The twin crises

The difficulties that President Pervez Musharraf faces are obvious. He has to win this election no matter how; he can't afford to lose. Therefore it will be necessary to watch how does the government machinery -- bureaucracy, intelligence services, and others -- behave. If a grand victory of the present ruling coalition is announced, it will be received with dismay and derision. People would say the results have been manufactured because the regime had no option but to remain in power; it is an existential crisis for the rulers.

One complication is that the President is not merely the President but is Army Chief of Staff on active service simultaneously. As a serving soldier, he has no business to be in politics. But there he is and has a number of political parties and politicians supporting him who think that he is popular and Pakistanis cannot do without him whether he dons or doffs the Army uniform. If he loses either election, all hell will break loose. The whole political system he has built will collapse in a matter of hours. That will not be good for his safety and security. He has, therefore, to win, no matter how.

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As it happens, any military coup-maker can get himself elected in a series of elections with the help of intelligence agencies and the bureaucracy. These agencies are supposed to have perfected a technique in which a ruling junta cannot lose an election, given the political backwardness of common voters. In this case, the chief threat of losing the election has been all but taken care of. This is common knowledge and is a major factor favouring the regime's survival.

Anyone believing in transparently free elections will never certify Pakistan's bureaucracy-managed elections. It is actually wrong to pin-point only the intelligence agencies. Behind them stands the whole phalanx of civilian administration. All state resources are at the disposal of those who have to win. Basic wheeling and dealing is arranged long before the votes are cast. Each district has several vote banks and the leaders of each vote bank are ever ready to make adjustments with powers that be, specifying who will get what if they vote for the King's party.

When elections come near, various political groups, important in districts and specific regions, start changing their loyalties. They join either PPP, PML(N), or ANP, or whatever, as additional aid to their own abilities to take votes. That process seems to have begun already. Major parties as well as agencies compete and it stands to reason that promises the agencies make will carry greater weight. Which cynical vote bank leader will opt for opposition if there is King's own promise of reward? The uniform plays no part in the wheeling dealing. This is a regular phenomenon from election to election. The regime is said to be well-placed to win the next election, warts and all.

It is now time to examine as to what the regime has achieved, the supposed criteria for the voters. It is clear that it has magnified and intensified the ideological hatred between the believers in Islamic Ideology and in other systems of governance. At least some areas in FATA have now become a Taliban territory so to say. This means electorally their representatives, MMA, are well placed in NWFP areas given the affinities between Taliban and the common Pushtoons.

The government is supposedly against Taliban. It is supposed to be secular and would have no truck with Taliban. And yet Taliban have been all over the place in FATA's various agencies and also in other areas outside the tribal belt. They are organizing the institutions of grassroots governance and are trying to dispense rough and ready justice. Reason for being maladroit was that Islamabad had no clue as to how it should operate in a rapidly changing political and ideological situation in the area. They have made Taliban extremely popular in many adjoining NWFP areas. This Islamic "greening" is the odd result of "moderate and modern Islam" of President Musharraf.

Two separate wars are going in NWFP. There is one between the Taliban ideology and Islamabad's supposed secular Pakistani nationalism and "modern moderate Islam." The writ of the Taliban in many of FATA agencies is as effective as that of the Army. Political beliefs in much of the NWFP can scarcely be different from those of Islamic clerics and the various religious extremists there being few others in the field. Secondly, Taliban are engaged in a physical war in Afghanistan. They want to conquer much of Afghanistan and re-establish their Caliphate. Whether it can be done or is unlikely to succeed is another matter. But Islamabad's efforts have given a fillip to religious obscurantism throughout the NWFP.

In Balochistan also two separate wars are going on. One is between Taliban and Karzai's Afghan soldiers, now led by Nato forces, in parallel with FATA's. The threat to Kabul from Taliban cannot be minimized. Some of the Afghan areas in point of fact are under practical Taliban control, though it shifts from time to time and place to place. Like elsewhere, when Nato forces come the Taliban disappear. When the former has gone, the Talibs reappear. So the game goes on. This is one fight that cannot be ignored for its implications.

There is another. This is a proper nationalistic war for self-determination. Balochistan Liberation Army is waging it against Islamabad. The BLA has been struggling against Pakistan authority in different places and are also strong in some areas where the writ of the government runs only in day-time or when troops are about. BLA is said to be a small, largely disorganized force that believes in Baloch nationalism and in winning the Baloch rights from the Punjabi-dominated central government. It is an openly anti-Centre force and wants to reorganize Pakistan on the basis of nationalities ruling their own areas and the central government being content with a smaller sphere of action for promoting common causes. For the rest, it is the nationalities that must rule their own areas and become the true masters of their own resources and destiny.

Big or small, the BLA comprises committed political groups spread throughout Balochistan's purely Baloch areas. They are the staunch nationalists and want to protect the resources of Balochistan for the benefit of its own people. The current exploitation of Balochistan's resources is seen to be for the benefit of Punjab-dominated central government and elites of major cities. They look like being ready for a long desultory war against Islamabad elites.

The issues having been framed, few can now ignore what the Baloch nationalists want. The question is what will the Centre decide: would they concede something substantive by way of reserving Balochistan's resources for the benefit of Balochistan itself? It is a major issue that will indirectly determine whether the election can be accepted as genuine insofar as Balochistan is concerned.

It is issues like these, and one has not mentioned the changing world scene, that makes the 2007-08 polls crucial: another 2002 and some sort of catastrophe will follow.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.