Unending eddies

On a cue from no obvious source, five or six PMLs are uniting supposedly under Mr. Shujaat Hussain; former President Farooq Leghari's Millat Party claimed the other day it has unconditionally merged itself with or into the Q League -- the enlarged --to-be King's Party in which most PML factions and other Musharraf-loving parties like Sindh National Alliance are for ever ready to merge. The unity show is on. There are questions about who can hold such a huge PML intact in which so many, indeed uncountable, PMs-to-be would be straining at the leash.

Inevitably President Musharraf's name is dragged into the arena. He, as President, needs a party to belong to -- may be has to head it. But many advocate that Gen. Musharraf should also remain the top general; he cannot afford to shed his uniform. Or else, the country will be overtaken by instability. The gentlemen, no ordinary folks these, are in vitally important positions in the Federal Cabinet. They have a point: if Gen. Musharraf doffs his uniform and becomes only a civilian Head of State, he will face the new situation in which a part, may be a large part, of his power will shift to another center of power, i.e. a new Army Chief. The unity of command will disappear that has been achieved so laboriously by Mr. Musharraf.

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On the other hand two needs have been felt: one, you cannot run institutions of democracy without a strong political party -- a conclusion arrived at by successive military dictators who tried to civilianise themselves. Remember Gen. Zia's compulsion to form a PML in a partyless Parliament. Also, why forget Ayub Khan's strongly felt need to have a PML (Convention), though we can ignore the putative plans of Gen. Yahya Khan.

Secondly, the Jamali government's image undoubtedly is a poor one; it looks, for all its running around and claimed economic gains, a bunch of amateurs and dilettantes. It shows no signs of moving in any particular direction. Compared to the image of power, dynamism and direction of the President, it is a non-government. So some change would appear to be indicated. Mr. Jamali is too much of a gentleman with Old World charm rather than a Premier on the go like Tony Blair.

Outside commentators are totally irrelevant: The present situation underscores the strangely familiar dilemmas that Gen. Musharraf is facing. These stem from the plenitude of his powers; it is an embarrassment of riches rather than the lack of anything. So he needs nobody's sympathy. He may need only more wisdom. But that is for God to bestow. Us mortals can only notice the giant eddy that encircles the political players -- and not for the first time either.

The hitherto unmentioned part comprises the 150 million or more Pakistanis -- most of whom are strangers to power game players. There is no linkage between the vast unwashed multitudes and the government wallahs, whether in uniform or in starched Shalwar Kameez. The two do not inhabit the same world. Uniformed rulers' knowledge of the civilian world remains confined to traditional influentials with large estates who claim to be able to manage these multitudes as their forefathers had done under the British.

Don't forget the party that served the British well in Punjab was the Unionist Party. Its (Muslim) stalwarts quickly joined the Pakistan Muslim League in 1946-47. Henceforth the latter became the ruling party with at least half a dozen, if not more, factions formed as a result of the political vicissitudes when some politicians of oversized ego retained a bit of the GOP while a new ruler inherited the old dowagers sans only a few. It was the same party that became Republican Party overnight or quickly became Convention ML or even, up to a point, PPP and back to PML(N). Most of its leaders are true, blue-blooded conservatives who love nothing so much as the status quo -- especially the land tenure system.

King's Party should be peering at the mayhem that Pakistan society has become. Sindh had only a vague tradition of a ML. The NWFP has always been under the influence of either Bacha Khan or the great Khans with large farms. Baluchistan had only incipient political tendencies among Sardars who spent more time in lording it over their own realms; for commoners there were slogans of nationalistic radicalism. Centre was a far off, rather alien, something that was to be obeyed or rebelled against. Crimes rate has zoomed up; unemployment, poverty, inflation, non-availability of social services and widespread misery stalk the land. But none of it impinges on the uniformed or un-uniformed princes -- or their well-groomed courtiers.

