Pakistan's coup within a coup

Photo: AFP
With characteristic recklessness, General Pervez Musharraf has undermined Pakistan's fragile democratic institutions, and plunged it into frightening instability. His "emergency" is nothing but unadulterated martial law imposed by a desperate dictator bereft of a strategy to resolve any of the problems his own rule has aggravated. Gen. Musharraf's main targets are the judiciary, lawyers, the media, and civil society organisations (CSOs). Especially nasty is his dismissal of the chief justice, his assault on the Supreme Court, and his order that its judges and those of the High Courts swear allegiance to his regime. With his coup, he has managed to illegally quash all petitions against his election as president. Yet, we must all be impressed by the intensity and defiant spirit of the protesting lawyers and CSO activists. If mainstream parties join in, the protests could acquire irresistible force. Signs are emerging that Gen. Musharraf's decision to impose martial law didn't have the full backing of the establishment, even the military. Some of his advisers opposed it. He cited 11 different reasons, eight of which pertain to the judiciary's "interference in executive functions," including "control of terrorist activity, economic policy … and urban planning." These won't wash. The judiciary did assert itself -- largely justifiably, in the Pakistan Steel Mills case, Chief Justice Choudhry's reinstatement, and inquiries into "missing persons" cases, etc. Admittedly, it also indulged in some grandstanding. However, Gen. Musharraf went along with all this -- conveniently forgetting constitutional propriety. He criticised the judiciary only when he sensed it might rule against his election as president. Then, he ruthlessly perpetuated his rule while citing grand causes like "threats to the nation." Some Supreme Court interventions seem questionable, like ordering the government to reopen the Lal Masjid and release 61 suspects long held without charges. Ironically, the judges involved, Mohammad Nawaz Abbasi and Faqir Mohammad Khokhar, took the new oath of allegiance to Gen. Musharraf! Even more unconvincing are the other reasons cited for martial law: viz, protecting Pakistan against "extremism" and "terrorism." These forces have indeed grown, especially in the North-West Frontier Province, North and South Waziristan, Bajaur, and most recently, Swat. However, their growth can be largely attributed to Gen. Musharraf's inept, half-hearted military operations against the extremists, coupled with his strategy of cutting unviable deals with them. He got $11 billion from the US to fight its Global War on Terror (GWoT). But he didn't deliver. It's not lack of military powers or judicial constraints that has hobbled the fight against the fundamentalists. The real constraint lies in the demoralisation of Pakistan's security forces, their high casualty rates, and desertions, estimated at more than 150. Such desertions have occurred for the first time since the Bangladesh War. As GWoT spills over into Pakistan, the colonial Durand Line, artificially drawn to run through the Pashtun belt, is under serious threat. Gen. Musharraf has no strategy to meet that threat. Meanwhile, the US wants to send in troops across the border in pursuit of al-Qaeda/Taliban elements. This growing -- and serious -- threat to Pakistan's control over its tribal frontiers has arisen because GWoT has gone haywire in Afghanistan, and Gen. Musharraf's strategy in fighting pro-Taliban forces has proved bankrupt. The US may yet add to these complications by disastrously replicating in the region the myopic policies it pursues in Iraq and Afghanistan. Gen. Musharraf's martial law is certain to increase public alienation, social turmoil and political instability. That will prove conducive to the further growth of extremism. Gen. Musharraf has aborted the democratic political process, which alone could have acted as a buffer against extremism. Ms. Benazir Bhutto is perfectly right in saying that military dictatorship and fundamentalism will feed on each other. But she herself has been collusive in creating these conditions. Had she not entered into a US-brokered deal with Gen. Musharraf, which let her off corruption charges in return for her tacit support to his election as president, events could have shaped differently. Instead, she prevented her Pakistan People's Party from joining the pro-democracy agitation, and made many unsavoury compromises. It's not clear that she has learnt her lesson. Her 48-hour trip to Dubai at a critical juncture, probably after being tipped off about martial law, and her return, possibly after secret talks with Gen. Musharraf and the Americans, suggest otherwise. The future of the other major player, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, remains uncertain. Whether his PML(N) will join, broaden and energise the anti-martial law struggle is unclear. At any rate, the present moment should settle the Pakistani debate between the "transitionists" (who want gradual change to democracy), and the "transformationists" (who stand for radical or quantum shifts). Pakistan can make no progress, whether slow or rapid, towards authentic democracy without a mass mobilisation. This alone can generate the moral-political climate, which deters the army from brutalising protestors. Another thing is clear too. By targeting Pakistan's CSOs, which represent secular liberals, Gen. Musharraf has undermined the chance of building a political climate that could help him combat extremism without becoming slavishly dependent on the US. There's some uncertainty over how strongly Washington will use its leverage over Gen. Musharraf to get martial law lifted. Left to itself, it wouldn't have gone beyond "regretting" the coup. The New York Times says many US officials want to "keep billions of dollars flowing to Pakistan's military" because they see Gen. Musharraf as their best bet in fighting al-Qaeda/Taliban. Yet, when President Bush and Secretary Condoleezza Rice, shamed by the street-level protests in Pakistan, demanded that Gen. Musharraf "take off his uniform" and "quickly return to a constitutional path," the Pakistan establishment announced that elections would be held soon. So, political pressure can yield results, but in tandem with mass protests. In their absence, it won't. A historic chance awaits Ms. Bhutto: she can make minor, personal gains while allowing the army to prolong its rule; or she can help transform Pakistan into a real democracy. Praful Bidwai is an eminent Indian columnist.
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