Loss of faith at Kargil

Putney did not say anything when we met but unhappiness was writ large on his face. I imagined he felt frustrated because he, or for that matter, the air force, I had heard, wanted to target the training camps of terrorists across the border. But the then Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, had said:

"Please don't cross the LoC," and repeated, "No, no crossing the LoC."

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Yet, that was not the full story. It turns out that the air force was sullen because the army had not taken it into confidence on Pakistan's intrusion in Kargil area. For the first time, a newspaper article by Tipnis has said that the air force felt let down on Kargil. Even when it checked with the army on the intrusion, the latter gave no information except that there was "reportedly unusual artillery firing" in Kargil area.

Tipnis has alleged that when he found that the ground situation was "grave," he offered the air force help. "But it (the army) was not amenable to the Air Headquarters position to seek government approval for use of air force offensively." The army wanted helicopters, not the air force. After Tipnis refused to deploy helicopters, "believing they would be too vulnerable," Army Chief General VP Malik said, "I will go it alone."

Malik and Tipnis are two outstanding officers with the highest integrity. Their knowledge of their respective field is beyond question and they have excelled themselves in their career of 40-odd years. Both have been batch-mates at the training academy in Pune. What struck me about the episode was not the difference between the two on the use of air force, but the distance between the two main wings of the armed forces. However, the question is bigger than the personalities. It is that of coordination -- and equation -- between the army and the air force.

This is not the first time that the differences have come to the fore. They were there during every war -- in 1962, 1965, and 1971. In 1962, former Air Vice-Marshall AK Tewary tells us that the use of air force was not even considered against the Chinese because New Delhi's attention was focused on getting air umbrella from the US.

The Kargil operation has only underlined the basic problem of how to harness all the three wings to achieve the best of results. I am sure that the Navy has its own tale of woes, but it is yet too small to create a fuss. That it should have an equal say cannot be questioned. Probably, the practice of three chiefs meeting every week has been abandoned. In fact, there is a standing committee of three service chiefs. Therefore, lack of coordination among them is not understandable. They should be talking on the phone all the time.

No doubt, the army is the leader in any combat. Tipnis concedes this in his article: "It was the army's leadership and we are only in support." But he also says that "because disturbing inputs continued to be brought in by his staff, he inquired whether all was well." The deputy chief of the army indicated that "the army could handle the situation on its own."

Disclosures by Tipnis should have evoked a healthy discussion. It does not seem to be the case. Already I hear accusations and counter-accusations from the two sides. Lt Gen Arjun Ray, the then army spokesman, has said: "Such utterances will create friction between the two services." True, but somebody has to tell the full story. Putney is right in his comment: "When national security is at stack it is important for us to admit our mistakes. The air force has done it." The nation is not concerned about the personal ego of a particular chief or a particular service. It wants to be assured the armed forces would amass all information and the capability to defeat the enemy if and when there is a war. It expects the three services not to stand in ceremony but to pool their resources to fight.

The Subramanian Committee which went into the acts of omission and commission in Kargil should have brought out the contradictions and lack of coordination.

Maybe, it did not want to open the Pandora's box. The composition of the committee was also defective. The only member from the armed forces was from the army. Air and army HQs have also undertaken studies and reviews and concluded their findings. I think there should be a re-look at the air force participation because Tipnis has complained that it was not involved from the beginning.

Still the government has to think of ways to effect coordination and cooperation among the three services. Apparently, the Ministry of Defence or, for that matter, the defence minister himself, has not been doing their job properly. I wonder if they knew what Tipnis has brought out in his article.

The government may seek a convenient way out and create the post of chief of defence staff. This is nothing new. Soon after the Manmohan Singh government took over, it was almost decided to have the chief of defence staff. One former air chief was able to persuade the government not to do so. His arguments were different. But I think such an appointment might encourage Bonapartism in the force which is apolitical.

The three chiefs are experts in their respective field. Who can excel them? Their input has to be there all the time. No one person can replace them, however brilliant. The army, the air force, and the navy are individually important and together they form the country's armed forces. They are answerable to the country. The chief of defence staff may turn out to be only a cog in the wheel. What is required is joint planning, joint handling, and joint fighting from the word go.

In the meanwhile, the government must find out why the army was reluctant to talk about Pakistan's intrusion even to the Ministry of Defence. As Tipnis says, the army did not want to inform the Ministry of Defence about it until very late, possibly because "it was embarrassed to have allowed the present situation to develop." This amounts to lack of faith, not so much in the air force as in the government.

Kuldip Nayar is an eminent Indian columnist.