Lessons from Lebanon
The US and its allies do not condemn any amount of evil conduct if the US is behind that power. Israel has destroyed the infrastructure of Gaza and Lebanon, deliberately making the civilians, men, women and children suffer which is contrary to all humanitarian laws and norms of warfare. Israel is treated as a civilized democratic state by the West. Israel can apparently do no wrong. Why? Because the US stands four square behind it. Israel's "disproportionate" use of force is kosher. But what is not kosher is resistance to Israel's 40 year old occupation. The message to all is: obey the US and side with it; or else be ready to be targeted and made a victim of disproportionate use of force.
For America, the Israeli oppression on, and suppression of, Palestinians is not the Middle East's central problem, whatever else it may be. Israel can use tactics like denying water, electricity and food to a besieged populace under its occupation. That is quite alright. International law, and agreed rules of war, now mean nothing to the US and its sidekick, Israel.
That the UN took one long month in producing a resolution for "cessation of hostilities" shows that the use of "disproportionate" force by one state against another is now OK; older norms of warfare no longer apply. The Americans justify Israel in the name of fighting terror.
The major conclusion concerns the UN. It has been exposed as an instrument of the US. During the cold war it could keep up appearances, and show some evenhandedness between the two superpowers. That exigency exists no more. It is the US that orders it around.
Denial of the right to resist foreign occupation is a development that the third world should clearly note. The US now terms resistance to foreign aggression and occupation as terrorism. A US-favoured state may abuse human rights in the grossest possible manner. That worries not the US, or UN for that matter. The US wants slaves to simply obey and not revolt.
A consensus is emerging among experts that Lebanon was a proxy war between America and Iran and Syria combined. Others say it was a prelude to a likely war with Iran and Syria. The Bush administration is, however, troubled. Domestic opinion is asserting itself against the unwanted Iraq war. That can hobble the Bush government, provided the opposition shows its mettle in the November Congressional elections. The Bush administration seems committed to the neo-con vision of America, creating a new Holy Roman Empire that would last a thousand years. This empire will not be colonial in kind. It will mean the global imposition of democracy and capitalism. If America's Big Money gets more profits, so be it.
But a new difficulty is that it may no longer be easy for America to ask Israel to go and blast Iran's nuclear installations: Israel has had a sad experience in Lebanon. Its IDF's deterrent value has been degraded. Only a few think otherwise. It may not undertake a new venture soon even in Syria, let alone Iran.
Even the fear of overreaching imperial power of the US has been dented. Its strategy will be studied realistically after Iraq. But this does not apply to India and Pakistan; these two have already chosen, and they have chosen America. Indians are militarily cooperating with America in preserving the American objectives that are believed to coincide with India's own. What else is the Indian navy doing in the Straits of Malacca?
In this context, the EU has shown itself as a compliant fellow traveler of America. It fails to stand up against the US. As the recent UNSC resolution on Lebanon has shown, it is unable to influence the US policy; it wanted an early ceasefire and didn't get it. It had to mould itself as best as it could to keep in step with the US.
The Russians have certainly shown some nerve. But they are not anxious to pick a quarrel with the Americans. The Russians are said to be flush with petrodollars and that has enabled them to resuscitate their army to a notable extent; it gives intimations of soon becoming a near superpower. It has, however, no need for premature involvement anywhere.
Similarly, China is a growing power-centre. It does not play second fiddle to the US. But China also refuses to envisage any military clash with the US. It wants to avoid war even on Taiwan. It will only fight if a war is thrust upon it. It wants to go on becoming stronger. To repeat, the ruling elites of both India and Pakistan are happy to be used by Americans. In Pakistan, it is said, only three powers count: Allah, America and the Chief of the Army Staff. There used to be doubts about who actually rules India. The people of India having been slow to assert themselves, the Big Money has advanced from simply being a patron of parties to becoming a part of the ruling elites.
It is time for South Asia to decide whether the sixty years old quarrel will go on keeping Pakistan and India divided while being partners of America in the War on Terror. One wants to underline a possible alternative idea: should India and Pakistan end their quarrels and evolve a partnership in South Asia, of a non-military kind, that involves averting their gaze from distant horizons to conditions at home, things can vastly improve for both. What is the rationale for Pakistan being a part of the American adventure in Central Asia? Or why should India emulate Pakistan, with appropriate modifications, of course.
What makes one wonder is how large areas of Eurasia still accept American advice, while changes in Latin America and turbulence in the Middle East by Hamas, Hizbollah and the Iraqi insurgents points the other way? The Middle East was, and up to a point still is, an American redoubt. These troublesome new forces demand that the world factors them in.
Most of the Far East was dominated by the American navy. South Korea, Taiwan and Japan supported it; US-Japan alliance anchors them. Australasia is of course a US-friendly expanse. In South-East Asia no major state opposes America. South Asia used to be outside the ambit of aggressive moves by either superpower during the Cold War, though Americans had succeeded in seducing Pakistan in the 1950s. In the new century, the Indians have partly imitated Pakistanis in shaping their attitude to America. Is that the net addition to American superpowerhood? The ugly potential of the two opposing nuclear deterrents, Kashmir dispute and possible new water disputes, may spoil the ointment for America.
Then there is the Chinese factor in South Asia. South Asia poses more questions. One may well wonder if the American strategy of establishing a new Holy Roman Empire can be sustained by the American economy. The answer so far has been yes; it can blithely go on incurring more payment liabilities by importing more, by exporting capital, by spending for military adventures abroad, for buying political support abroad. All they have to do is to write cheques on themselves. But the rise of the Euro and the Yen is threatening it. However, that is another subject.
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