Of tall claims and white lies

Its true content is conveyed more eloquently by the 16-page folio of photographs than by the 352 pages-long text.

The folio's first three pictures concern the December 2003 attempt on the General's life --his self-depiction as a victim of terrorism, and a reliable ally in the US-led "Global War on Terrorism" (GWOT). Then follows a short career and family album. After that, it's all politics.

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This montage is calculated to refute former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's claim that he wasn't informed of the preparations for Kargil. It also depicts Gen Musharraf as a leader of world stature meeting President George W Bush (both men in open collars, with their wives, signifying bonhomie), Mr Vajpayee, Dr Singh, and others.

Of the 32 post-coup pictures, Gen Musharraf appears in uniform in only five.

Gen Musharraf is telling his two audiences -- mainly Western, and secondarily, domestic -- that he's a reliable moderate who saved Pakistan from disaster, and the world from more Taliban-al-Qaeda violence. He's indispensable.

As he told BBC Radio: "You will be brought down to your knees if Pakistan doesn't cooperate with you. If the ISI is not with you, you will fail." Domestically, he promotes himself as conventional hardcore nationalist.

The book's composition reflects Gen Musharraf's priorities. "The War on Terror" part occupies 82 pages, while the Kargil chapter is only 12 pages long.

The text totally hides Musharraf's identity as a general.

Gen Musharraf has been criticised by his colleagues, including former classmate Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan and former foreign minister Sartaj Aziz, for lying about Kargil. Kargil was no "victory." Pakistan had to vacate seized territory. It lost hundreds of men.

Why did Gen Musharraf make the fateful decision in 2001 to dump al-Qaeda-Taliban? He won't admit he was arm-twisted through Mr Bush's "you-are-with-us-or-you-are-against-us" ultimatum.

Nobody has corroborated his statement that Mr Richard Armitage told the ISI chief that Pakistan would be bombed "back to the Stone Age" if it doesn't join GWOT.

Gen Musharraf says the decision had "nothing to do" with threats. " made a dispassionate, military-style analysis of our options ... My decision was based on the well-being of my people ... war-gamed the US as an adversary ... can we confront them and withstand the onslaught? The answer was no."

Besides, India would exploit the situation to make the Kashmir status quo permanent. "The security of our strategic assets [read, nuclear weapons] would be jeopardised."

His "analysis" rationalises Pakistan's capitulation to US pressure.

Gen Musharraf blames India for the Agra summit's failure. The charge isn't false. India withdrew an agreed joint statement at the last minute because Mr LK Advani objected to it.

However, Gen Musharraf doesn't say why he came to Agra, and what he expected. After all, he had decided not to salute Mr Vajpayee in Lahore, in February 1999. He was also Kargil's architect.

He doesn't disclose what persuaded him to meet Mr Vajpayee in 2004, and start the dialogue process.

Gen Musharraf depicts a false consistency in Pakistan's approach towards the Taliban. He justifies Pakistan's original support for the Taliban.

Even after they unleashed a reign of terror the support continued, "for geo-strategic reasons. If we had broken with them, that would have created a [power vacuum] ... into which might have stepped the Northern Alliance ... supported by Russia, India, and Iran."

Gen Musharraf just won't admit that Pakistan was disastrously wrong to create this monster in the first place. Nor does he show the slightest awareness of the evil and immoral nature of Taliban-style terrorism.

The general's hype and bragging have a definite purpose. For instance, the "bombing-back-to-Stone-Age" claim reminds Mr Bush of the assurances given to Gen Musharraf in 2001 for joining GWOT, including US help in getting India to discuss Kashmir.

Similarly, Gen Musharraf's Kargil story is meant to expand his domestic constituency by stressing his anti-India credentials. While talking of Mr Sharif's attempt to prevent his plane from landing in Pakistan during the 1999 coup, he describes India as an "enemy" country.

Gen Musharraf is also given to self-delusion. He claims he's more genuinely democratic than the civilians who ruled Pakistan. Similarly, he says most "emphatically," that progress in the bilateral dialogue "is owed considerably to the Kargil conflict."

This takes one's breath away. It was only after India and Pakistan put Kargil's bitter legacy behind them that their relations thawed. Such "khaki" fantasies about the effectiveness of force are dangerous.

Gen Musharraf probably doesn't believe all this. He has shown remarkable openness in dealing with India since 2004. He has negotiated CBMs with sincerity and stopped harping upon Kashmir. Yet, the book rubs many people up the wrong way and makes controversial claims.

That's why it's seen as unhelpful to the India-Pakistan dialogue. Some hawks have declared Gen Musharraf as unreliable.

The book wasn't written to promote the dialogue process. It has negative and unpleasant features. They reveal a complex, troubled, military personality dealing with fraught situations in a country beset by multiple crises, including a crisis of identity.

Gen Musharraf is no serious, deep analyst.

However, that's no reason why the world should stop pushing him towards moderation, which the book seriously endorses. There's even less reason why India should underrate the bilateral dialogue process.

India must recognise the contribution the process has made, and build on it. It is far superior to working through Washington. Even if a strong India-US strategic partnership emerges, the US won't abandon Pakistan, or force it to do India's bidding.

India must evolve a long-term policy towards Pakistan, which looks towards real democracy. But India has to deal with Gen Musharraf so long as he's there.

Praful Bidwai is an eminent Indian columnist.