After the North Korean blast

Praful Bidwai writes from New Delhi
North Korea has punched a big hole through the global nuclear order, changing the Asian balance of power and probably impacting Iran.

The explosion underscores some plain unvarnished wisdom: the best way to deal with "problem cases" like North Korea is to sincerely pursue global disarmament. The alternative is to risk a more unsafe world with more nuclear powers.

North Korea shows that a small (population 23 million), poor, economically and politically isolated country, which recently experienced famines, can build nuclear weapons if it is determined to. Nuclear weapons require neither high science nor very advanced technology.

The science is 60-plus years old, and the technology no more advanced than what a car garage has -- if you have fissile material or reactors. The test sets a terrible example. Some 40 countries have significant civilian nuclear programmes which can be diverted to make weapons.

Why did North Korea test? It has a long history of conflict with South Korea and the United States. During the 1950-53 Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur had plans to launch nuclear strikes against it.

More recently, President George W Bush torpedoed the reconciliation process between the two Koreas. In 2002, he named North Korea an "Axis of Evil" state and reneged on aid promises. This negated improved Washington-Pyongyang relations achieved through the 1994 Agreed Framework under which North Korea suspended its nuclear activities.

In 2003, Pyongyang quit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The six-party talks with Pyongyang faltered largely because of inept US diplomacy.

Yet, in September 2005, Pyongyang signed a preliminary denuclearisation agreement in Beijing. Four days later, Washington declared economic war on it!

After the US-led invasion of Iraq, North Korea became desperate to prevent "regime change" in Pyongyang. Recently, it grew uncomfortable with the appointment of the militarist Shinzo Abe as Japan's Prime Minister and South Korea's Ban Ki-Moon's lead in the election for the United Nations Secretary General.

On October 3, its foreign ministry said: "A people without a reliable war deterrent are bound to meet a tragic death and [loss of] sovereignty... This is a bitter lesson taught by the bloodshed... in different parts of the world." Then came October 9.

North Korea's test exposes the folly of relying on purely physical controls -- like International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards under the NPT -- to prevent nuclear materials from being put to military use. IAEA safeguards are leak-prone.

In some past years, IAEA reprocessing-plant inspections failed to account for over 20 kg of plutonium -- enough for half-a-dozen nuclear bombs.

More important than safeguards, and critical to a country's decision not to cross the nuclear-weapons threshold, is its political will. In many countries this will has got greatly weakened -- because the nuclear-weapons states (NWSs) have refused to undertake nuclear disarmament.

This flagrantly violates NPT Article VI, which mandates the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

India and Pakistan slavishly imitate the NWSs in their hypocrisy. India's nuclear deal with the US is widely seen as involving double standards: indulgence for America's friends, and punishment for adversaries. All NWSs practise double standards.

The world has few options to deal with Pyongyang. Military force isn't one. The US is bogged down in Iraq.

Over 37,000 US troops are stationed in South Korea. North Korea's 1.2 million-strong army, with 11,000 artillery pieces, and an arsenal of missiles, can make devastating conventional strikes against South Korea and even Japan, where another 40,000 US troops are stationed. There's the risk of a nuclear attack too.

India and Pakistan have strongly condemned North Korea. This is another instance of hypocrisy. Pyongyang cites the same reasons for going nuclear as they did.

It doesn't lie in India's mouth to condemn Pyongyang. And even less in Pakistan's after it traded uranium centrifuges with North Korea's missiles. Today, India and Pakistan both practise the same double standards as the N-5!

India has strongly warned against "the dangers of clandestine proliferation." The reference is to Pakistan. Some Indian commentators cite President Musharraf's book which says: "Dr Khan transferred nearly two dozen P-1 and P-11 centrifuges to North Korea," along with supporting equipment, etc.

However, on all available evidence, the Korean test used plutonium, not uranium. The plutonium came from a small reactor at Yongbyon, built by the Soviet Union in 1965, whose used fuel North Korea reprocessed.

It would be foolish for India to use the Korean test as a stick to beat Pakistan with. The demand that Khan be subjected to interrogation for his Korean operation won't cut much ice anywhere.

North Korea's test will strengthen the non-proliferation lobby in the US, and create more difficulties for the India-US nuclear deal which already faces hurdles.

Japan and South Korea would be singularly ill-advised go nuclear in response to North Korea. That will trigger an arms race involving China, destabilising the entire region.

If the US develops a "theatre ballistic missile defence" ("Star Wars") shield for Northeast Asia, matters will get worse.

The time has come for a radically different approach, which reforms the global nuclear order by honestly implementing the two-way bargain on which it was originally based.

Under the bargain, the non-nuclear weapons-states agreed not to make or acquire nuclear weapons, and subjected themselves to IAEA inspections. In return, the NWSs committed themselves to serious negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons worldwide. However, the NWSs have betrayed the bargain.

The remedy lies in negotiating a return to the global disarmament agenda. What the world needs is de-alerting of all nuclear weapons, separation of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles, and phased destruction of nuclear armaments.

Regional initiatives are also necessary to dissuade North Korea from pursuing a weapons programme by offering it security assurances, generous agricultural and industrial assistance, and food and fuel aid. Such arrangements can lead to the creation of a Northeast Asian nuclear weapons-free zone.

The world cannot afford any more breakouts before it takes the nuclear bull by the horns.

Praful Bidwai is an eminent Indian columnist.