Saga of bomb blasts and black Saturday
Incidentally, a grenade is, generically speaking, a bomb. A grenade like the one used at the Awami League rally, can only be projected up to 30-40 meters by hand and between 200-250 meters with the help of a special delivery contraption. A bomb can vary in size and lethality whereas a grenade, due to the very nature of its usage, is limited in size as well lethality. Thus, although the Udichi bomb blast was one single detonation, compared to the twelve or thirteen at the Awami League rally, the casualty figures were relatively greater in respect of the Udichi incident. The little technical aside was necessary, since one faced the question as to whether the device that was detonated at the Awami League meeting was a "grenade" or a "bomb."
The attack on the Awami League rally is qualitatively different than the previous ones for several reasons. Never before in Bangladesh were such high value targets made the object of militant attack. Never before did we behold a situation where a bomb attack was conducted with such precision and professionalism. The modus operendi of the perpetrators points to a well-organised group, trained and committed to carry out a dangerous mission. Never before have we seen so many "bombs" been hurled at one gathering and in such quick succession.
Going by the descriptions of the eyewitnesses and the video reports, there is very little doubt that anybody else other than the Awami League leadership was the target of this assault. That an area weapon was used points to the fact that no one single individual in particular was the target; the idea was to take out the Awami League leadership in one go. Reportedly, there were bullet marks in Hasina's vehicle, which points to the fact that more than one type of weapon was used.
The qualitative difference is also in the choice of the weapons that were used -- grenades. Grenades are highly lethal weapons with extremely damaging consequences within a short radius of effect, as borne out by the number of deaths and injured caused by the blasts. Also, the type of injury sustained by the victims indicates that the grenade that was used was of the more lethal variety containing pre-formed pellets with enhanced lethality because of its high fragment density. Grenades are more sophisticated than a homemade device or devices put together indigenously.
This incident is also different from the previous ones in that the attack was carried out by a trained group, a fact confirmed by investigating officers, who slipped through the security cordons of whatever definition that might have been in place, remained surreptitious and undetected from well before the meeting started, hurled the grenades just as soon as the leader of the opposition finished speaking, and made good their escape. All these speak of a well-coordinated operation.
That the grenades were targeted at the truck that was working as a podium for the Awami League leaders, and they all detonated, reportedly in very close proximity to the truck, suggests that all the grenades were hurled from within thirty to fifty meters of it. It also suggests that the attackers had pretty good prior knowledge as to the exact location of the truck, in order to be able to pre-position themselves to be within grenade throwing distance from the podium yet at a stand off range for their own safety. To have thrown a grenade from a close distance, in a recumbent or prone position at street level, as described by some, is difficult to accept, unless these people were on a suicide mission, which was clearly not the case. The roof top location, from where the grenades were apparently hurled, provided the stand off distance; but again, this raises some corollaries that we will address later.
The disconcerting aspect of all these is that we now see a graduation, from use of indigenous explosive devices (IED), to more sophisticated and lethal devices like hand grenades. Even more matter for worry is that weapons, manufactured exclusively for military use, are now in the hands of clandestine militant groups. Needless to say, it takes some training and the self-assurance that comes with it, to operate such devices. The long and short of the matter is that we are now faced with not only the reality of the existence of extremists and militants in our country, we are also faced with a disconcerting prospect of having to combat this evidently highly-trained menace, something that we may not be fully prepared for at this moment.
Now to the corollary questions related to the August 21 assault on the Awami League rally. As per reports, there was a large contingent of security and law enforcement agencies in the area. The question that comes up is that, several militants slipped through police cordon, ensconced themselves in the spot, in close proximity of each other, and threw the hand grenades just as soon as Hasina finished her speech with complete freedom of operation. One finds it difficult to accept this proposition, if the police description of its force deployment is to be taken to be accurate. On a secured rooftop, in broad daylight, not only to hurl grenades with some degree of accuracy but also to fire small arms weapons seems too brazen to not draw attention to oneself.
Could this particular incident, or the other recent ones, have been predicted? This is a pertinent question that should be asked by any Bangladeshi. The important thing to remember is that capacity to predict such occurrences and interdict or preempt the perpetrators requires real time information as well as the ability to convert this information into actionable intelligence. Unfortunately we do not have the wherewithal, the technical expertise, or the human intelligence capability good enough for what we expect the intelligence agencies to do.
Could the bomb attack have been prevented? Perhaps yes. Pervasive security measures and plugging of holes and creating a cordon sanitaire can act as a disincentive to the militants. Unfortunately, as per press reports, the large number of police and other security personnel that were there were only to secure against the rally rather than secure the rally itself.
Is there a link between the detonations that have taken place recently in the country? What about the "hoax" phone calls that have been made recently? There is no doubt the aim of this particular attack was to destabilise the country. Who are the beneficiaries of the ensuing instability? Who stands to gain from eliminating the Awami League leadership? Do those that have engaged in recent spate of bomb attacks, have external sponsors or they are home grown?
Without appearing to be didactic it can be said that a cut and dried answer is difficult. But the investigators must keep all the options open. The causal link as well as the cost and benefit of these actions must be calculated until excluded by a process of elimination.
Several armies in the region use the type of grenade used in the recent attacks. But these are also in the possession of various militant groups in the region. Militants having external links or who are externally motivated and sponsored, have easier access to these weapons than do those who are indigenous.
The fact that all the bombings since 1996 have remained unsolved is a severe indictment of the successive governments' inability, unwillingness, and lack of commitment to see these cases resolved. We were apparently so puerile as to think that these incidents were a one-off case and that although the rest of the region was struggling against this phenomenon, we were somehow safe from it.
Help in investigation of this case is on offer. It is time we took it up. That should not hurt any ego, on the contrary, it could ensure safety and security of Bangladesh in the long run.
The author is Editor Defence and Strategic Issues, The Daily Star.
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