Problems continue in Iraq

These are indeed very harsh and frank observations by a specialist who is now a member of the Faculty of the Security Studies Programme at Georgetown University.

Events of the recent past appear to support the idea that the US is superior to everyone else in terms of high-tech surveillance and intelligence gathering. However, they still do not really possess the desirable network and means for obtaining clear information on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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A few weeks have passed since the death of Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi. The US Special Forces through this act have shown that targeted assassination is now acceptable. Iraqis in general have also not been mourning his demise. Nevertheless, it is clear that it has not made much of a dent in the ranks of Iraq's insurgents. On a regular basis, the horror of killings and sectarian violence continues.

Analysts now believe that there is today in Iraq a Mujahedin Shura Council. Besides, Zarqawi's Al Qaeda, its membership possibly also includes seven other organisations. An umbrella grouping, it has ostensibly been set up to coordinate activities among religiously motivated insurgent factions. US agencies also think that in addition to this Council, there are four other 'Islami terrorist groups' who are operating inside Iraq. Strategists have also indicated that former Saddam loyalists and a Baath underground linked to Saddam's intelligence apparatus are supplementing this 'terrorist' organogram, enhancing its complexity.

Consequently, despite having an elected government of sorts, Iraq appears to be stumbling along. This has included differences of opinion even in identifying Zarqawi's successor. Not everyone agrees that Abu Ayyub al-Misri, an Egyptian, has taken over Zarqawi's group. Even, Stephen Hadley, the US National Security Adviser is 'not clear at this point' about this matter.

This lack of clarity underlines the latent constraints that exist in the relationship between intelligence gathering and policymaking in Iraq. It has become that much more cumbersome because efforts directed towards obtaining intelligence have been affected somewhat by conflicting interests and credibility. Analytical projections and their policy implications have become fuzzy. This is making confused situation even more chaotic.

In the recent past we have also witnessed media criticism, particularly in the USA and Europe, about how 'the Bush Administration deviated' from established 'professional' standards. It has been acknowledged even by Paul Pillar that there has sometimes been aggressive use of 'intelligence to win public support' for Bush's controversial decision to go to war in Iraq. In this context, it has 'meant selectively adducing data -- "cherry-picking" -- rather than using the intelligence community's own analytic judgments'. Such steps have not enhanced, for obvious reasons, trust within the international community.

Several factors have emerged over the last few days in Iraq. Press reports coming out of Washington have mentioned that American deaths, since the invasion of Iraq has reached 2509-1,981 service members killed in action and 528 dead from other non-hostile causes. 18,491 troops have also been wounded in action, including 8,501 who did not return to duty. It has also been revealed that nearly 4,800 Iraqi police and security forces have died during the war and at least 30,000 Iraqi civilians have been killed. These are grim statistics. It has also led some members of the US Congress to call for a timetable for the eventual withdrawal of the estimated 127,000 US troops from Iraq.

Bush has dismissed calls for a US withdrawal as election-year politics. He has also consistently refused to either give a timetable or any benchmark, for evaluating the required success, that could enable the US troops to return. In the meantime however, Japan has ordered its 600 troops to leave Iraq, ending its first military mission since World War II to any country where fighting is under way. These troops are expected to return by the end of July. In similar vein, the government of Italy has also undertaken steps that would soon result in Italian contingents coming back.

The criticism and pressure generated by the European Union and the United Nations over the closing of the Guantanamo prison facility have also not helped. To this has also been added the controversy created by the killings in Haditha and in the Salahaddin province. All these have contributed to the erosion of the moral high ground claimed earlier by the occupying forces.

The continuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and other associated elements in the war against terror have been taking a serious toll in the popularity ratings of both US President Bush and British Prime Minister Blair. Bush's popularity has reportedly fallen to a mere 31 percent, lowest among recent incumbent US Presidents. Similarly, Labour Party's popularity in Britain has fallen to 32 percent, the lowest in 20 years. Since April 12, consecutive opinion polls have put the Conservative Party ahead by between two and 10 percentage points.

President Bush and his policymakers have tried to boost his ratings through his recent visit to Iraq. Despite comments by many Iraqi officials that several Iraqi civilians have not been treated with respect and killed on suspicion, US spin-doctors have tried to refute these charges by claiming that the circumstances of such incidents were generally ambiguous.

Nevertheless, both the US as well as the Iraqi government should understand that in Iraq today, their common effort should be solely directed towards winning the hearts and minds of the affected people. This is not happening. The problem in Iraq is fundamentally political. Its solutions will not be found in greater use of technology or armed forces. According to US and Iraqi sources, there are, in Iraq, in addition to nearly 1,50,000 foreign forces, nearly 2,60,000 Iraqi soldiers and police. Obviously, their presence has not been enough. It has not curbed violence.

As I see it, what is required is effective political bargaining. Prime Minister Nuri-al-Maliki has to seek national reconciliation. Fareed Zakaria of 'Newsweek' in his column on 5 June has suggested that 'co-opting the majority of the Sunnis' within the government machinery would be the simplest way for crippling the insurgency. Yes, that would help.

The Iraqi government would also however have to address other issues. It includes the proposed amendments to the Constitution and the sharing of oil revenue. In addition, sooner than later, both the US and the new Iraqi government, have to take definitive steps to end the de-Baathification process, which has created massive unemployment and social unrest among whole classes and groups of people. In this, the US should follow the advice of their Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. He has correctly suggested that 'de-Baathification has to evolve into reconciliation with accountability'.

The other important step that needs to be taken by the Shia dominated Iraqi government is to rein in the Shia militias who are running rampant in all areas of Iraq other than the Kurdish provinces. If they cannot disband these groups and also the informal armed cadres of Moqtada al-Sadr, the insurgency will not end. The infighting will continue to increase and it will not be unlikely for the fractured violent political landscape of Iraq to become another Lebanon.

Once mixed ethnic neighbourhoods in Iraq are unraveling at a brisk pace. Discord has also grown among factions. Sectarian killings have become common. Decentralisation of powers and relations with neighbours has also not progressed sufficiently. The future role of Islam within the context of governance also remains unclear.

There are issues and problems in Iraq and they have to be addressed with seriousness and understanding. Intelligence gathering and policy planning will have to move together.

Muhammad Zamir is a former Secretary and Ambassador who can be reached at mzamir @dhaka.net.