As I See It
Back from the future
On Monday Nov 5, rumours about a military coup swept through the country like wildfire, they were false. Paraphrasing Mark Twain, "the rumours about Musharraf's exit were greatly exaggerated." Military men (and not necessarily generals) in third world countries see themselves as potential saviours of the nation, very few get the opportunity (or have the courage) to translate their dreams into reality.
For every successful military coup, many more have been failures. Coups only succeed in Pakistan, or have succeeded until now, because they were led by the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Army (Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan), and after the nomenclature of the Army Chief was changed to the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) (Ziaul Haq and Pervez Musharraf). One can well understand why Musharraf is reluctant to give up the COAS post, the rumours could well have come true.
While all of us welcomed the restoration of Chief Justice (CJ) Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry to his office, and era of the judicial activism it heralded, there was concern and disquiet in the public about the SC's orders to re-open Lal Masjid and free the terrorists caught in the bloody confrontation. In restoring "the rule of law" the honourable justices unfortunately brought us perilously close to conditions of anarchy.
The Supreme Court (SC) and the Sindh High Court (SHC) were intent on waging legal guerilla warfare through the "suo moto" mechanism in taking over the functions of government, in fact came close to paralysing part of the government machinery.
While one does not condone the high-handedness of the law enforcement agencies, being increasingly dragged into court, the rank and file were bewildered as to which authority to answer to. On the one hand, one cherished the judicial activism restoring the fundamental rights of citizens. On the other, the conservative streak was appalled at the judiciary running berserk in encroaching upon the executive privilege of governance. Already beset by myriad problems, the confrontation between the executive and judiciary evoked deep apprehension among the populace.
As if on cue, Newsweek called Pakistan "the most dangerous place on earth!" A master of timing, Pervez Musharraf grabbed the opportunity afforded by the circumstances to fulfill his personal ambition of extending his rule. In a world driven by media-influenced perceptions the term "martial law" is not kosher anymore; it is camouflaged in Pakistan by the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO). Successfully used in the past, it was successfully used again to dump the recalcitrant off the superior judiciary. One small step by Musharraf, the PCO is one giant step into the past for Pakistan!
The atrocious situation in FATA remains generally removed from public attention, but, being a frequent destination of choice for domestic tourists, Swat is very much in the public eye. There has been consternation among the public, which is increasingly skeptical about the efficacy (and success thereof) of the "war against terrorism."
The horrific Karachi blast (and various bomb blasts in the country before and after Oct 18) did amount to "casus belli" for imposing emergency. Musharraf was well on his way to restoring democracy, albeit with a power-sharing arrangement; the judiciary had other ideas. Boxed legally into a Catch-22 situation on the uniform issue, Pervez Musharraf is not the sort to roll over and play dead; he is lethal when he seems down and out. His past history is replete with calculated risks, and some not so calculated.
To his credit he did try patience in the face of grave provocation, and when that failed Musharraf did what he is very good at, carry the fight to the opposition. The PCO-created vacancies in the various Courts are being rapidly filled by those more amenable to "necessity." Instead of delaying the process by further prevarication, one should pragmatically accept the situation as a fait accompli and get on with it.
It will be quite a miracle if the newly constituted SC does not overturn the legal challenge to his fighting the election in uniform. Once over that technicality, Pervez Musharraf should take oath of office as president, on or before Nov 15; and, in keeping with the affidavit to the SC, he should take off his uniform before taking the oath.
Having ensured his survival, Musharraf's objectives are (or should be) to contain the protests from spinning out of control, salvage the image of the army, which has taken quite a beating and redeem his own image which has taken a greater beating domestically and internationally.
Without getting provoked (or seeming to succumb) by the "demands" being made internationally and internally, the order of business will be to immediately mandate a caretaker with no alignments or preferences to carry out free and fair elections within 60 to 90 days of the dissolution of the assemblies. Constructive engagement with major political parties for a genuinely neutral caretaker set-up will be the acid test for ensuring credibility of the electoral process.
While the "war against terrorism" is unfortunately necessary, there are sensitivities as to the "modus operandi" of conducting such a war against one's own people. The US's postponing/cancelling of scheduled talks on defence matters gives us a convenient way out, all military cooperation must be suspended till discussions remove the differences. We need to put on display the little self-respect we have left!
Though we are grateful to the US for the generous military aid, they cannot dictate to us about the conduct of the war.
The army's presence in Fata has compromised traditional tribal authority. With bases as static targets to attack at will, the logistics and routes thereof even more vulnerable, the militants have an upper hand. Far from being on the offensive, the army is on the defensive. Moving out of Fata immediately, the army should position helicopter-borne forces in the vicinity.
The tribals must be re-entrusted with their historical responsibility of defending the country's frontiers, and maintaining the peace in their areas. Movement should be allowed only on some arterial roads, manned and unmanned aerial vehicles being used for monitoring purposes. If and when the tribals fail this commitment, the federal government has the right to interdict, intercept and destroy the militants.
The army must operate from a position of strength, power is what the tribals understand. In Swat the demography does not have a tribal structure as in Fata, and there is no substitute for direct action to eliminate the militant threat. The mullahs moved into the vacuum created by years of bureaucratic lethargy, neglect and incompetence, replacing the benign autocracy of the Wali of Swat.
A referendum must ascertain public desire about enforcement of Shahriah in the affected districts, with local elders working through "Jirgas" to ensure the unconditional laying down of weapons and restoration of the rule of law. FATA (and other backward mountainous areas) needs meaningful economic initiatives as a dire necessity.
After ensuring a transparent and free electoral exercise, the army must recede from the affairs of the country, not only in word but also in deed. Whatever semantics one indulges in, at the end of the day we need this much-maligned army to hold this country together.
Ikram Sehgal is an eminent Pakistani political analyst and columnist.
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