Iraq: Problems and prospects

This Resolution was important because it attempted to paper over the cracks that appeared within the international community over the unilateral decision to invade Iraq bypassing existing international law.

Security Council Resolution 1546 has addressed some significant elements. It promises eventual Iraq transition to a democratically elected government with the help of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).

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The basis for this role has been evoked from a request made to the President of the Security Council on 5 June by the Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Iraq. Under this Resolution, the United Nations is expected to play a 'leading role' in the convening of a national conference to select a Consultative Council during July 2004, advise and support the process for holding elections, promote national dialogue and consensus building on the drafting of a national constitution, help to create conditions for development of effective civil and social services, contribute to the coordination and delivery of reconstruction, arrange for a comprehensive census and also arrange judicial and legal reform.

I do not know what else is left. I guess, it is the arranging of security, not only for the war affected people of Iraq, but also for the hundreds of UN officials who will have to implement plans on the ground to make this Resolution meaningful.

More than one preambular paragraph recognises the consent of the 'sovereign' government of Iraq with regard to the presence of the multinational force in Iraq territory and also the need for close coordination between the multinational force and that government to promote the maintenance of security and stability. Apparently, such engagement will including obligations to function in accordance with international law, international humanitarian law and cooperation with relevant international organisations.

It is here that questions have arisen. It has been obvious from the start that any US contingent in such a multinational force is unlikely to be under the command of any officer other than from the US armed forces. Similarly, not being a party to international criminal court stipulations will enable their presence to be outside ICC principles. There is a reference of 'unified command,' but one presumes that the nature of such a command will hardly be so.

Secondly, will such a multinational force be under the regular UN blue helmet command? This is the only format and the usual practice that can be described as being in the service of peace-keeping. Any ambiguity in the nature of the composition of this force will not encourage greater participation.

Thirdly, who or which coordinating body will be responsible for identifying strategy or priorities in the functional matrix of such a force charged with the specific task of 'preventing and deterring terrorism'? Vagueness in this area will not help in obtaining military forces from UN member states and regional organisations.

Hesitation with regard to participation in such a multinational force has already been reflected during Rumsfeld's recent visit to Bangladesh and Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh's meeting with Secretary of State Colin Powell in Washington.

This caution and scepticism has also been perceived in the disagreements that have surfaced at the end of the recently concluded G-8 Summit held in Sea Island, USA.

Encouraged by the unanimous acceptance of the Security Council Resolution both President Bush and Prime Minister Blair tried to persuade the other leaders of the G-8 to work together with other NATO member states 'to at least continue the role that now exists, and hopefully expand it somewhat for the new Iraqi government and... to work out how, over time, the Iraqi capability for security can be established and built up.' Unfortunately, for Blair and Bush, despite the apparent bonhomie among the G-8 leadership, objection arose from French President Chirac. In clear terms, he not only indicated that he did 'not think it is NATO's purpose to intervene in Iraq' but also mentioned that he was 'totally reserved about this initiative.' One presumes that despite this splash of cold water, fresh efforts will be made towards broad agreement about NATO and the multinational force in Iraq, during the forthcoming NATO Summit to be convened at the end of June in Istanbul, Turkey.

In the meantime, both President Bush and Prime Minister Blair are understanding the dire effects of their Iraq policy within their domestic political arenas. Successive polls carried out by several news agencies, including Fox News and the LA Times, after taking note of the Ralph Nader factor, have revealed that John Keery is ahead of Bush in opinion polls. The dissatisfaction quotient relates not only to the way Bush is handling the situation in Iraq but also in his efforts to boost economic growth. Bush is still seen as being better able to defend the United States against terrorism, but his disapproval ratings are climbing, Similarly, Iraq is beginning to give Blair a black eye. The ruling Labour Party has suffered heavy reverses in the recently concluded local elections in England and Wales with several city councils changing hands. While Labour has globally lost more than 315 seats. Conservatives have gained 108 seats and the Liberal Democrats (who opposed the war) gained 62 seats. As a consequence, the British Home Secretary Blunkett has been forced to acknowledge that the government's policy on Iraq is being disliked by the voters.

This steady erosion of support for the Iraqi war (as part of the global war on terrorism) has also not been helped with a recent revelation from the US State Department that its past report indicating that the number of international terrorist attacks had fallen last year was wrong. Such an admission has dented the claim by President Bush's administration that Washington is winning the war on terrorism.

It is time for the powers that be to understand that mere resolutions in the Security Council will not ensure a peaceful and gradual transition in Iraq. Recent events in Afghanistan, despite US claims, have shown that this country continues to be in a terrible state. Administration and governance outside Kabul is still severely impaired. Many involved in the process of reconstruction have died needlessly.

It is in this context that the Interim Government of Iraq has to find the right balance that will ensure the performance of the several tasks expected of them after 30 June.

They already have a lack of credibility factor as most of its members, particularly the President and the Prime Minister were US appointees and former members of the controversial Iraq Governing Council. The current arrangement will reduce the frontline controversy for the USA and the UK, but will in all likelihood, be less than successful in keeping the time frame.

The important question is trust and faith in the expected process. Unless this is brought into place, the chance of effective participation will remain remote.

It might be useful for the interim government to be bold and request Ayatullah Sistani and other important informal leaders within Iraq to come forward and nominate some additional representatives. Let the democratic process reflect true involvement. If the nascent development of democracy has to succeed in Iraq, it has to be a bottom-up approach rather than a top-down directive. It should include as many branches of opinion as possible. Without this, the Transitional National Assembly and the Transitional Government of Iraq will have a constitution and a constitutionally elected government that will neither be universally acceptable nor stable.

Muhammad Zamir is a former Secretary and Ambassador.