Of patriots and quislings

The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), which was required to assist Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN's special envoy, in his mission of crafting an interim administration that was to assume power on June 30 had already been a collection of America's trusted allies. Brahimi was still in the process of consultation when on June 1 the IGC announced the composition of the proposed interim government. Consequently, the government that followed was composed of the people -- yet remained loyal to the Americans. A mild mannered Brahimi, lacking the grit to stand up to Washington's bullying and manipulation (the reason why the Americans never opposed his choice as the UN's pointman both in Baghdad and Kabul), was apparently outmaneuvered by the US-Controlled IGC.

The American ploy to retain control of Iraq behind the facade of a "sovereign" Iraqi government became a fail accompli when the interim prime minister Iyad Allawi and his foreign minister Hoshyan Lebari -- both longtime trusted allies of the US -- conveyed to the UNSC their acceptance of the US troops in Iraq staying on, and requested that the council formally endorse it. Allawi's action surprised all except the Americans. The international community was equally surprised at the interim prime minister's uncalled for statement that the "sovereignty" stipulated in the UN resolution was "quite adequate."

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As scepticism abounded with regard to the nature of sovereignty given to the Iraqis, prudence demanded that, in its own interest, the interim government should have made every possible effort to dispel the impression that it would be toeing the US line. The members of the UNSC who were trying to totally discard the idea of the US troops after the power transfer, or at least to limit their stay in Iraq to the bare minimum period, were indeed baffled at the interim administration's willingness to accept the continued presence of American force in a "sovereign" country.

The spirit behind the much-touted transfer of power has consistently been an exercise to hoodwink the world as much as the Iraqis. Even if, under compelling circumstances, the Americans had to transfer power in one hand, they wanted to take it back with another. This exercise required a pliant figurehead in this seat of power who would have no qualms about obliging his American mentors even to the detriment of national interest. Allawi's background does vindicate his appointment as prime minister by the Americans. For the past thirteen years of his political career he has been a pampered agent of British and American intelligence agencies. A former Baathist and personal physician of Saddam Hussain, Allawi was compromised soon after Saddam's occupation of Kuwait in 1990 by Britain's M-16 which later passed him on to the CIA.

Along with the recently abandoned Chalabi, Allawi -- also a Shia like Chalabi -- remained on the take from the CIA for all these years, particularly since Iraq became the top foreign policy priority to Washington. Chalabi, enjoying his CIA millions in Washington as the head of the Iraqi National Congress, could worm his way into the Pentagon, and was subsequently able to drag America into its War in Iraq by feeding her with false intelligence with regards to Saddam's WMD. In the meantime, Allawi thrived in London at the head of the rival Iraqi National Accord (INA). Although Chalabi had the notoriety of being the more ambitious of the two, it was Allawi who dragged his patrons into a costly misadventure in the American-controlled Kurdish enclave in Northern Iraq. Allawi was also the author of the much-maligned and discredited fantasy that Saddam's forces could launch weapons of mass destruction in 45 minutes.

Even if the Americans are able to foist their man Allawi on Iraq, he cannot, for a variety of reasons, be acceptable to the vast majority of Iraqis. Allawi's most damning handicap is his shady past. For thirty years, Allawi lived a life of plush exile in the West with no contact of any substance with the suffering Shias who toiled hard to eke out bare existence under Saddam's tyranny and the oppression of US-led sanctions.

They loathed all those who claimed to represent them from their pampered shelter in the West. Allawi's only redeeming grace is that of a moderate Baathist who had the courage to show a different face of the party followers in contrast to the thuggish cult of Saddam and his Tikrili Mafia.

With only that, it is to be seen now how far forward he can advance even under the umbrella of American protection. But then there has never been any dearth of quislings in a country defiled by the politics of occupation.

Brig ( retd) Hafiz is former DG of BIISS.