Politics of insurgent camps and need for mutual trust

One notices that the number of camps on the Indian list, handed over to Bangladesh, during the most recent meeting between the BDR and the Indian BSF, has gone up to 195. By the last Indian count it was 192. It is worth noting that the practice of providing list of Indian miscreants' camp in Bangladesh has been going on for some time now, with varying degree of intensity. What is also worthy of note is the intensity of the Indian complaints, which modulates between severe and mild, depending on the perceived disposition of the government in Dhaka towards India. It is worthy of note too that no such complaints came to Bangladesh's hand while the CHT insurgency was at its peak.

The only difference this time, which is very significant, is the comment made by the Indian leader of the delegation to the Indian press, imputing to the BDR the act of direct abettment of these miscreants. PTI says, "they have direct evidence that the BDR personnel were mingling

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with the militants and protecting them also." This is a serious allegation, which has serious implications. It cannot miss the eyes of even a casual observer that there is a shift in the Indian emphasis, in that it now sees Bangladesh's complicity in the activities of the Indian miscreants. These claims have been rejected by the BDR.

It is therefore necessary to consider the merit of the issue objectively.

The fact is that there is an ongoing insurgency situation in the Indian North-East, varying from high to moderate in intensity. In fact, the causes of dissension and the prevailing insurgency situation following therefrom in some of the states of the North-East predate the partition of 1947.

It is also a geopolitical reality that most of the peoples, culture and other linkages in the Northeast, like any other part of the Bangladesh-India border, straddle the political boundary.

It is also an inescapable dictate of nature that the terrain, being what it is, renders effective and continuous oversight and surveillance of the region rather difficult, if not altogether impossible, something that the leader of the Indian delegation has also acknowledged.

Given the criteria above, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that the Indian miscreants or insurgents, whatever one wishes to call these elements, will exploit all the variables that are outside the states' control, to their advantage. If they use the territory of Bangladesh they do so not at the behest of Bangladesh but of their own volition It would be unfair to suggest that Bangladesh follows a policy of active support to these miscreants in their anti-Indian activity.

However, there are perhaps other compulsions that provoke the type of Indian posture on the issue of insurgency and India's North-East vis a vis Bangladesh. One needs to be conscious of the very sensitive nature of this area that India is finding hard to rein in, despite many peace treaties between the government of India and various insurgents groups of the North-East.

According to. Indian analysts, India is worried about the prospects of the fringe Muslim elements in these border regions of generating trouble and garnering support from the radical elements in Bangladesh, to subsume a part of this area within Bangladesh. They see collusion between the Bangladesh and Pakistan intelligence agencies in fomenting the unrest. This scenario

is more relevant in the case of Assam than the other states of the North-East. The following quote sums up the anxiety, "Islamic militant activities have begun to proliferate in the region… Recent reports have also indicated that the ISI and the DGFI are reportedly encouraging the illegal influx with an eye to carving out a Brihot Bangladesh (Greater Bangladesh) in the region." (Jaideep Saika, ACDIS Paper, July 2003).

The other Indian motivation perhaps stems from Sun Tzu's maxim of winning wars without fighting a battle and winning battles without firing a shot. There may be a degree of pressure, through these allegations to persuade Bangladesh on the strategic plane to meet India's strategic needs. Each of the issues merits serious consideration by relevant circles in Bangladesh.

One must also look objectively at Bangladesh's standpoint in this regard. It has been Bangladesh's policy not to allow insurgent groups from across the border to operate from within its territory and from time to time the Bangladesh security forces have rounded up such elements from inside Bangladesh. In this regard Bangladesh's quandary is something quite similar to that of India's vis a vis

Nepal, where similar allegations are levelled against India for allegedly sheltering Nepali Maoist insurgents in its territory, unbeknownst to the Indian security forces.

Given the lay of the terrain of this region, one cannot discount the possibilities of the miscreants' crossing into Bangladesh and even taking temporary shelter here unbeknownst to our security forces. One fails to see any strategic dividends accruing to Bangladesh from its alleged support to these miscreants, simply because, one, it would be counterproductive for Bangladesh to engender a situation that might affect its territorial integrity in the future, given the cultural, ethnic and etymological tenor of the region.

Secondly, the efficacy of a quid pro quo policy of indirect pressure will be less than fruitful. Bangladesh stands to gain very little strategic advantage from an unstable North-East. It is difficult to believe that the strategic planners in Bangladesh are not aware of the negative consequences and the likely pitfalls of such a policy.

While it is not the purpose here to go into a detail critique of the likely scenario, that is painted by some international analysts, of the consequence of Islamist nexus in the Bangladesh and the northeast border region of India, the strategic farsightedness of those that are allegedly seeking to carve out a Muslim state in the North-East cannot but be questioned. To even a strategic ignoramus it would not be hard to see that a 'greater Muslim North-East' would have the same fate as that of the Kurds - hemmed in by hostile groups, being landlocked and left to the mercy of the neighbours - doomed to destruction. What strategic gain would this new configuration bring Bangladesh either, is difficult to imagine. However, it is not hard to imagine why such drivels are churned out from time to time in the international media.

Concerns and compulsions must be addressed without trying to take advantage of a neighbour's predicament. Goodwill can only develop if efforts taken to assuage each other's concerns display sincerity of purpose.

This can come about only in an atmosphere of mutual trust.

The author is Editor, Defense and Strategic Affairs, 'The Daily Star'