Economic FATA, peaceful Afghanistan

During the 1980s, the Afghan Mujahideen outfought the combined might of the Soviet Union and a strong Afghan army which had multiple times more men, material, and helicopters than presently deployed by Nato. Then the Mujahideen could count on a constant flow of arms, equipment, and other supplies from (and through) Pakistan.

Every one of the nine Mujahideen factions had a Taliban contingent. After the Soviets left in 1989, the excesses of brutal warlords, the corruption of officials appointed by the Northern Alliance led by the Tajiks who controlled Kabul, the general anarchy prevailing and the emergence of a charismatic one-eyed cleric in 1993-94 turned them into a unified force.

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Better armed and equipped, Nato's ground troops are far lesser in number than the Soviets, and far more averse to taking casualties. The lack of combat experience, and a failure to recognize ground realities, condemns their present campaign into a recipe for failure. The Taliban this time do not have the access to the resources the Mujahideen had in the 1980s, which had dried up by the early 1990s. But the Taliban have battle hardened cadres and a constant supply of recruits, mostly from inside Afghanistan but some from Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, with a smattering of Pakistanis also.

On taking over as COAS Pakistan army, Gen Waheed Kakar, mandated the then ISI chief to stop all further interactions in Afghanistan. Such things cannot be turned off like a spigot, and it took a couple of years before the termination of official flow of funds and material to the Taliban in the mid 1990s. By 1999 whatever little influence the ISI wielded over the Taliban had waned, and Osama bin Laden's (OBL) influence over Mullah Umar increased proportionately.

OBL was resented by most of the Taliban hierarchy, but the loyalty and devotion to their leader overcame this. At the urging of the ISI some restrictions were placed on him, and there is ample record of OBL's frustrations about this. Certainly, OBL and the ISI had no love lost between them. The fundamental mistake the west made was to club al-Qaeda with the Taliban, instead of dealing with the two separately. The same strategic blunder was made by Paul Bremer in disbanding the Iraqi army in 2003.

Surprised by the Taliban response on the ground, the Nato commanders' knee-jerk reaction, to camouflage their shortcomings in the field of battle, was to blame the ISI. They have got it wrong, this sort of activity cannot remain hidden for long. This Nato policy of "if you are not for us, you are against us" is bankrupt. Pakistan should tell Nato very candidly: "We are for ourselves" as are all sovereign nations. It is true that the Taliban are getting help from the Pakhtun areas in borders contiguous to Afghanistan, but Pakistan is doing its best, at grievous cost in casualties, to stem this. There is no way to completely restrict the tribals' traditional affinity and blood relationships. Enough weapons and ammunition are stored, hidden within Afghanistan, to last for many decades to come.

From time to time seriously wounded insurgents have been apprehended in Quetta in out-of-the way medical clinics. Logistics support emanating from Quetta and Peshawar is possible only in a surreptitious manner, and has no official sanction, either from the ISI or the civil administration. Funds are certainly collected through voluntary donations, and more should be done to restrict this. In a pragmatic reversal of policy because of the exigencies of the circumstances the Taliban, who had eradicated narcotics, have turned to opium farmers and smugglers as a major source for funds.

Notwithstanding widespread admiration for the fact that they disarmed everyone, including the private militias of the warlords, and brought peace to a country racked by upheavals for more than two decades, Pakistan's intelligentsia and masses have never agreed with the Taliban on issues like their treatment of women.

Bringing the rule of law to their society was heavily influenced by the Taliban's own particular interpretation of Islam. Their treatment of women was obnoxious, it has no relevance to the emancipation of women as envisaged by Islam. Almost everyone in Pakistan decries al-Qaeda's actions, however association with the Taliban makes them grudgingly tolerable in local eyes. Only terrorists of different ilks support them, a case of "an enemy of an enemy is a friend." Military action increases the sympathy for the Taliban, translating into more volunteers to fight the "oppressors."

If the pragmatic agreement in FATA, between the government and tribal chiefs, is not blown apart by motivated and vested interests, it is a good beginning and can serve as a model. It incorporates tribal culture and traditions and invokes self-governance. Politically, it is far potent than military initiatives. While the Karzai government is yelling to the high heavens that Pakistan is "dealing with the Taliban," they are themselves engaged in a similar dialogue with tribal chiefs on their side of the border.

The "joint" jirga idea is an exercise in frustration because it will allow unscrupulous tribal chiefs to play both sides while blurring the sanctity of the Durand Line as a frontier demarcation. A drastic change of attitude and direction is needed. That the British are also engaged in clandestine negotiations with the Taliban themselves is not surprising. The right route is to have constructive engagement with the Taliban and to convince them to integrate into world society by compromising on some issues already in practice in other Muslim nations.

Both sides of the Durand Line are mostly barren and desolate, agriculture is sparse as a basis for eking out even a meager existence. Bearing weapons, mostly for hire to the highest paymaster, is the only means of livelihood. It doesn't take an Einstein to work out that the economic initiatives must be given preference. The world can try military and political solutions for the next 100 years, but these will only fetch makeshift peace unless an economic mechanism is put into place.

All Afghan Transit Trade (ATT) through Pakistan, except for the Afghan government's official import of food-grains, must stop. The proposed "Reconstruction Opportunity Zones" (ROZs) is only a patchwork solution. The Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) must become a giant Free Trade Area (FTA).

Anything required by the Afghans, or even beyond Afghanistan, can be supplied from this FATA. With economic livelihood guaranteed, the tribals will have a vested interest in keeping the peace on both sides of the Durand Line. With factories and shopping centres coming up schools, colleges, hospitals, etc will follow. The aim must be to eliminate the prevalent permanent economic deprivation which breeds anarchy.

The west has a vested interest in keeping peace in Afghanistan, and a joint effort must be made with Pakistan to club together economic initiatives with political and military ones. Instead of spending billions of dollars fighting a war without end, why not spend a fraction of that creating jobs?

Ikram Sehgal, a former Major of Pakistan Army, is a political analyst and columnist.