But some parties do exist that are still incipient ones after all these decades. The military rulers, generally at a decade's distance with one another, come, destroy what political order there was so as to be able to rule and, after a few years, usually three or four, suddenly realize that they cannot go on being an Army Chief. They look around, create a new Muslim League, hold a well-managed election, have an elected government to show to outsiders and yet hold most levers of power.

Somehow in this tasty ointment flies intrude: either the people out there rebel as they did in 1968-69 or even 1977 or unmanageable tensions grow within the system they roughhew. See the tension between Zia and Junejo or the sight of seven or eight PMs marching in and out of PM's House and four general elections between 1988 and 1999. In these 11 years there was no unity of command, as Gen. Musharraf has said; instead there were three power centers: the Army Chief, the President (with Eighth Amendment powers) and of course the PM. Everyone could see the Troika system totally broke down when one civilian PM tried to establish a unified command of his own by amending away the Eighth Amendment.

Thus we are back at the beginning, trying to build yet another political system. The true requirements of its builders are (a) it should look like democracy -- of a parliamentary kind so as to satisfy foreigners. (b) It should seem to the multitudes that it is an answer to their prayers. And (c) it should preserve the unity of command under the Army Chief. In other words, the President should remain both the President and Army Chief and somehow preside over, or at a minimum control, the King's Party -- without which control the party may burst at its seams. The Prime Minister's job is hardest in the new system: He should seem to have total power but should be no hindrance at all in the exercise of total power by the Army Chief and the President.

Leaving aside the people -- who at any rate do not come into this architecture of power -- there are inherent difficulties. For one thing, at odd hours of Pakistan history some parties come together, probably on a cue from somewhere, attract shouting crowds and cause instability. There was that father figure of the Army who was ruling wonderfully, as Altaf Gauhar told us. Suddenly odd incidents took place and a movement brought down Ayub Khan's system that had taken seven years of labour to perfect. Obviously some people elsewhere were getting impatient. So another General appeared on the stage and had plans of a long-range nature. But East Pakistan Crisis forced him into a civil war that later became a war with India in which the valiant Commander surrendered the entire Eastern Command. Yahya's plans died on the vine.

Next, Zia was able to create a system that might have worked as he planned, if only he could prevent the 1988 crash. As we saw, the system creaked and gave way 11 years after Zia had gone. The system must be adjudged a failure as Ayub Khan's obviously was. Why do Generals' well-laid plans work while they hold the whip and break down after they suffer a setback or die? The only conclusion to emerge is that they try to square a circle; you cannot empower an individual with a unified command and yet appear to be a democratic system.

Look clearly at the ten periods one divides Pakistan's history into. The first was clearly a unified command under civilians; it ended in 1951 with Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination. Next phase was of uncertainty during which the bureaucracy, both civil and military, conspired and finally succeeded in becoming the decisive power in the land. Its victory came in 1954 with the sacking of Constituent Assembly by a bureaucrat who became a Minister and Governor General. Third phase was transitional (1954 to 1958) during which politicians were manipulated by two persons: President Iskandar Mirza and Army C-in-C Ayub Khan.

Fourth phase was pure Ayub; he ruled as Chief Martial Law Administrator for four years. He became a civilian President in 1962 and was overthrown in 1969. Thus ended the fifth phase. Sixth period was denoted by Gen. Yahya's bumbling and ended in the disaster for the country; Yahya was overthrown by other Generals. Seventh began by generals choosing ZA Bhutto to put in power. Bhutto did have a unified command; army submitted to his whims for a while and then overthrew him in 1977. Eighth period was again pure Martial Law for eight long years. Ninth, Zia devised a system that was best known for innumerable PMs marching in and out on President's orders -- behind whom loomed the Army Chief. The tenth period was inaugurated in 1999 when Gen. Musharraf overthrew Nawaz Sharif and the whole Zia system.

Now Musharraf is grappling with the abiding problem of an Army Chief's need to keep all the levers of power. But the old necessity of showing a democracy to ward off foreigners' criticism and other generals' lust for power create difficulties.

Kuldip Nayar is an eminent Indian columnist.