Iraq: Mission far from accomplished!

One year to the day that Mr. Bush haughtily proclaimed the end of combat, the war in Iraq is far from over. Cynics suggest that the actual war has only just begun, and the end does not appear to be in the horizon. A year ago, just before the US embarked on Iraq war, I had stated in an article that, while it was easy to start a war it was difficult to bring it to a conclusion, all by yourself. That, there are so many variables and imponderables in a conflict, particularly the one which is motivated by all the wrong reasons, and whose rationale is based on deceit, ending the war becomes all nigh impossible without effecting a honourable retreat.

We have been given to believe that milk and honey is about to flow in Iraq, that people in post Saddam have witnessed a growth in standard of living and the little resistance that the coalition forces are encountering are but the work of pro-Saddam Baathist and foreign fighters, whose capitulation is but a matter of time only. As Paul Krugman commenting in the New York Times states, "The official story line portrayed a virtuous circle of nation-building, one that could eventually lead to a democratic Iraq, allied with the U.S." The reverse is the reality on ground, prompting many to wonder whether the situation can be saved at all.

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A year after the 'Coalition' brought Iraq under its occupation, the US is faced with situations it did not foresee and were even less prepared to deal with. There are several predicaments that the US is currently faced with. First, its devious designs to exploit the Shia-Sunni divide has failed and indeed, backfired. By its actions in Najaf and Falujah not only is the common Iraqi feeling alienated, the rift between the two communities have been mended, for the time being, at least.

Second, it has to contend with a full-blown insurgency situation, both in the 'Sunni Triangle' and now, lately, what the American cliché terms, the 'Shia Circle,' without adequate level of combat forces. "An uptick in localized engagements," was how the U.S. military spokesman characterized the insurgents' activities that have kept the hundred-fifty thousand US forces on their toes. The Americans are describing the insurgents as "gangs" and "thugs".

The Pentagon had failed to determine the troops-to-task ratio before committing forces to ground. This really stems from the failure of the political masters to predict the exact nature of task that the troops were required to perform and assess the unforeseen eventualities that the troops would have to deal with. No wonder the US has sent additional heavy tanks and armoured vehicles to Iraq to combat the recent upsurge in attacks on its forces there.

Third, the 'coalition of the willing' is gradually becoming the 'coalition of the unwilling' as apparent from the thinning out process that has commenced, starting with Spain, of coming out of the league. Thus, the US finds itself more and more isolated in Iraq, and more and more under fire both literally and metaphorically, from the Iraqi freedom fighters and critics at home. More than 120 US troops have been killed in Iraq in the month of April alone - by far the highest casualty rate since the toppling of Saddam Hussein a year ago. There has been erosion in public support in the US. A new opinion poll shows only 47% of 1,042 Americans questioned believed invading Iraq was the right thing to do, the lowest support recorded in the polls since the war began.

Fourth, the predicament stemming from the compulsion of having to bring about a political dispensation in a country that was under a singular and monolithic construct the last eighty years. The US failed to understand that while an invading army can bring about 'liberation,' democracy and democratic and political institutions take much more than the wings of F-16s or the backs of Abraham tanks, to germinate.

The most serious predicament for the US is that it cannot now leave Iraq without sorting out the mess that has been created, with or without outside assistance. It just cannot leave Iraq to the Iraqis, in the current situation and call it quits, without creating serious consequences for the country as well as the region. Thus the frantic call to the UN to come to the aid of Bush and Blair. How the Brahimi plan would be set in motion remains to be seen.

The US rationales of attacking Iraq have gone through constant changes, from WMD, to preempting Saddam, to human rights and democracy. Even if one were to pretend that all this was, "Justified on humanitarian grounds, given the controversy surrounding the decision to go to war, and, given the Bush administration's retrospective claims of humanitarian purpose, we might have expected greater attention to human rights concerns during the military occupation. What we saw instead was a failure to deploy sufficient forces trained and equipped for law enforcement responsibilities, contributing to the lamentable security situation that pervades Iraq today," according to one commentator, proves the fallacy of all the rationale offered by Mr. Bush. Falujjah and Najjaf are but its latest illustration.

The carnage in Falujjah, reaching genocidal proportions, was so evident that the UN Secretary General was forced to call upon the US to reign in. The 'liberators' have now taken on the role of 'occupiers' arrayed against those that they claimed to have liberated. Seven hundred Iraqi civilian lives, mostly women and children (the US claims they were all insurgents), have been taken for the four US civilians who were killed gruesomely in Fallujah.

Although the US had brought to bear on the city the full brunt of US firepower, the town of three hundred thousand is yet to be reduced to submission. One could not agree more with a commentator who said, "The assault in Fallujah is a catastrophic mistake, because what the Americans wanted to present as a war against a dictatorial regime will be now seen as a war directly against the people of Iraq. This is the end of the little rest of credibility the US had there." The conflict in Falujjah has become the longest and costliest single engagement of the war in Iraq.

The new strategy of tackling Fallujah, through ex-Baathist generals, is an indication of Bremmer's volte-face; it is also an expression of reluctance of military commanders on ground, to engage in urban anti-guerilla operations, which reduction of Falujjah would entail. The new Iraqi force would be set up under an agreement reached with local leaders to be known as the Falujjah Protection Army, made up of about 1,100 Iraqi soldiers led by a former general from the Saddam Hussein era. "The plan is that the whole of Falujjah will be under the control of the FPA," according to US sources. Analysts are not sure though just how much influence a new force would be able to exert over the rebel fighters in Falujjah - or how effective it would be in bringing about an end to the fighting.

The Najjaf situation is even more complicated in that any disproportionate use of force will cause further loss of coalition credibility in the eyes of the majority population. No wonder that the US strategy in Najjaf has been very different from that in Falujjah.

Mr. Bush is facing a Sisyphean task, having to finish a war whose conclusion was not properly planned. I am again tempted to quote Krugman because it encapsulates very crisply Bush's current predicament in Iraq. He says, "I don't have a plan for Iraq. I strongly suspect, however, that all the plans you hear now are irrelevant. If America's leaders hadn't made so many bad decisions, they might have had a chance to shape Iraq to their liking. But that window closed many months ago." While the American leaders are busy trying to salvage a no win situation in Iraq all the wretched Iraqis can do is 'pray, and bury the dead.'

The author is Editor, Defense & Strategic Affairs, the Daily Star