Pakistan's new stance on Kashmir

The Indians insist that Kashmir has acceded to India, and that is that. The rest of the world has to live with the reality of the Kashmir Valley being an integral part of India. India's Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh used the deft formulation: let's make the borders irrelevant; they will be there alright, but would not matter in the daily lives of the Kashmiri citizens of the two countries. To make this proposal more acceptable, Dr Singh has thrown in a yet-to-be-negotiated quantum of autonomy for the two Kashmirs, Indian and Pakistani (AJK). Pakistan has tentatively accepted this Indian idea and has, itself, developed the Indians' concept.

There are four aspects to Musharraf's Kashmir proposals. One is, of course, autonomy for the two Kashmirs. The second is the attempt to make the border soft -- "irrelevant" -- by allowing the Kashmiris on both sides of LOC to cross it more easily, and to conduct trade across it. How free that trade will be has to be worked out. The third element is thinning out of the troops on both sides, although Musharraf's use of the term "de-militarisation" is unlikely to be acceptable to the Indian security establishment -- the true strength of which is now becoming clear. Finally, there has to be a joint mechanism between the two countries to manage the all-Kashmir problems that concern both parts, or arise from time to time.

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President Musharraf has, thus, notionally recognized India's sovereignty over the parts of Kashmir it is occupying. That has a ring of finality about it. There is no point in the Pakistan Foreign Office saying that policy has not changed. It is a theoretical proposition. For the rest of the world, Pakistan has moved away from the old demand and is now open to others ideas.

There are also obscurities: Why is Musharraf in such a terrible hurry, wanting a Kashmir solution within days and weeks. But he is a soldier, and should be credited with knowing his trade. New ideas preempt the threat of war. He and his ministers proclaim that no stable peace can come to South Asia without a satisfactory solution of the Kashmir problem. This implies that if the Indians do not accept Pakistan's pleas there is bound to be a war; stable peace is contingent on the desired settlement. It involves a threat from Pakistan's side.

History shows that all the wars, or semi-wars, with India had some linkage or other with Kashmir. The first two wars, in 1948 and 1965, were specifically over Kashmir. The 1971 war was about East Pakistan, though India's interests included Kashmir-related demands. While the Kutch clashes can be attributed to a general deterioration of Indo-Pakistan relations, the Kargil adventure was clearly for forcing India to the negotiating table.

Now that India has been brought to the negotiating table -- two rounds of negotiations having failed, a third, or is it fourth, may soon take place -- President Musharraf's initial indication is that the likely Kashmir settlement is to be basically on India's terms. This arrangement could have been arrived at 5, 10 or 15 years ago. The reasons why Musharraf now proposes to recognize India's sovereignty over the Kashmir Valley, Jammu and Laddakh are based on hard realism, though it is painful for sentimental patriots to admit it.

The origins of Musharraf's formula, one finds, is in an American Study Group's report a few years ago. The coordinator was said to be Robert Oakley, then President of New York's Asia Society. There was also a book, based on this group's ideas, explaining this. But that, per se, is no disqualification. The US purpose could only be to free India of the embarrassment of constant anti-India propaganda by Pakistan over Kashmir. That was detrimental to India's being built up as a great bastion of freedom. Fundamental to Musharraf's ideas are, however, ground realities.

A war with India is now out of the question. Pakistan's minimum Nuclear Deterrent and the conventional arms preparedness together do not make war with India a practical proposal. The experience of the 2002 crisis, with two armies confronting each other eyeball-to-eyeball, showed that a nuclear war between these two neighbours is no longer possible. Note that India had credibly threatened to invade Pakistan, knowing that Pakistan was a nuclear power. George Fernandes had threatened that India could absorb Pakistan's first strike, but would retaliate massively and destroy its seven or eight industrial-military centres.

There is obvious truth in that. This means that India's larger deterrent has more deterring power than Pakistan's smaller one. Therefore, Pakistan cannot take the initiative to start another war, and whichever way another war starts it will not be to Pakistan's advantage. That changes the whole complexion of the Kashmir dispute: now no solution can be built on military force. Musharraf knows it, and it is good that he is proceeding on this basis. One agrees.

This will certainly cause much argumentation, and it should have been known earlier. After spending money and human effort in building conventional and nuclear deterrents, we are faced with simple facts: India is a larger country with a larger deterrent; it is more developed; it is richer and more influential in the world. These facts should have been known earlier. Pakistan went to war so many times, but only to force India to the negotiating table -- a silly proposition. If you cannot solve a problem through war, how can diplomacy after an inconclusive war get you Kashmir? Why were the wars inconclusive? Because of Pakistan being poorer and weaker. Didn't Pakistani generals know this? Why should poor Pakistanis pay for a huge military establishment that has usurped people's political rights, subverted politics and foisted the army's unending domination over the whole polity.

Well, what has happened has happened. It cannot be undone. We had better do some course correction now. It is blindingly clear that there will be no war with India. At least Pakistan should avoid it at all costs. For a Pakistan Army general to offer recognition of India's sovereignty over Kashmir shows that, hitherto, the course followed was unrealistic and shortsighted.

That poses an urgent question before Pakistanis. They have a large paraphernalia of military equipment, and nuclear deterrent complete with missiles, but what do they do with them? They are costly to maintain. Pakistan's economy could never sustain this establishment without foreign aid. Musharraf had himself said that Pakistan faces no external threat; only internal threats need attention. Why not reduce the military establishment and give people a peace dividend. Let this be a 2007 polls issue.

Also up for discussion is the question of what kind of development we need. Considerable disarmament and de-militarization are needed for the economy itself. Its main task must be to ensure all the democratic rights, including jobs for the maximum number of people, and social security for those who cannot be provided with jobs. The paradigm actually followed in recent years has increased disparities of income, both vertically and horizontally. We need a more pro-poor development paradigm. Social equity is an integral part of political freedom. Let's follow this paradigm.

MB Naqvi is a leading Pakistani columnist.