Independence Day thoughts

Pakistan, as if it was fated, is yet again under a one-man dictatorship. The Army remains in full control of national affairs and new institutions suggesting democracy are deceptive. The ruler has declared it is complete and 'real' democracy; nothing more need be expected. It is perhaps the maximum democracy that a military strongman can concede. Is it going to satisfy the 15 crore Pakistanis? The answer is blowing in the air -- events suggest it.

Those who do not swallow the official spin on events, notice four ongoing major struggles or polarisations. The first has been caused by the incurable itch of the Army to take over: As soon as a takeover takes place, an army of civilian time-servers, sycophants, carpet beggars and a portion of the social elites, the Khans, Chaudhries, Waders, Pirs et al, rush to welcome the new Saviour and set up a new Muslim League to serve him permanently -- until the next Man on a Horseback arrives. The rest of the populace remains unmoved and ignores the change. This division remains mostly dormant, except when some spark ignites a prairie fire of protests.

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The oldest division was over ideology. Elites remain satisfied with Muslim Nationalism, invented by Muslim League regimes that love a Strong Centre and oppose regional or ethnic nationalisms. This invention came after successive governments ignored Jinnah's secular Pakistani Nationalism. Ethnic nationalists call themselves nationalities or sub-nationalisms. Four -- Sindhi, Baloch, Pathan and Punjabi -- sub-nationalisms are commonly recognised, though two others, viz. MQM's Mohajrs and Seraiki speakers, want admission to the nationalities club, PONM. This polarization, for and against the Strong Centre, retains its explosive potential. It has repeatedly occasioned military crackdowns in the than East Pakistan, Balochistan and Sindh; the country lost its eastern wing just because of it. Two military actions, one in FATA and another in Balochistan, are going on and the national horizon is clouded.

There used to be a controversy between democracy or modern authoritarianism on one side and Islamic State -- the latter also named as Nizam-i-Mustafa, Nizam-i-Islam or Islamic Ideology -- on the other. Earlier religious leaders used to be satisfied with some Islamic Provisions written into the Constitution that rightist governments happily wrote; the growing volume of Islamic Provisions in each succeeding Constitution of 1954, 1956, 1962 and finally 1973 was required. Somehow Ulema of all sects called each Constitution adequately Islamic at the time of its promulgation though shortly thereafter they always reverted to their variously named demands. The Ulema who had expressed voluble satisfaction with the new Constitution in 1973 as quite Islamic were loudest in demanding Nizam-i-Mustafa in 1977.

Today this contradiction has come alive as an open war rages between Islamabad and al-Qaeda; the latter is assisted by Taliban and assorted Jihadi organisations, if not the main religious parties or MMA. Original war was between Washington and al Qaeda and Taliban combine. Since Pakistan betrayed Taliban and joined the American side, flag bearers of Militant Islam (al Qaeda and Taliban) are fighting the military-controlled Islamabad. Suicide bombing, al Qaeda's signature tune, has arrived in Pakistan.

There are polarisations on foreign policy and on the economic paradigm. There is another on how to create a culture of tolerance and moderation; Gen. Musharraf claims he can create these laudable traits in Pakistanis by his speeches and employing law enforcement agencies and the military. Others demur. In short, the issues of foreign policy have largely defined the challenges before Pakistan today.

Pakistan's foreign policy has always turned on the Kashmir fulcrum: It joined the west in 1953 for the sake of military aid and support on Kashmir in the UN; it went to war with India in 1947-48, 1965 and 1999 for Kashmir; all negotiations with India broke down because India refused to do in Kashmir what Pakistan demanded in the 1960s, 1970s, 1990s; and the current series of talks are again threatened because Islamabad still wants tangible progress on Kashmir before it will actually make any other agreement.

Gen. Musharraf used to claim in 2001 and 2002 that he switched sides in Afghanistan in order to preserve stances on Kashmir and nuclear weapons, thus foregoing much influence in, and friendship of, Afghanistan. Highest price paid by Pakistan for the sake of Kashmir is in the economic field in terms of lost opportunities of development. Why? because it has to run a nonstop arms race with a bigger and richer neighbour. This cannot be stopped so long as Kashmir issue is not out of the way. Society has been militarised, democracy's foundations have been seriously weakened as a result. The outlook is bleak. Poverty and unemployment are creations of present policy and the deteriorating law and order cannot be improved or recruitment of Jihadis stopped without a radical change.

Pak-American relations are, despite close cooperation on al Qaeda, full of ugly potential, as American press and think tanks frequently remind. There is firm and persistent refusal to accept Pakistan's nuclear status, on the one hand, and the last of AQ Khan's story may not have been heard of, on the other. Pakistan's close relations with China do not frighten anyone today. But if Sino-American ties were to worsen, Pakistan can come under pressure. Gwadur port can itself become a temptation to the US Navy. There is a possible scenario of coming under a nut cracker of Indo-US cooperation against China.

Entire future depends on a radical shift in Pakistan's Kashmir-centred India policy. Strategically, Pakistan must cultivate as close a relationship with India as possible and create durable structures of peace, including Indian vested interests in preserving friendship with Pakistan. Does that require giving up the Kashmiri cause altogether? Not necessarily. All it required was what Pakistan has already conceded -- at least in words: it should refrain from infiltrating into IHK Pakistani and foreign Jihadists and stop gun running.

If Pakistan were to remember the main lesson from 2002 Crisis -- that neither side can start a war to change any part of status quo and that guns cannot liberate Kashmir -- the total futility of old Kashmir policy becomes manifest. Whatever change in Kashmir has to happen, it will be due to what Kashmiris themselves manage to do to make India change tack. Some change is near certain. But Pakistan is not going to be the agency of that change.

Now if Kashmir is not to be liberated by Pakistan, the latter must recast its foreign policy. Also, we must look around in Pakistan and notice three main trends: economy's 5 to 6 per cent growth is producing more unemployment and poverty. That is a bad background music for deteriorating law and order. The second is the growing religious intolerance creating new theatres in Islamabad's war with al Qaeda. The latter is getting more recruits more easily, for the sources that produce would-be al Qaeda men or Jihadists are in full production. No one can say Pakistan and the US can win this war with better intelligence or policing only; al Qaeda cannot be contained without changing society's ambience.

Whatever the extent of Islamabad's present military action in South Waziristan and Balochistan, objectively Pak forces are again fighting regional nationalists; this is clear enough in Balochistan but this aspect is not absent in NWFP. Remember previous wars against regional nationalists in East Pakistan and Balochistan. We can forget East Pakistan. India's role confused that situation and provided a fig leaf to the Army. Does anyone really think that Bhutto or Zia won over Baloch nationalists in the 1973 military action? What legacy has it left behind? The gun is no answer to a political demand. Let's talk while there is still time.

What policy changes can be expected to take the ship out of choppy waters? If Pakistan is not to go to war again and it should accept that position -- the huge military establishment needs to be drastically cut. Arms races need to be stopped. A purely defensive force structure -- small more mobile, well-equipped, well trained, more professional and its officer corps tightly disciplined -- is what we need. Nuclear weapons need to be rethought.

Economic development needs three times or more funds than it is getting in the public sector for infrastructure expansion. We need to evolve a Pakistan-specific paradigm of growth with social goals spelled out: creation of as many jobs each year as to provide for new entrants to labour force. A better redistribution of incomes policy is needed to counter the trend of rich becoming richer and poor poorer. Economic wellbeing of the common people should be the specified goal. Each Pakistani needs to be made a stake holder. Power must return from the Army Officers Messes to the poor and neglected commoners by re-establishing the supremacy of the Parliament in the first instance.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.