How fares the War on Terror?
As it is, the Anglo-Americans have been caught in a quagmire in both Afghanistan and Iraq. It is hard to say which of the two countries is more significant for the Americans. Although the statement attributed to Pakistan's foreign minister has been denied the fact remains that what has been denied reflected reality: without Nato agreeing with and acting on Pakistan's advice it will lose in Afghanistan -- that, too, to the Taliban. It is a serious situation for the Anglo-American leadership that Nato has not come up to their expectations, and it is less than enthusiastic about saving the values for which the Bush-Blair duo started the war.
In Iraq there is a clear and present danger that that the state will soon die. What will replace it may be, first, a civil war and later three separate denominational states with Shias in the south, Sunnis in the middle and Kurds in the north. Each of them will be a messy affair, particularly the Kurdish state. It has the potential of engulfing in war all the surrounding states in which Kurds live, viz. Iran, Turkey, Syria and as far as parts of former Soviet Union.
The Shia state-to-be is the most feared outcome: apart from the determined opposition by al-Qaeda and Saudi Arabia on sectarian grounds, it may signal a much larger war. Shia minorities in most Arab states and Sheikhdoms might rise in revolt against their potentates. Some Arab states like Lebanon and Bahrain have suppressed Shia majorities with non-Shia rulers. This was a little discussed subject earlier. But now, after the recent Lebanon war and the start of civil war in Iraq, it has become a matter of life and death for both sects. Indeed this had better be avoided at all costs.
The Sunni state would require a great deal of understanding and aid from the Shia and Kurd states because the latter two have oil while the middle desert does not have any. Moreover, the Sunnis have traditionally been the dominant community that has kept the Shia majority as more or less second-class citizens. The establishment of the Baathist regime in the 1960s did provide relief to the Shias, as it was a secular state. But it did not alter the basis of the society, and it largely depended on Saddam Hussain's tribe for really sensitive jobs. True, secularism of the Baathists was genuine enough; there were Shia generals and, of course, the bulk of the Iraqi Army was Shia. Iraq fought an eight year war against Shia Iran without its Shia soldiers deserting. But on present indications the political intervention of the Saudi government into Iraq's affairs carries the danger of a fierce Iran-Arab war.
These are not the only complications for Anglo-American designs. There is the hardy perennial issue of Palestine. There is wide recognition that unless the Arab-Israeli contradiction within Palestine is resolved, no Arab state can settle down to peaceful pursuits. The kind of atrocities that the Israelis are committing daily are sure to ignite an even larger war with Palestinians, to begin with, and there may also be one in Lebanon. Lebanon is now a powder keg where things are moving in an ugly direction. The recent murder of Pierre Gemayel the famous Maronite leader, and the Hezbollah demonstrations may engulf the country in a civil war once again, and may possibly result in the intervention of Syria, which would bring on a larger war. Neither is the Palestinian issue any nearer to a solution, despite the exertions of US Secretary of State Condeleeza Rice, nor was President Bush able to prevail over Nato heads of governments regarding their more enthusiastic participation in Afghanistan war.
Establishing a Shia state would be signal to Saudi Arabia that the ultimate change is upon them. The Iraqi civil war may then merge with the Iran-Saudi war, if the western powers would let the "natives" go on fighting themselves. The consequences of such a war are incalculable.
Independently of these troubles, there is the looming crisis over Iran. Somehow the American establishment is hell-bent on destroying Iran's nuclear installations; so is Israel. The threat of war against Iran is serious, and apparently not too distant. But Iran is a different kettle of fish from other Arab states. Because of its size and resources it will not be a pushover. Iran's military capabilities, recently demonstrated, may be fearsome for the American Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Fleets, should they be in the Persian Gulf. Iran has three options that would seriously hurt others.
Whatever else Iran can possibly do, it can surely stop export of oil; it can sink one or two ships in the Straits of Hormuz and block all exports of oil from the Gulf; and, as it has indicated, Iran can cause a rain of modern missiles to fall on Israel. That would be no picnic. This is not to say that Iran can defeat America, Britain and Nato; that is out of the question. But it can hurt them badly. The weapon of oil is very effective; a closure of the Gulf for some months can cause immense harm to the world economy.
What has happened during the last four years? The awe of Israeli, and even of American military strength, has distinctly diminished. The suicide bombers, and the fanaticism to fight fiercely, is a new factor for the Anglo-Americans in the Middle East. Israel, by not being able to win a clear victory in Lebanon, has actually lost that war. It will think many times before it undertakes another military operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon, let alone Iran. The US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown that a plenitude of military strength does not guarantee political gains. They can kill a lot of people, but cannot set up effective governments that work. So long as Anglo-American forces are in Iraq and Afghanistan no one can predict an orderly transition to new states to replace the dying ones. It is difficult to imagine that America will undertake a war in Iran, no matter how badly it wants to cripple the Iranian nuclear programme. Whether Israel actually translates its threats into action against Iran is altogether hypothetical. The kind of riposte that Iran can make is likely to deter the Israelis, rather than embolden them.
The world is now witnessing a decline of influence of the only superpower that is still dominating the world. The limits of its powers are now apparent, though its military sinews are stronger today than at anytime before. Similarly, the mini-superpower that Israel was in the region remains as strong as it ever was, and no comparable strong Arab state has emerged. But its ability to go on suppressing Palestinians and grossly abusing their human rights, while also punishing the Hezbollah, is not likely to last long. Even the Baker task force on Iraq is set to recommend that America put some distance between itself and the Israelis by forcing Israel to make serious political concessions on Palestine for good American reasons. This is something new: the political advantages that superior military strength usually ensured are subject to diminishing returns. When ordinary people become fired with some vision, relevant or otherwise, old assumptions must change.
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