject in which the whole world feels involved. No reasonable Pakistani can really object to other nations taking a close hard look at these goings on. Cover for the KRL's activities has blown away. Indeed, now there is no option but to come clean.
What of the Nuclear Deterrent itself? Well, the residual sovereignty of this country entitles it to keep it and away from the prying eyes of foreigners. This is not covered by the full inquiry one recommends, now that Pakistani nukes are a fact of life for all others. But the issue of what should Pakistan do with its nuclear deterrent has however come centrestage. Anyway, Pakistanis have paid for it by massive amount of lost opportunities of development and prosperity.
They want to know how useful it has been or now is? The darned thing did not prevent July 4, 1999 humiliation; then, the Indians were credibly threatening a conventional war despite this deterrent in 2002. It failed to deter. No strategist, whether real or arm-chair variety, can rely on it after the Indians have declared that they are not deterred by it: they said then 'let Pakistan use it first if it so likes. But then it will have to wait for a riposte in kind. That will send Pakistan back to the Stone Age'. It was a credible narrative, if also gloomy. Instead of deterring the designated enemy, it deterred Pakistani decision-makers from using it. What is the point of it? Let's cut costs.
If so, the better course for President Musharraf is to put his money where his mouth is: let democracy be given a chance to decide upon the future of this otherwise useless and costly deterrent. Let all the schools of thought in the country be consulted openly and freely: Do Pakistanis still want to keep it after its relevance to the real defence of Pakistan was shown to be nil in 2002? May be they will want to sign CTBT, NPT, their various protocols and related conventions unilaterally. May be they will invite India for a dialogue on the future of the two deterrents Â- on pain of going it alone in denuclearising Pakistan. It is a better course and time is short.
MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.
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