Strategically Speaking
The ten-year itch
General Pervez Musharraf has surprised even his biggest ally and staunchest backer by carrying out yet another coup, this time against himself, and this time with his feet firmly planted on the ground, or at least that is what he would have us believe. As COAS he has suspended the constitution of 1973, which, as the president of Pakistan, he had taken an oath to defend. In doing so he, like other military dictators who preceded him, has sought to perpetuate his regime. Democracy, in whatever form that existed in Pakistan, has once again been subverted.
It seems that the Pakistan president has called the US bluff. Admiral Fallon, the senior American military commander in the Middle East, had told him in Islamabad last Friday that Pakistan may have to face the prospect of a cut in US aid (the United States has given Pakistan more than $10 billion in aid, mostly military, since 2001) if he opted for extra-constitutional means. And Musharraf has played the terror card very deftly. Who says Pak generals lacked imagination!
It is hardly possible to comment on Pakistan politics, particularly at times like now, without feeling sorry for the people of Pakistan. They have been, once again, short-changed by a power-hungry general whose excuse this time was what has become by now a well-known acronym -- TINA -- there is no alternative.
The pretext has very few takers in Pakistan. Musharraf's two major compulsions, as expressed during his televised speech to the nation, predictably, were law and order, which was deteriorating fast, and terrorists' gaining of the upper hand. He admitted that the terrorists were not taking the law enforcing agencies seriously.
These are all very true, but most Pakistanis find those, as the justification of his actions, hardly convincing. Even more so because the focus of the law enforcing agencies, since the imposition of emergency, has not been the terrorists but an organ of the state that did not have the remotest of links with terrorists or terrorism -- the judiciary.
Abrogation of the constitution, subversion of democracy, or downright martial law, have become very predictable phenomena in Pakistan. A close scrutiny of the time-line of Pakistan's 60 years existence shows a well-defined pattern. Some call it the Pak generals' ten-year itch.
Looking at history, this is exactly the sixth instance in sixty years since 1947 that a martial law has been declared, one every decade on the average -- 1958, 1969, 1977, 1999, and 2007 -- and as many times democracy derailed. In 1993 -- while it was not a military coup -- both the president and the prime minister had to resign under pressure from the military, to make way for an election that reinstated Benazir to power.
Almost every ten years, the military top brass in Pakistan had been overtaken by an insuppressible urge to paint the democratic firmament of the country with the colour of khaki.
Emergency is a proviso enshrined in the Pakistan constitution. And that is what begs the question: If the country's constitution has been held in abeyance, and it is the constitution that allows the imposition of emergency under specific circumstances, on what basis is the emergency holding its ground?
But while the Supreme Court and the High Courts have been virtually dissolved, the parliaments, both the national and provincial, have escaped being shut down. And that is why, according to the apologists for the general, it does not fulfill the characteristics of a martial law. That is a matter of semantics; most observers in Pakistan believe that the substance indicates something more than emergency.
What were Musharraf's compulsions that, in spite of US threats, he went ahead with his plans? It was simply an exercise at clinging on to power at the expense of the country's interest.
The underlying reason was to anticipate the ruling of the Supreme Court on whether he was eligible to run for re-election as president, that was to be delivered the following Monday. And President Musharraf had come to know that the judgment was not going to go in his favour.
Coming to the question of unavoidability and alternatives, it is true that this was unavoidable. That is so because nothing else would have ensured his continuity in office. And what other alternatives were there except to go after those who had made his departure a very distinct possibility -- the judiciary and the lawyers?
And this is what the marked difference from the previous clampdowns is. The highest judiciary and lawyers are the targets of Musharraf government's wrath.
Although terrorism and terrorists have been cited as the reason for the imposition of emergency, the government of Pakistan has gone so far as to point the finger at the judiciary as being a hindrance to its counter-terror operation, stating in the emergency proclamation, "some members of the judiciary were working at cross purposes with the executive and legislature in the fight against terrorism and extremism, thereby weakening the government's and the nation's resolve and diluting the efficacy of the actions to control this menace." There are even graver indictments of the judiciary in the proclamation. No wonder that terrorist threats are being flaunted to cut the judiciary down to size.
This time one notices a reversal of the role of the judiciary. While all these 60 years Pakistan's judiciary, either willingly or through coercion, had validated all the military actions, this time the Supreme Court of Pakistan has declared the emergency illegal and has asked the members of the Supreme Court and High Court benches not to take oath under the PCO, and have gone beyond that too.
The question is, how are things likely to shape up for Pakistan?
This is not the first time that the generals in Pakistan have realised that the constitution provides no solution for tackling the emerging situation, and the only way out was through emergent and extraordinary measures. And this is not the first time that democracy has been stifled in Pakistan in order to save it.
But President Musharraf is under pressure. He is now facing two fronts; the terrorist threat that remains alive and strengthened and a political situation that does not augur well at all, the potential of a nationwide conflagration being very real. He may not find it easy to suppress people's resentment for long.
International pressure is mounting, but his greatest backer, the US, is in a catch-22 situation. The so-called protagonist of democratic governance worldwide cannot afford to be seen to be supporting a virtually military regime, yet the US cannot pull out its support to Pakistan, its strongest ally in its so-called war against terror.
While military rulers have never been known to hand over power peacefully, it's ones hope that the Pak president would draw lessons from history and restore power to where it belongs -- the people. Although election has been promised for Jan 2008, the point at issue is President Musharraf himself, who most consider is a part of the problem.
It is not external pressure that will determine the political dispensation in Pakistan for now and the future. It will depend entirely on what the people of Pakistan want. Pakistanis realise that military rule can never be a panacea, and certainly must never be considered as an alternative to political solution. They want a change in the status quo. Whether they can make that happen is quite another matter.
The author is Editor, Defense & Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.
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