No point being pessimistic

In the earlier two cases, politics regarding what document were to be carried by Kashmiris crossing LOC and who was to man various checkposts was involved. Not so in this case. This was a technical and official level meeting at which Pakistan was to propose a set of CBMs, christened Nuclear Restraint Regime. I understand that India has a good idea of what Pakistan is proposing. When India's former PM AB Vajpayee rode a bus to Lahore in Feb 1999, he signed an MOU with Mr. Nawaz Sharif regarding nuclear CBMs. Insofar as is known the substance of the CBM that India then had in mind differ from what Pakistan is now likely to propose. Ideas of both are based on what CBMs American experts have been advising to both. This will be one agreement the two rivals will quickly be able to agree on. Indian proposal is realistic enough: talks on CBMs can begin two days earlier than the next Foreign Secretaries' scheduled meeting.

It is remarkable that these CBMs talks were kept separate by Foreign Secretaries in Feb last. These do not form part of eight subject groups because they were thought non-controversial. The two Foreign Secretaries will talk on the two toughest of issues:

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Kashmir and security problems faced by the two states, with special reference to nuclear weapons that have been inducted on both sides. Insofar as Kashmir is concerned, little more than a review and reiteration of respective positions can be expected in the next encounter, though they can lay out an agreed programme of further talks on the subjects at varying levels.

Needless to say Kashmir is a fearfully complex issue. Basic stands of the two countries are not only wide apart but are mutually exclusive. Shorn of diplomatic verbiage, Pakistan wants a radical change in the constitutional status of Jammu and Kashmir State, especially with regard to its Muslim majority areas. India, on the other hand, is committed to preserving the status quo (i.e. Indian sovereignty over J&K state). There is no middle ground.

Which is where it is difficult to see what can come out of this new possible talkathon. These national stands have remained firm and they have not changed either through 1965, 1971 and 1999 Kargil wars or through peace agreements like Tashkent Declaration of 1966, Shimla Accord of 1972 or Lahore Declaration of 1999. There appears to be little hope of any compromise. But leaving Kashmir question unresolved, now that both states have become the atomic powers, is too dangerous. Why? because if an issue cannot have a peaceful resolution, it will lead to war, as Kashmir problem has led to three wars and scares of several more. Given their present stances, Pakistan and India will go on colliding -- unless one side agrees to change its basic stance. Is that likely?

The second issue the two Foreign Secretaries will discuss is the nuclear question. It is not really an altogether separate issue. As one sees it, it has grown out of the womb of Kashmir issue. Whatever the Indians and Perkovich may say about the Indian pursuit of national grandeur and its regarding the nuclear capability as a currency of power, one remains persuaded that Mrs. Indira Gandhi ordered a nuclear test explosion in May 1974 in order to warn our ebullient Z.A. Bhutto to desist from dreaming nuclear dreams. Whether or not this is true, it does not matter. The fact is that 2002 experience shows that, given the presence of atomic WMDs on both sides, the basic stances of both sides on Kashmir are now an anachronism because they irresistibly lead to a clash; and clashing with atomic weapons is a madman's antic.

Which is where we all are. Atomic weapons pose wholly unacceptable dangers to both India and Pakistan and it can now be said with solemnity that no cause, Kashmir included, is worth an atomic war. So, to the negotiating table the two have to march. But whether they have the wit to find a modus operandi, is hard to say. A solution that saves the face of the two and provides substance of 'Azadi' the Kashmiris seek is the challenge for both. After the 57 years of history and the likely consequences of an atomic war, it is now imperative to satisfy all the three sides involved in Kashmir dispute with the substance of what they demand.

Obviously Foreign Service officers of the two countries are not the likeliest agents of such a quest for resolving an intricate and difficult problem. It requires the labours of the best Indian and Pakistani brains in both political and academic spheres.

Ideally, statesmanship in those who lead the countries is what is to be looked for, in the first instance. Although excessive -- vulgarised --pragmatism of politicians will be a hindrance in India, but it may have become impossible to find some who can try in Pakistan. In the latter case, the incursions of the military in governance hobbles all and politicians have been reduced to manoeuvring for ministerial jobs, if they are on the side of the military they have to look for escaping the NAB's and intelligence hounds. No one here has time to ponder over larger problems. And yet the two people must throw up eggheads of various backgrounds who can find solutions that will work.

But Pakistani delegates should also be carrying a detailed proposal to 'solve' the problems that have resulted from two rival nuclear deterrents, sitting cheek by jowl in South Asia. In Pakistan's case, it is called a Nuclear Restraint Regime. While one does not decry it, it needs to be critically evaluated. For a start, it is premised on a thoroughly pessimistic proposition: since the two states have chosen to acquire atomic capability, the rest of the world can do nothing but accept this reality. The NRR seeks to prevent unintended (accidental) bunch of nuclear WMDs by strengthening the Command and Control System and implementing various CBMs, intended to prevent accidents, miscalculations or hasty actions based on misreading of radar screens. It is intended to provide a minimal assurance to each other that no one will wantonly unleash nuclear WMDs.

No one can honestly deny the need for this minimal Indo-Pak détente. But all said and done, compared to the huge problems created by these WMDs, NRR does no more than scratch the surface. There is no point in emphasising the origins of these ideas. But the issue has to be seen in perspective. South Asians cannot equate the east-west cold war and the long series of US-Soviets negotiations on disarmament and Mutually Balanced Force Reductions of their conventional armies with Indo-Pak talks on these issues. Why, because the US and Soviets had no emotive quarrel of their own; they were fighting for intellectual constructs that left their peoples largely uninvolved. Hence deterrence seemed to work. In South Asia the position is wholly different.

As noted, the NRR comprises a series of CBMs. The story of CBMs in the Subcontinent is decades old; quite a few have already been in place for over a decade. What is the experience? Whenever military tensions rose too high, Generals on both sides rushed to reposition their men and guns. They always forgot about using the CBMs -- or may be these did not work as intended. Which is why the US diplomacy had had to prevent an Indo-Pak clash in 1990, 1995, 1999 and twice in 2002. The point is however simple.

CBMs, desirable though they are, cannot by themselves solve the dangerous, indeed impossible, problems that have been generated by two rival nuclear deterrents. The relative sizes of the deterrents do not matter. Even the use of one nuke on India is totally unwelcome and unacceptable to Indians. So is the impact of one Indian nuke on Pak soil is to be prevented. Total prevention of atomic exchange by making it impossible is what India and Pakistan have to achieve. NRR is a palliative, perhaps necessary, but it is no solution. All that NRR's success promises is that people and the Bomb will remain safe while the going is good (i.e. peace obtains). The bombs are to be kept safe for what? Why, for eventual use! There is thus something inherently defective about a détente -- limited as it always is -- on this subject. Let's have a proper solution that prevents war altogether and banish the trust destroying nuclear weapons.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.