Editorial

Corruption in project implementation

A massive road-block to national development
The beans have been spilled about utilisation of project funds under Annual Development Programmes. None other than by an internal watchdog: the Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Division (IMED) of the planning ministry. In a report analysing its findings from spot inspections of 289 projects out of 1345 implemented in fiscal 2002 and 2003, the monitoring cell has literally blown the whistle.

It has uncovered strings of mal-practices including corruption, misuse of funds and a whole lot of cleverly crafted irregularities. Obviously, this is just a tip of the iceberg, because less than one-fourth of the total number of projects undertaken in the two fiscal years were scrutinised; the remainder 1056 having been left out where saints could not have been in charge.

Let's sample the measly-minded and shrewdly, yet brazenly, contrived devices to line individual or group pockets at the expense of national development: project costs were inflated taking undue advantage of a 10 percent allowable limit; contracts were doled out through lotteries to handpicked contractors, 80 percent of whom failed to meet deadlines for construction works in primary and mass education sectors; 40 percent of contractors -- heaven knows, who and why -- didn't get paid; and project designs were drastically modified to obtain bigger funds. The list is endless: projects spinning more money, like for instance, flood protection projects were preferred to irrigation projects (the preference ratio being 61.34 percent to 8.77 percent!); rehabilitation, renovation and augmentation of grid system were made a short shrift of, while high tension transmission lines passed through residential areas spelling danger; and DESA showed a tendency towards spending unauthorised funds. Furthermore, there were instances detected of drawing tender money without implementation, procurement of low quality materials and misuse of vehicles purchased for projects.

The conventional critique on poor ADP performances has been focused on four factors: our poor implementation capacity, snapped aid disbursement, faulty project designs, and political considerations behind project selection superseding economic rationale.

Of course, these negative elements have had a cumulative stifling effect on the progress of ADPs on a year-to-year basis. But the overriding roadblock to ADP implementation has been playing foul with resources, both domestic and external, placed at the disposal of the annual development programmes.

Our kudos to the IMED for what they have done hoping they would redouble their efforts to unearth more tales behind ADP debacles. But without corrective actions their findings will be of little avail. So, we are keenly awaiting proceedings against the corrupt who forage on the ADP funds to make a killing at home and perhaps abroad, and rob the poor of their dreams for a better day.