The flawed India-US nuclear deal

Praful Bidwai writes from New Delhi
Few things have polarised Indian opinion as sharply as the India-US nuclear deal. To enable it, the US Congress has just passed the Henry J. Hyde, US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act (Hyde Act).

The deal's supporters say that this is India's "nuclear liberation" and entry into the Nuclear Club as a privileged Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) non-signatory. Most opponents of the deal say the Act violates India's sovereignty and caps its nuclear arsenal.

In truth, the opponents are right -- but not for the reasons they cite. Sounds confusing?

Consider this:

  • The Hyde Act does violate Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's assurances to Parliament that India won't accept any departure from the agreements signed with the US since July 2005.
  • Dr Singh said that India would accept nothing short of full civilian nuclear cooperation. But the Act excludes uranium enrichment, spent-fuel reprocessing, and heavy-water technologies.
  • India opposed any reference to a future nuclear test. The Act says that all cooperation would be stopped if India tests.
  • Dr Singh opposed annual certification of India's compliance with non-proliferation pledges. The Act merely changes "certification" to "assessment."
  • India insisted on creating strategic reserves of nuclear fuel over the lifetime of its reactors. The Act only permits non-strategic reserves.
  • India wanted a specific reciprocal sequence for the steps remaining in the deal's completion. These include a bilateral "123 agreement" -- to amend the US Atomic Energy Act -- approval from the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, and a safeguards (inspections) agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Hyde Act changes the sequence.
  • India opposes any scrutiny of its military-nuclear facilities. The Act mandates such scrutiny.

The Hyde Act can thus be strongly opposed on procedural grounds. But if it were substantially to promote worthy causes like peace, sustainable energy and policy autonomy for India, the procedural flaws could be condoned. However, its purpose is to reward India as a new strategic ally whose elite craves America's symbolic recognition.

As Undersecretary Nicholas Burns said, the deal is the symbolic centre of India-US relations -- a collusive agreement to further narrow interests.

While craving US recognition, the Indian elite nurtures a false sense of "humiliation" because Washington slapped sanctions following India's 1974 test, and cut off fuel for the two reactors it had donated.

In reality, India wasn't "humiliated." It remained defiant, refused to sign the NPT and steadily built up its weapons capability. In 1998, India conducted nuclear blasts, citing sovereign rights. Many countries, also invoking sovereignty, imposed sanctions on India's nuclear program. These didn't hurt nuclear power generation much, given its puny size (3 percent of total).

Those who believe that the deal upholds India's rightful claim to nuclear weapons either have double standards or a faulty moral compass. Nobody has a right to own horror weapons. It's hard to argue that India was unfairly sanctioned for an honourable or noble act.

Washington offered India this special deal to recruit it as a junior partner in the field of strategic alliances, which sub-serve the US Empire project. In particular, India would help contain China.

The Act, logically, expects Indian foreign policy to be "congruent to that of the US," and demands support for American goals, including isolating Iran. This unequal arrangement will severely erode India's independence and limit its global role just when it is well placed to influence world events.

Ironically, the deal's Right-wing critics, including the BJP and much of the nuclear lobby, aren't opposed to this real erosion of sovereignty and freedom, but only to some sections of the Act. For them, sovereignty lies in mass-destruction weapons, not policy independence or the people's interest.

That's not all. The deal will promote nuclear power. Nuclear power is costly, prone to catastrophes like Chernobyl, and leaves enormous quantities of radioactive waste, which cannot be safely stored.

There are safe, affordable and renewable alternatives, like wind and solar power, to this outmoded dirty technology.

Nuclear power in India enjoys gigantic subsidies running into billions annually. The Department of Atomic Energy has an embarrassing history of cost overruns, missed targets, and unsafe operating practices. It delivers electricity unreliably.

However, renewable sources have performed spectacularly. Wind power capacity has ballooned to 5,500 MW, compared to nuclear's 3,400 MW -- without heavy subsidies. India's wind potential is 60,000 MW-plus.

Nuclear power is largely irrelevant to India's long-term energy security or self-reliance. Even if DAE's always-hyped up targets are achieved its contribution will only double -- to a still- marginal 6 percent by 2050. But DAE targets have never been met.

Had DAE's 1970 plans materialised, India would have had 10,000 MW of nuclear electricity by 1980 and 50,000-plus MW by now -- 15 times more than achieved. Indigenous uranium can't fuel even 10,000 MW of nuclear capacity.

Worse, the deal will help India expand its nuclear arsenal. India can import uranium for civilian use while dedicating domestic uranium to weapons.

India will only put 14 of its 22 power reactors under safeguards. The remaining eight can be used to produce tonnes of plutonium; only 3 to 8 kg is needed for a bomb.

Military reactors, fast breeders and enrichment plants can produce even more fuel for nuclear weapons -- well exceeding anything like the minimum deterrent.

The Hyde Act contains instruments for pressurising India through periodic certifications, scrutiny of facilities, and demands that its foreign policy behaviour conform to Washington's priorities, etc. A future hostile president or Congress can abuse these instruments.

The deal is bad for regional and global peace, too. It's likely to fuel not just one, but two, nuclear arms races: with Pakistan and China.

Worst of all, by sealing the deal, India will betray its promise, reiterated two years ago, to fight for global nuclear disarmament. You don't join an exclusive club and then immediately demand that it change its rules!

The deal cannot be reformed to promote worthy objectives such as peace or energy security. It must be scrapped lock, stock and barrel.

Praful Bidwai is an eminent Indian columnist.