Hotline: Not a moment too soon, but more fail-safe measures needed

The two countries have also committed not to conduct further nuclear tests, "unless, in exercise of national sovereignty, it decides that extraordinary events have jeopardised its supreme interests."

These are positive attitudes, a departure from the rather hawkish dispositions displayed following the nuclear tests of 1998, as well as during the period of deployment of Indian troops along the LOC in 1992.

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But the recent agreement answers only partially the concerns of the neighbours of an accidental nuclear conflagration. One, however, hopes that this is merely the beginning of a more constructive dialogue towards de-weaponisation.

Without sounding cynical, it could be said that this region is more vulnerable, with a high degree of probability of a nuclear exchange, because of the fact that we have two nuclear states with shared borders, a long history of animosity, and unresolved issues that have proved intractable over the last fifty-five years.

Nonetheless, the leadership of the two countries ought to be credited with the prudence to comprehend the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear exchange. But one has to concede also the hypothesis that an Indo-Pak nuclear exchange may not necessarily stem from deliberate strategic planning, but occur rather as a result of miscalculations and accident.

It would be folly to consider the issue of nuclearisation and weaponisation of India and Pakistan as matters of exclusive concern of the two countries, because any possible conflagration between the two would engulf the regional states, more so if it involved nuclear weapons. Therefore, the concerns expressed by the NNWS, which reflect the unease brought about by the proximity factor, are justified.

However, the West had appeared more worried about Pakistan's prospects for acquiring nuclear weapons. It being a country under military dictatorship, the prospects of it using nuclear weapon were reasonably more, according to their logic. While the concerns about Pakistan were valid, the reason was unconvincing. One cannot see a correlation between the type of government and the propensity to use nuclear weapons. It is well to remember that the only country to have used nuclear weapons also happened, at the time, to be the largest democracy in the world.

We are not, however, concerned about the nature of governments that possess nuclear weapons, but about the compulsions and pressures that might motivate them to exercise the nuclear option.

Although not used so far, the chances of their use, even accidentally, cannot be ruled out. That is why we consider that the recent arrangement does not go quite far enough as it does nothing to prevent an accidental nuclear outbreak.

India's motivations for going nuclear are quite different from that of Pakistan, whose motivations remain entirely Indo-centric, designed to offset the asymmetry in conventional forces and weaponry. The statement by Pakistan's Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar at Lahore, on February 25, 2000, amplifies this immensely: "Acquisition of nuclear capability by Pakistan has proved a positive factor for peace. Scholarly studies perceive nuclear deterrence at work in 1986 when India massed a quarter million troops close to our border on the pretext of a military exercise. The nuclear capability prevented war in 1990 and again in 1999." This understanding in itself is self-fulfilling -- giving rise to the vicious cycle of proliferation, both nuclear and conventional.

The dynamics of deterrence and proliferation are unique and are inter-linked. First, nuclear weapons by themselves do not prevent proliferation of conventional weapons. Deterrence on the other hand gives snowballing effect to proliferation, particularly nuclear proliferation. That is so because deterrence, to be effective, should not only be seen to exist, its potency must also be clear to the potential adversary.

Deterrence also entails attaining a second strike capability that should not only be flexible enough to withstand the enemy's first strike, but should also be able to take out the enemy's second strike capacity as well. This automatically requires perfecting the delivery "triad" to ensure flexibility and survivability of the weapon systems. Thus, nuclearisation itself is a recipe for nuclear proliferation.

The acquisition of the Sagarika nuclear submarine, indicates India's attempt to complete the third arm of the "triad," and its enhancement of the delivery range of its Agni missiles, and the Ghauri tests by Pakistan, also lend credibility to this argument. The size of India's defense budget, of around 14 per cent since 1999, while Pakistan's expenditure of 5.3 per cent of its GDP on defense, are corollary consequences of proliferation.

On the other hand, the recent proliferation in conventional weapons disproves the typical argument that nuclear weapons, as a deterrent, cost the state less in the long run since they preclude the need for conventional weapons.

That possession of nuclear weapons also does not prevent conventional conflict is borne out by the Kargil war that followed in the wake of nuclearisation of the two countries.

So much has been the strategic disadvantage of India in the whole equation that it has been forced to come up with a new strategy to circumvent the situation, which is called "cold start" strategy. This envisages a shorter build-up time prior to any offensive, as well as plans to commit Pakistan's front line and strategic reserves simultaneously, and in a manner that would pre-empt a nuclear response from Pakistan.

All these hazardous prospects beg for more fail-safe measures beyond a hotline.

Reportedly, there were more than a dozen fail-safe arrangements in place between the two superpowers at the height of the Cold War, yet the two came to the brink of nuclear confrontation accidentally many times.

The advantages of a large physical standoff distance and the absence of a common border between the two superpowers which were warranties against an accidental actuation are absent in the case of the two South Asian neighbours.

Thus the urgency of a range of fail-safe measures. The stakes are very high since it involves the entire region. As the saying goes, a nuclear cloud knows no frontier -- it drifts with the wind. It would do us all well if India and Pakistan were to heed the sagacious warning.

The author is Editor, Defence and Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.