The Maulana has said it all

The specific context was that the Maulana was stung by Musharraf's current election campaign: Musharraf wants to defeat the reactionary mullahs, and wants the moderate and modern Muslims to win. The Maulana appears to have taken umbrage to this terminology.

What he said clearly carried an implied threat: "Unless you make up with us your writ cannot run smoothly in the areas of our influence, and areas of Taliban influence are included in this." What he seems to be hinting at is: "Unless you revive the traditional military-mullah alliance and abide by it, you will be in difficulty; we will fight hard on the issue."

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It is now clear to all that fighting on the planks of traditional Islam, and an ambiguous and unconvincing modern, moderate Islam will be an unequal fight in present conditions, certainly in NWFP and Balochistan. As for Afghanistan, the Taliban already have a great deal of territory under their near-control, and are optimistic about the future.

The Maulana was talking from a position of strength. He already has the provincial government of NWFP under his belt. He has nominated half the provincial government of Balochistan. He is really a partner with Musharraf in ruling the country. Keeping their alliance going, the Maulana implies, is in the interest of both.

The Maulana's internal position in the MMA is also relevant. He appears to be in conflict with Qazi Hussain Ahmed on the tactics to be adopted. Qazi Hussain Ahmed appears to believe that a raging and tearing agitation against Musharraf in the here and now can bring electoral victory to MMA as well as to JI. He appears to be very confident that the army would eventually not crush the clergy to a degree that would be fatal for MMA's political position in NWFP and Balochistan. He could only be banking on some support from within the army.

The JUI chief seems to be more cautious, and is concerned that matters should not go out of hand, or the military-mullah alliance sundered. He is holding out an olive branch to the military and Musharraf both, and is concerned with preserving the political advantages that the JUI already has. Instead of wanting much more tomorrow, he wants to advance slowly but surely: first preserving what advantage he has and then, hopefully, to win more. The styles of the two Maulanas are different. But on the ultimate aim the two are not much different. It is a good tactic, also, for one to be more strident and the other to appear more moderate and peace-seeking.

It is possible that Musharraf's aides may advise him to divide the MMA, the differences on tactics between the Maulana and Qazi Saheb can be skillfully exploited without fatally wounding the traditional understanding between the military and the clergy. For administrators, fixing things up is their forte; they tend to be value neutral. But the issue now posed by a thoroughly radicalized clergy, led increasingly by the likes of al-Qaeda and Taliban, is too intransigent. The issue between democracy and a medieval dictatorship of obscurantists, in the holy name of Islam, has to be resolved by letting the people decide rationally and freely.

Actually Musharraf is sandwiched between an increasingly strident America and Nato in Afghanistan, on the one hand, and the forces of Islamic militancy inside the country on the other. American moves are not really benign or benevolent toward Pakistan. They are becoming increasingly critical of Musharraf's compromises.

The latter's September 5 agreement with the elders of North Waziristan is now increasingly being criticized by the western media as having encouraged the Taliban and al-Qaeda to keep Afghanistan burning to an extent that they are now seen as a winning force that looks like being able to, next year, force the Nato and American forces out of the country. Defeat stares Nato in the face in Afghanistan.

The Americans want Pakistan to pull their chestnuts out of the fire. But Musharraf has to worry that the Pakistan army's hold on FATA areas is becoming a subject of debate throughout the world. Can he keep these areas under his control? Or will they come under the Taliban's sway?

Let no one make a mistake. The Taliban are not generically different from both versions of the JUI and also, up to a point, Jamaate Islami in terms of aims. Orthodox Islamic militancy of the Deobandi school is what unites MMA with the Taliban. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are now well adjusted to each other, and they cooperate. They have the same politics and their true strength should not be underrated.

Reviewing a parade of the smart Pakistan army may broaden the chest of the Commander momentarily; it is also not easy to visualize that a rag-tag crowd of the Taliban would defeat it, or takeover from it. But the way their influence is spreading, and the uncertainties of the international situation, may put Pakistan's military in a difficult position. That needs to be avoided through diplomacy and politics.

Needless to say, Maulana Rahman's chief context is Pakistan politics. Conscious of his power in the two western provinces, the Maulana has to preserve this redoubt from the Q-League. Apart from the expectation of MMA making electoral advances in Punjab and Sindh, it has a deeper dimension. If things go wrong the potentialities of the issues involved include unending conflict and, possibly, a civil war. Like most civil wars, it is best avoided by politics. Not being advisors to the government or the general, it is for them to find political means that hopefully can avoid or, if necessary, to fight the menace effectively by political means.

Musharraf was certainly not the only addressee of Maulana Rahman. He was also addressing US President George Bush, his army and America's actives allies: "If you want an honourable and orderly retreat from Afghanistan come and talk to us. We will arrange negotiations between you and the Taliban. You are not likely to win in Afghanistan. Eventually you will lose. Why not withdraw in an orderly manner. We will make it honourable for you through a political pact."

It is unlikely that President Bush will sue for peace just yet. It is more likely that he will concentrate on putting more pressure on the embattled Pakistan president to do more. The Americans have spent a lot in supporting Musharraf and shoring up Pakistan's economy. They expect a return: the Pakistan army pulling their chestnuts out of the Afghan fire.

One is not too sure which way American thinking will move now. Faced with the uncertainties of the Afghan war how will Bush amend his geo-political aims? Will he be able to create a new bipartisan consensus in America on the future aim of the Afghanistan campaign? Much hangs on that. All that is uncertain. But, for the short-term, Islamabad should expect increased pressure from America and the Nato countries.

MB Naqvi is a leading Pakistani columnist.