Strategically Speaking

About face in Iraq?

Brig Gen Shahedul Anam Khan ndc, psc (Retd)
Is a change of the US strategy vis-a-vis Iraq in the offing? Are we likely to see the beginning of the end of the presence of coalition forces in Iraq soon? It would seem so. Certain developments point to that possibility in spite of the Bush administration's denial.

The assertion of senior Republicans that the Iraq situation is moving sideways and their call for redesigning the future course in Iraq may have put severe pressure on the US president to seek alternatives.

This perception has been reinforced by leaked portions of a report (that was to come out only after the November 7 mid-term elections) of the Iraq Study Group (ISG), co-chaired by former secretary of state James Baker, that it might suggest policy changes to the Bush administration, that might offer alternatives to "staying the course" in Iraq.

The possibility of changing course has been further increased by Gen Sir Richard Dannatt's implied suggestion that the British should get out of Iraq "sometime soon" because their presence "exacerbates" security problems in Iraq. Although he later clarified that "sometime soon" does not mean immediately, it is very clear that the political aim of the occupation was beyond the capability of the British forces to achieve in terms of military objectives. The same is also equally true of the US forces in Iraq.

It was a bitter truth that the most senior British soldier came out last week with reports on how badly things were going in Iraq. He hit the nail squarely on the head when he said that the British presence (symbolising foreign occupation) in Iraq has caused the situation to worsen. The commander of the British army, a very small part of which is operating in Iraq, hinted that they would much sooner be out of the country. This must have jolted the Blair administration although Mr Blair continues to insist that it would take place only after "the job is done." After three years in Iraq one remains confused about the exact nature of the job and how long it might take to complete it. This has also prompted the opposition in Britain to call for a new Iraq strategy.

Although Gen Dannat later said that there was not even a cigarette-paper-thin chasm between him and the prime minister, he insisted that he was quite convinced that things were more difficult than expected and the result was contrary to his anticipation.

If he was a soldier speaking up for the army, he was also sending a clear message to his political masters that the British troops were out of their depths -- a situation not entirely of their own making, one might add. High hopes, according to him, have not been realised, and thus he feels that these troops ought to pack up. However, he later clarified that the pull-out would not be before their mission is accomplished within a reasonable length of time.

No doubt the occupation forces are running out of ideas and there is a stalemate in the sense that the political objectives have not been achieved as yet and there is no indication that they are likely to be achieved soon.

There is no doubt that the bipartisan ISG, set up at the urging of the Congress, will come out with viable options that would be short of "cut and run" but at the same time would convey to the rest of the world, particularly to the Iraqis that they are not being abandoned. Mr Baker and his team would presumably provide an exit strategy for the coalition forces in Iraq.

There are several predicaments that confront the Bush-Blair coalition in Iraq. In spite of the claim that there is still not a full-fledged civil war in Iraq, the fact is that civil war has been going on in Iraq for the last one year or more. But equally seriously, there is a four-pronged war going on at the moment according to experts: the war of jihadists against US troops, the war of nationalists against US troops, the war of Sunni jihadists against Shias, and the war of Shia militias against Sunnis, and any action to alleviate one area could impact the other.

The reason the US has been so far unwilling to acknowledge that there is a civil war in Iraq is that it would be politically impossible to keep US troops in a country where there is an ongoing civil war.

Given such trying circumstances in Iraq, and the rapidly dwindling home support for his war in Iraq, it was only natural for Mr Bush to look for new strategies. But the administration seems unsure as to how effective the new strategies would be (provided he opted for those) given the radical attitudinal change that would be required of the Bush administration in implementing these strategies.

For example, if stability in Iraq were to be the main option, it would mean ditching democracy and have Iraq ruled by a strong man who would be able to take strong measures to quell the current spate of violence. Considering the level of the current conflict that will indeed be a difficult proposition, but more importantly Mr. Bush's very rationale of "spreading democracy" in the region and championing freedom of the Iraqi people will collapse.

The other alternative, as contemplated by the panel, is to bring in other countries to sort out the mess. And these include Syria and Iran. Given that one is considered a member of the "Axis of Evil" and the other a sponsor of international terrorism by the Bush administration, it would be a bitter pill for the Bush administration to swallow. But that is an alternative even the Iraqi president feels is most likely to see the end of violence. What is even more remarkable is the view that even the insurgents should be brought to the discussion table for the sake of peace and integrity in Iraq.

Indeed Mr Bush is in a tight spot in Iraq and no matter how brave a face he may put on, he is looking down the barrel. The situation has become so intricate and the options so complex that implementing one may result in negating many others.

Changing course is not a bad thing. A good statesman is one who can see beyond his nose and adjust to changed circumstances. What is perhaps of concern to Mr Bush is whether changing the course would allow his forces to leave Iraq with dignity, with the credibility of the military machine that he let loose in Iraq unsullied, and whether it would keep his political credentials intact.

The question is: is he capable of seeing beyond his nose?

The author is Editor, Defence & Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.