Plain words

An honour to do without

M B Naqvi writes from Karachi
Pakistan has become a Major Non NATO Ally of the US. This has opened the door to Pak Army buying spares, training and some US made equipment, subject to approval by the US, case by case. The US has lifted most sanctions on this country. The new status is supposed to be an honour, though those conferring it were unsure whether Pakistanis would actually feel honoured and accept it.

The Americans could not have been surprised at the near-automatic acceptance of this by Islamabad without a second thought or domestic debate. Apparently not even the Cabinet was consulted. It can be argued that there is nothing new in it. Pakistan was already an ally in the same war. Also the US Ambassador to the NATO had disclosed on January 29 that the US proposes to make both India and Pakistan sort of quasi, or associate, members of NATO in the fight on Terror under its desired new role extension to Asia and Africa.

That New Delhi seems to be angry at America for not informing it before US Secretary of State announced it in Islamabad -­

only a day after leaving Delhi. How does South Block failed to see that there was nothing new in the MNNA status except its nomenclature: Instead of non-full membership of NATO, it is called MNNA. The new title is more grandiloquent than the second grade NATO membership. Maybe it is a dilution of even the uncertain content of being nominally linked to the NATO, though the words Major and Ally may compensate for what is not involved in MNNA status. For, the vague verbal impression of membership of NATO might have suggested a bit of liability by the Pact and its members. While sounding great, MNNA takes NATO right out of the picture, though it is mentioned. That is its beauty; may be Europeans abhorred the earlier idea.

Pakistan's supposed new ally status in War on Terror implies that in consideration of what the US would do for it, Pakistan will be required to do for the War whatever is in its power. Its contribution can only be troops ­- to do policing or fighting anywhere needed in the open-ended War on Terror. For the US, liabilities are limited by its convenience and laws. For Pakistan legal penalties on the supply of military hardware and accessories are being removed. Pakistan will now be able to buy what is desired by Pakistan Army ­- subject to Pentagon's approval of each transaction. There is absolutely no commitment by the US toward Pak security; it has undertaken no new (treaty) obligation.

The Americans know that the Pak military always yearns for and welcomes a relationship with Pentagon no matter what the terms. It always says yes to all terms. There is a lot of bogus anti-Americanism around: Relying on 1959 Agreement attached to 1954 mutual security treaty, it has been sentimentally argued that the US did not come to Pakistan's defence in 1965 and 1971. The US had made it publicly clear soon after the 1959 accord was signed that it is an executive agreement and not a treaty. It did not call for America to rush to the defence of Pakistan, no matter from where the threat comes. The US had made it abundantly clear that the executive agreement pertained to only one threat to Pak security: from a Communist State.

This history needs to be remembered because, once again Pakistan military, the true suzerain of Pakistan, is entering into an obviously unequal relationship in which liabilities of a military nature are Pakistan's and the US is not obliged to do anything except to consider -­ not necessarily favourably -­ trading in its excess (read obsolescent) war material. As in 1950s and 1960s, receipt of some military equipment creates such euphoria that finds an outlet in adventures against India. The voluminous propaganda of American untrustworthiness is a cover for the failure of imprudent policies.

To be fair, the US has never betrayed Pakistan; they have never been committed to defend Pakistan against India. It is Pakistani publicists who have evolved an elaborate alibi for the miscarriage of ill-conceived military adventures of 1965 and 1971. Pakistanis should understand that the US is offering a close military-to-military relationship with promises of aid and readiness to sell "some" military equipment and training for its own purposes. It has been gratefully accepted. The fear is that arms races, conventional and nuclear, with India are going to intensify and the present peace policy may falter. Everyone may be back to square one.

It is unwise for Pakistan either to annoy and provoke the hyper power or to be needlessly servile to it. A dignified distance from it is best. Today no nation can live in splendid isolation; it has to sell and buy goods to and from other countries; cultural exchanges ­for promoting education, sciences and technology ­- are an absolute necessity in this shrinking world. But one fact stands out: there are no free lunches; any aid received has to be paid for by promoting the donor's purposes. Pakistanis have shown their readiness to take any aid, no matter what the terms; should beware: only aid for economic construction that accelerates wealth production over calculated periods is justified so that repayment with interest becomes possible; none else is wise.

Pakistan should stop flirting with the US. Policies directed against US interests should of course be eschewed but getting too close to the hyper power can be undesirable. The US is obviously trying to be the sole dominant power over the globe. Europe largely comprises its friends and a few of them were once great powers. The Latin America poses no problem to Pentagon. Nor do Africa and Australasia, for different reasons. Only Asia is where the action is. But here there are five major powers abuilding: China, Japan, India and Australia; Russia is a special case. Major flashpoints are ME and North East Asia while Central Asia might become one. Logjammed South Asia, the Americans think, can be wrapped up and used by bestowing honourific titles.

Pakistan is already in the fold; it is being used at about a billion dollars a year. Islamabad has to answer some questions: War on Terror is acceptable in theory ­- provided terrorism can be so defined as to leave some scope for fighting tyranny and oppression. But are we at one with the US over the way it has fought Terror so far in Afghanistan and Iraq? Islamabad, being a partner and major ally, has to show that US occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq is only for the purpose of fighting terrorism and is not related to other US geo-strategic aims of global domination, eliminating threats to Israeli security, securing control over oil and key raw material everywhere else.

Is the US-dominated world acceptable to Pakistanis? Need we be accomplices, indeed bag carriers, of the great American push to manage the world and making Israel supreme in the ME for starters? What are US recommendations for South Asia? Pakistan has to take a position on it: the US wants India and Pakistan to work out a dé

tente over nuclear matters, solve Kashmir problem, make SAARC work and let both India and Pakistan live like civilized neighbours. This sounds fine. But can all this be done by yoking both countries to the American chariot by playing on their mutual hostility, all with fine verbiage. Can the two be simultaneously oriented to serve American aims?

It has to be realised that unless and until the radically destabilising factor, two competitive nuclear deterrents, is out of the way, no meaningful friendship between India and Pakistan can be sustained. Nor a Kashmir solution be found that can satisfy India, Pakistan and Kashmiris of various ethnicities. Actually without a genuine reconciliation between the peoples of the two major South Asian countries ­- indeed among all the South Asian peoples ­

- from the grassroots up, stable friendships cannot sprout and last. But once such interlocking friendships in South Asia begin to take shape, various inter-state, and many intra-state, problems will begin to be solved. It is only in the context of a people-to-people friendship that nuclear and Kashmir problems can conceivably be solved.

Most governments in the region are manned by blue-blooded conservatives; most of them thrive on either inter-state conflicts or intra-state polarizations or both. Their current politics does not sit well with all round reconciliation on non-racial, non-ethnic or non-religious bases. These aims are for the long haul and require a sustained humanistic politics that can rise above ethnicities that politicians exploit. There is a lot of work awaiting humanists to progressively achieve this necessary aim and save civilisation.

In terms of current international situation, the foregoing is too idealistic.

Today power counts. America disposes a lot of it. So minor powers happily get attached to it for a consideration. But the honourable course is not to punch above one's height, nor to expect free lunches. A nation has to be content to reorganise its political and economic lives with a view to expanding the economy for providing decent incomes amidst more human freedoms. Fascination for power juggernauts should be resisted. Being content with one's true independence in this turbulent world, despite some limitations, and standing on one's own economic legs, is the desired thing to do. Seeking favours from others for sustaining enmities with neighbours is the way of the foolhardy. If this is less than splendid isolation, so be it.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.