North Korea: Seeking symbolical security
Today, we have a situation where DPRK appears to be the latest, the ninth member of an exclusive club, where each country can claim having nuclear weapons. The DPRK Government has declared that it has detonated a nuclear bomb of around 15 kiloton capacity. Yet, there are many countries, including the USA, not totally sure, if such an assertion is real.
Such uncertainty has made the situation that much more surreal. The White House, having recently failed to prove their claims in Iraq, appear to have grown that much more cautious about announcing the presence of weapons of mass destruction in the DPRK. In fact, it was most interesting to read Agence France-Presse's report from Washington headlined 'US may never know whether North Korea tested N-bomb'. In most matters pertaining to North Korea, analysts in USA are usually forthcoming. Consequently, the comment from White House spokesman Tony Snow was refreshingly different. It was indicated that it 'may take some time' before the US could conclude whether DPRK had gone nuclear. It was also stated that this process would be 'a complex undertaking'. Given the availability of hi-tech, this was indeed surprising.
Japan, a neighbour of North Korea, talked tough in the United Nations Security Council, but its Prime Minister Shinzo Abe cautiously informed his Parliament that 'it is hard to say' if there has been a successful nuclear test. In fact, it has since been revealed by this country that its monitoring aircraft had detected no unusual radiation levels in dust samples collected over the major Japanese islands of Kyushu, Honshu and Hokkaido. Apparently, such signs would have been evident had there been any strong nuclear explosion.
This controversy was taken one step further by the French Defence Minister Michele Alliot-Marie with the comment that France 'was not certain that North Korea's test explosion was nuclear, and that, if it was, then it was a failure'. It was also suggested that instead of being a nuclear explosion, it might have been just a huge conventional explosion. French analysts also added another twist to the scenario. They pointed out that 'if it was a failed nuclear test, it would not change the serious nature of the affair' as DPRK might seek to show to the world through a second attempt that it was capable of detonating nuclear weapons.
I wish I could have said that France, Japan and the USA, not being sure, means that there is a credibility gap in DPRK's claims. Unfortunately, such an assertion does not seem possible.
Russia's Defence Ministry is not only sure that a nuclear test has been undertaken by DPRK, but they are interpreting differences of opinion as being based more on 'politics' rather than correct scientific analysis.
In any case, the intensity of the nuclear device supposed to have been exploded varies widely from about 0.5 kilotons (France) to 5 kilotons (Russia). South Korea, next door neighbour of DPRK has estimated the kiloton fallout to be about 0.8 and the USA slightly less than one kiloton. For better comparative understanding, readers may note that the Hiroshima World War II bomb had an intensity of 12.5 kilotons. Such comparison and uncertainty about the nature of the test also reveals the reason why the response and reaction till now have been on a relatively lower scale.
Confronted with a dilemma, President Bush, known for unilateralist efforts, displayed maturity for a change. He termed the North Korean action as constituting 'a threat to international peace and security' and urged that it required 'an immediate response'. He also reiterated that the US remained committed to diplomacy.
Other reactions have also been interesting. India, keen to show itself as a responsible nuclear power, went on record by stating that 'erosion of the non-proliferation regime was not in our interests'. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, speaking from London also observed that India does not support another nuclear weapons state. One would be tempted to observe that India's reaction to a great extent has been out of her concern that her nuclear cooperation deal with the United States could be undermined if it did not react sharply.
South Korea, quite understandably, went on high alert and declared that it would review thawing of relations with its northern neighbour. Basking in the glory of the appointment of their Foreign Minister as the next UN Secretary General, South Korea now finds itself in the difficult position of being under pressure to suspend or scale down its 'sunshine' policy of economic engagement with its northern neighbour.
China, the host of 'Six-Party Talks' (to persuade North Korea not to go nuclear) for the past two years, has clearly been embarrassed. It had been apparent for quite some time that USA was averse to using military force in the DPRK and had left it to China to restrain its southern neighbour. I remember writing on this issue last year and noting that USA and her partners had few obvious options other than to keep North Korea hemmed in. I had observed that they would have to rely on patient negotiations and on China for such influence that China possesses on the DPRK regime. It does appear now that any hope on China being able to control DPRK was greatly exaggerated.
However, no consideration of the DPRK nuclear test would be complete without a brief discussion of Iran's interpretation of why DPRK undertook the nuclear test. Iran has blamed the other major nuclear powers for this situation. Iranian government spokesman Gholam Hossein Elham has noted that 'the major powers feel that they are entitled to use and produce nuclear weapons'. Iran has described such a situation as unjust, unequal and discriminatory according to the precepts of international law. They feel that such a practice has resulted in threats to world peace. Iran appears to have a point here.
Recent events have proven one thing. The non-proliferation regime has really not worked. It has not discouraged nations to go forward on the path of nuclear nationalism. We have seen examples of that in India and Pakistan. We have also seen quest for security, inducing Israel, to achieve covert nuclear capability. There are many others waiting in the wings.
It would be pertinent at this point to also refer here to some recent comments made by Dr Hans Blix, former United Nations weapons inspector and Chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. He has remarked that while the current international debate focuses on limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, it tends to overlook the fact that they are dangerous wherever they might presently be. In this context, he has suggested that, as well as working to prevent their proliferation, the international community should urge the states that currently possess nuclear weapons to revive their disarmament efforts. Dr. Blix believes that this would not only reduce the nuclear threat, but would also prevent proliferation. I totally agree with this proposition. This would also be more logical than 'nuclear states' rearming and relying on their nuclear weapons, and preaching arms control and restraint to others. The real need is to get agreement for all nuclear states to disarm and reduce their stocks of nuclear weapons.
DPRK has crossed a threshold that they need not have. It is a small country with a lot of problems. Millions of its citizens are denied basic health care rights and are perennially suffering from malnutrition. I remember the agony that I went through as Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the World Food Programme and the International Fund for Agricultural Development. Bangladesh held important portfolios in both multilateral Organizations and had to work very hard to steer through agreed packages of food aid for DPRK. I understand that food security is still very bleak in DPRK. Wasting money on nuclear weapons is hardly a suitable alternative.
North Korean leaders are probably trying to flag their symbolical quest for security through such provocative action. However, this is not the best way of doing it.
Nevertheless, one feels, that DPRK needs to be re-assured that they are not going to be invaded and that there is no plan for regime change. It is also important that the Six-Party talks are re-convened as soon as possible. Let there also be strict sanctions at the same time to ensure that the carrot and stick formula works.
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