Chiittagong arms haul : Some queries

But even more disconcerting is the fact that the CUFL jetty was being used as the offloading point, under the nose of the police, if the press reports are to be believed. The fact that these people chose to use a government facility, and that too a key point installation (KPI), to unload such a huge quantity of arms and ammunition, points to some collusive arrangements. Such a large operation cannot be undertaken without a 'guarantee' of immunity. Given the fact that the operation did not involve only the unloading of this consignment but also an equally risky task of delivering it to the 'consignee,' was possible only with a guarantee of sorts.

This incident also underpins the allegation that Bangladesh is a transit route for illicit weapons, whatever are its destinations. For many years this issue has come up repeatedly as a point for discussion in many fora. We were loathed to acknowledge the fact much less accept the reality of this phenomenon.

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There are at least three questions that should agitate our minds which are 'from, for and by' whom these weapons. We must delve deeply into these because of the serious ramifications these have for our overall security.

The first question is the origin of the seized consignment. Admittedly, it is always a difficult proposition to trace the source or the origin of clandestine, illicit weapons and equipments, although the country of origin may not be difficult to determine. The gunrunners and suppliers of illicit weapons, in all likelihood have 'sourced' these weapons from multiple sources, and the 'delivery orders' must have been processed through several layers, in order to keep the identity of the source secret. But there are many indicators and telltale signs, which should be able to provide us some clues as to where it was packed, of the place or port of origin etc. There could be two likely sources of these weapons. One, these are licitly produced arms and ammunition, which have been clandestinely transferred to illicit arms dealers subsequently. It is difficult for a third country, under the present UN control regime in respect of small arms and light weapons, if not impossible, to siphon off genuinely traded weapons to clandestine groups, because all records of transfer have to be communicated to the relevant UN agency in New York, where records of all transfers are maintained in an arms transfer 'register.' The second possibility is that these were clandestinely produced weapons; delivered in the manner these were produced, clandestinely.

The next point that begs the question is, who are these huge quantities of weapons and ammunition meant for? There are two plausible scenarios in this regard. It could have been brought in for use in country or for transit to a third country. It is too difficult and serious a question to be addressed perfunctorily. I would like to believe, in spite of what have been articulated by some very responsible government functionaries, that these were destined for a third country. I shall situate my arguments on the following rationale. First, were it meant for use in Bangladesh, the consignments would have been brought in smaller quantities rather than in bulk, unlike the way it was done. Second, the logistics involved in transportation, storage and eventual redistribution would involve planning, expertise, real estate and manpower, of huge proportion. I am not aware of any subterranean group capable of such undertakings. Thirdly, the quantity of the seized hardware negates the argument that it was for in-house use, because we are not aware of the existence of such a well manned and well-trained underground set up, capable of not only absorbing the quantum of the materiel brought in, but also proficient in the use and handling of the weapons that were seized. Even the Bangladesh armed forces do not possess some the types of the weapons seized in Chittagong. The types of military hardware also suggest that whoever it was meant for is well organized and trained to indulge in open hostility, i.e. taking on the government forces through conventional combat or classical military operations. We are not aware of any such groups operating in Bangladesh at this moment either.

The last but by no means the least is, who are the persons involved in this illegal trade. One wishes one had the answer. This is a difficult question which one should not even attempt to answer without going into the details. However, that there is a well-organized group in Bangladesh, playing a part in a team of international dealers in illicit weapons is a certain. This phenomenon (trade in illicit weapons) has both 'demand and supply' dynamics, which must be meticulously addressed. Without determining what or who are generating the need for these weapons, tackling the supply side will be meaningless.

We must also not take comfort in the fact that these items were not meant to be used in Bangladesh, given that the arguments proffered above are held true. These weapons are capable of creating havoc anywhere. An exacerbation of the ongoing turmoil in our neighbourhood would have consequences that might be difficult for us to deal with in future.

Our law enforcing and intelligence agencies do not possess the necessary data bank or the expertise to analyse the information and generate actionable intelligence from these facts or clues. We should not hesitate to seek the help of international agencies such as the INTERPOL, who have the expertise and wherewithal to unravel much of the mystery. The sooner we get the answers to 'for whom, by whom and from whom' of the seized weapons, the better it will be for our overall security.

Brig Gen (Retd) Shahedul Anam Khan is former Director General, biss, dhaka