Perspectives

An inevitable parting of the ways

M Abdul Hafiz
The news that Ahmad Chalabi's elegant headquarters-cum-residence in Baghdad was raided on the morning of May 20 in presence of CIA men exploded like a bombshell. Not long ago Ahmad Chalabi had been the Pentagon's darling and one who could hobnob with the likes of Rumsfeld and Paul Bremer as their trusted man. The convicted criminal of Jordan's Petra Bank embezzlement was virtually hand picked by the neo-cons as a man fit to run Iraq for them.

Therefore this reversal of fortune shocked many while his close associates were rudely jolted.

After a chequered career following Iraq's 1958 anti-monarchy coup when Chalabi finally arrived in the US he could with his sixth sense understand that the US was willing to spend liberally on Iraq particularly its Shiite population opposed to Saddam Husain. Chalabi did not want to let this opportunity slip away, floated his INC (Iraqi National Congress) almost overnight and went on the payroll of the CIA which is said to have paid him a purse of $ 27 million over the years. In exchange a clever Chalabi supplied the CIA the 'intelligence' it relished: all false information about Saddam's nuclear weapon programme, weapons of mass destruction and so on, the possession of which by Iraq was claimed later as justification for Iraq invasion.

But the love's labour on both sides started to be lost rather soon. When after the coalition forces' occupation of Iraq Chalabi was flown into his country he appeared to be a stranger before his people who were rather cool to him. It was an embarrassment for Chalabi and a disappointment for his American handlers. Nevertheless, like all other collaborators there was still some trick left with him. He could collect several hundred paid agents who pranced around in front of the cameras of the BBC, CNN and so on while Saddam's statue was brought down and a scene of jubilation by Iraqis was staged. As expected he was soon inducted into the Governing council where he took over the plum committee of finance. A sly manipulator he managed to have an access to the bulk of Saddam's secret files.

That was an uneasy development from occupiers' point of view for those files contained a lot of incriminating evidence of the US and British collaboration with Saddam -- even to the extent of supplying him with technical means to produce chemical and biological weapons. Furthermore, the so called 'intelligence' he and his friends supplied to Pentagon turned out to be bogus and no WMD could be found after the occupation. Obviously it was the beginning of an acrimony that refused to go away and it proved to be a turning point in the US-Chalabi collaboration based on blatant falsehood. Aptly both sides developed complaints against each other even on minor issues.

As an illustrious member of the governing council and being a 'trusted' friend of America Chalabi took liberty in placing several of his cronies in key positions of important ministries. Even if his moves could have been overlooked two other things done by him could not escape the notice of the American authority which was ostensibly offended by what was considered by it an outright sabotage. First, it was mainly on his advice that Paul Bremer, the US pro-consul in Iraq disbanded the Iraqi Army and police while also dismissing umpteen number of state employees on the pretext of de-Baathification. It only produced tens of thousands of jobless employees with their disgruntled family members, mass anger and demobilisation of state machinery apart from fuelling insurgency. Bremer eventually came to believe that Chalabi's advice was as misguiding as the information he generated earlier for Rumsfeld. Bremer seemed convinced that Chalabi -- having been sentenced to 27 years in prison by Jordanian authority for high crimes, having fed false information to the Pentagon that led the US to a disastrous war, having been paid $ 27 million from the US exchequer and having offered wrong-headed advice to Bremer himself -- was certainly not the star he was supposed to have been and was perhaps even a liability.

So much so that it was also believed that Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN envoy who is helping the US putting together a new group of clients to whom the 'sovereignty' is to be transferred after a week or so was indeed thinking of sidelining Chalabi in the new dispensation for Iraq. Even Chalabi himself is not oblivious of this development. He very well understands that the time has now arrived for the parting of the ways.

Once he had established himself in postwar Baghdad and after witnessing the shifting sands of occupation politics Chalabi well understood that new power centres were developing among the Shiites friendly towards the Americans and he therefore promptly opened his independent channels with the dissident elements possibly including Mugtada al-Sadar against whom the US is currently fighting. Meanwhile Chalabi, now apparently abandoned by the US was also getting closer to the more hardline faction in Iran and attempting to emerge as one of their clients.

It is possible that he had sensed that his days with the Americans were numbered and he should think of a different power base and look for new sponsor. Joining up with anti-US Shia resistance and becoming a full-time client of Tehran is certainly an option. It is now widely believed that the US was tricked by Iran into invading Iraq through Chalabi. The US has already ordered a probe into Chalabi's role in catalyzing both Iran-Iraq war and Anglo-US invasion of Iraq. In Iran-Iraq war Chalabi worked for the CIA while in persuading the US to invade Iraq he had been of immense benefit to Iran by removing its mortal enemy : Iraq under Saddam. It is now to be seen how Chalabi will be rewarded by Tehran when a Shia-ruled Iraq becomes a reality and develops a close ideological partnership with Iraq.

Brig ( retd) Hafiz is former DG of BIISS.