Killing Bugti was a mistake

It was an operation, on a fair scale, that lasted several days. The government case is simple. Two helicopters were fired at, and that required a riposte. No doubt the authorities had some intelligence about the Bugti Sardar. This is what is suggested by so many published reports.

For one thing, the official response was disproportionate. That is why one says it was a big mistake. The government position of establishing order -- there is no law involved -- is comprehensible, but not necessarily correct.

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Balochistan's state of law and order has been deplorable for some years now; an insurgency of sorts has been going on. Who is responsible? Well, there are two sides, and both can be faulted for their methods. The government's responsibility is even greater. It should have prevented the emergence of insurgency by political methods.

The main Baloch grievance is political in nature that, except for the short duration of Ataullah Mengal's government in the early 1970s, the Balochistan governments have comprised simple and crude nominees of the Islamabad rulers; governments in Quetta have served the interests and the purposes of Islamabad. Islamabad has not given as much to Balochistan as it has taken out of Balochistan. This is exploitation, properly so called.

The Baloch have the obvious grievance that so much of natural gas is taken out from Balochistan and consumed in other provinces. What does Balochistan get for it? The royalties are measly and have no relationship with the value of the goods shipped out. Then there is the fact that no central government has ever cared for the development of this vast and arid province; it is still the most underdeveloped area of Pakistan.

Why is it a big political mistake? Sardar Bugti was not an ordinary individual; he symbolized Baloch nationalism. The quibbling about nationality, sub-nationalism, and nationalism is foolish. The essence of the thing has to be focused on. It is the consciousness of an identity that one possesses on the basis of race, language, history, religion, or culture. Should anyone oppose that identity with any ethnic factor it can cause strong reaction.

It is not a law and order matter at all. The reaction will of course be proportionate to the offence caused. While maintaining law and order is the duty of all governments, it is not necessary to be stupid, or ignorant, to do so. The government should know how to solve basic political problems by political means.

Insofar as Balochistan is concerned, Islamabad governments have been far too trigger-happy. The current operations, serially, must be the fifth or the sixth in the short history of this country. It is not that the Baloch people are unreasonable, or that they are far too demanding. One remembers any number of conversations with the elder Mengal, Bugti, and a few Marris. Their demands were quite reasonable, and in fact modest, amounting to no more than being patiently and sympathetically heard by Islamabad's high ups.

Military action against them in the 1970s was totally unjustified, no matter what the intelligence agencies had fed the government with. Doubtless there were indications of foreigners' interest in this province. Islamabad was angry with most others than the one proves that actually affirmed national interest in Balochistan on the record: I mean the Shah of Iran. Islamabad was in cohorts with him then. The action was taken against a democratic as well as moderate government, which had not done anything wrong.

Again, there is so much talk of foreign incitement. The ones mainly complained against are Afghanistan and India. Non-officials of a particular school mention the US as a scheming overlord; it is said to be behind the whole trouble in Pakistan.

While problems exist with Afghanistan, they are of a historical nature: the concern is with the validity of the Durand line. The Afghan treaty with the British (that ceded Quetta as well as the surrounding hinterland) specified that 100 years later, the status of the area was to change.

There are other historical strands that do link the two Balochistans in history. But to think that any power will forcibly take Balochistan from this country is ludicrous; the think tanks in other countries have noted Pakistan's troubles on this matter and they know where it will end if Pakistan authorities continue with their penchant for responding with the gun to every political demand.

Even if it were true that foreign monsters were waiting with open jaws, Pakistani's making noises about it will not help. At least in one respect the Afghans and the US are right, that the Taliban in Pakistan do pose a threat to them in Afghanistan. It is Islamabad that has to clearly choose between the War on Terrorism and the Taliban. Pakistan cannot do both, to hunt with the Americans and run with the Taliban.

But far and away, the right thing to do is to have an inclusive democratic dispensation in which the outsiders of today can be accommodated, including the unhappy and disillusioned Baloch nationalists. The solution to the problem of Islamic extremists and militants can also be solved through that inclusive democratic dispensation, if also gradually.

Pakistanis need to be particularly careful. They went through the traumatic events of 1971. Why? Because they mishandled East Pakistan, and created a new nationalism away from Pakistan by their greed and exploitation; they opposed all Bengali demands that were fully justified.

In this case also the Baloch demands boil down to a share in decision making and the ending of the exploitation of the region's resources for the benefit of others but not for the Baloch. These demands are fully justified. One says nothing about the methods that were adopted by unhappy and dissatisfied Baloch young men. One is opposed to violence in politics, all violence, even by the state.

There is no earthly reason why the Baloch should not be the true decision makers about their own affairs. They have to be stakeholders, not merely to be informed from on High. It is the substance of power that is being demanded. But the power that can be given to them will be their due. It will not be at the expense of Punjabis, Sindhis, or Pathans. Each of these ethnicities can have their own share of power. The regional governments should be true, or basic, governments made by and for local citizens. It is not for army generals, or Waderas from other provinces, to determine how the resources of a province should be used.

What the government is required to do is to let the Baloch people to order, and reorder, their own affairs without let or hindrance from others. They have to be empowered to shape their own destiny. In addition, the Islamabad rulers ought to create conditions in which the Baloch people regard themselves as stakeholders, not only in Balochistan but also in Pakistan.

If Pakistan is dear to the rulers, they should do what it takes to create that awareness and affection among the Baloch people. It is for Islamabad to adjust, and not the other way around.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.