Why will an Indo-Pak peace process sustain?

In the wake of Pakistan's nuclear tests there was an upsurge of nuclear jingoism as it was in India as well. In Pakistan it stemmed from a conviction that its acquisition of nuclear weapons would compel India to make concessions in bilateral issues including Kashmir. The conviction led Pakistan to indulge in Kargil misadventure. The attempt not only boomeranged, it resulted in the leading powers beginning to speak openly of the need to maintain the sanctity of the LOC (Line of Control) in Kashmir -- something Pakistan wasn't comfortable with. The final unravelling of Pakistan's nuclear hype came with AQ Khan's scandal.

However, the key shift in the equation came even earlier -- on September 11, 2001 -- when an enraged United States compelled Pakistan to drop another pillar of its security policy -- support of the Taliban and by extension the al-Qaeda. The international reaction to the ghastly event of nine-eleven made it clear that the days of supporting armed 'Kashmiri freedom fighters' were no more possible. India's threat of war in the wake of December 13 terrorists' attack on Indian parliament led to General Musharraf's January 12, 2002 speech promising comprehensive crackdown on the domestic support structures of terrorists in Pakistan. This turn around had a good deal to do away with Kashmir policy henceforth pursued by Pakistan. That Musharraf acted on his words slowly but steadily can be measured from the attacks on Musharraf and fellow generals by their angry erstwhile proteges.

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In the meantime some kind of reciprocity by India is also visible. During the same period she also has driven down her learning curve. India has at long last understood that disputes cannot be settled unilaterally. She now recognises that there is a problem over Kashmir and it is simply not a viable strategy to exclude Pakistan from its resolution. There are, of late, elements in India who believe that once the infiltration across the LOC is stalled either physically or by military-diplomatic compellance, things would return to normal in the valley.

But the actual experience in this regard has so far been instructive. First, despite a plethora of evidence of the Pakistani support for Jihadi terrorism aimed at India, the US and the world community have not put Pakistan outside the pale and instead slowly pushed it only to change course. Second, despite a valid cause the December 13 attack on the parliament and a massive military build-up India was not able to compel Pakistan to either surrender 20 wanted fugitives or stop support for cross-border terrorism. India seems to have sadly learnt that it lacks the instrument to do so. Because not only Pakistan is a nuclear power it also has more than adequate force to deter an Indian attack and fight a defensive war. The Indian forces, as experienced during its much touted 'operation Parakram' had neither the doctrine nor the organisation and equipment to chastise or punish Pakistan. So it helplessly refrained from crossing suicidal nuclear threshold.

There may still be a temptation in both the countries to revert to the path of conflict. But the option is not viable for either. As regards India, it will take her an enormous managerial effort spanning decades and costing exorbitant price in all political, economic and developmental terms to put in place the range of forces that can militarily coerce Pakistan into capitulation. There is little likelihood that India will venture it. There does not seem to be any special agency on her part to undertake deep reforms to provide that teeth to Indian armed forces. Moreover, the demand for developmental fund is so strong in India that it will be scarcely possible for the government to divert sizeable money to the military.

Pakistan's options are even more limited. With its much smaller economy it can not indefinitely continue to try to match India. While nuclear weapons now provide it a measure of security it needs, a nuclear sabre-rattling of Kargil war period will no more work. Neither is it any more possible for Islamabad to back a proxy war even with a military dominated government at the helm. Moreover, an increasing popular demand for public fund for education, health care and so on are no less compelling to restrain the trigger-happy generals.

Therefore, in all likelihood the peace process now underway will be sustained with its own dynamics. Neither side has alternate options even if they seek them. It is, however, another debate as to how will it proceed and for how long.

Brig ( retd) Hafiz is former DG of BIISS.