As I See It
Breaking the impasse
A genuinely neutral federal caretaker cabinet to oversee the conduct of a fair and transparent electoral process was an acid test for Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Looking forward to his peaceful transition from being uniformed president to a civilian one, one was probably naïve to assume that given the transition a higher calling would overcome the requirements of self-survival and demands of realpolitik of Pakistani power politics, that as his lasting legacy he would ensure elections without rigging or manipulation. To those of us who count themselves as Musharraf's friends, he has failed a crucial testof sincerity.
While those appointed to the caretaker cabinet have generally good reputations, the likes of senate chairman turned caretaker PM Mohammadmian Soomro are clearly aligned to Pervez Musharraf; that is not only public perception, it is a fact.
Even if they were to conduct genuinely fair general elections a majority of the intelligentsia and the masses would not accept the result. The credibility of the electoral process can only be ensured by the mass public perception that the caretakers are not puppets on a string manipulated by Musharraf.
Musharraf's selection of the bad option has ensured its rejection by opposition political parties, causing further doubt about the neutrality of the whole electoral process. If the aim was to keep the opposition from contesting, it will have succeeded; will this give legitimacy to the general elections? Not only are we doomed to stay in a state of prolonged crisis, history is witness that in such circumstances authoritarian regimes lacking widespread public support have to give way.
Given that the country's image has suffered grievously, is Musharraf prepared to accept irretrievable collateral (and probably lasting) damage to the integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan?
The opposition political parties have not helped by their intransigent attitude. One can understand PML(N) frustrations, their leader was ejected bodily from Pakistan. Without Mian Nawaz Sharif's presence to galvanise his supporters the PML(N) electoral performance will certainly suffer.
While in Sindh her supporters remain in great numbers, in Punjab Ms. Benazir has clearly lost considerable ground. In the NWFP and Balochistan she is now bereft of virtually any support, a real tragedy for what was once a truly national party. One, thus, understands Ms. Benazir's need to walk away from her deal with Musharraf and abort the general elections.
With the PML(N) led by Mian Nawaz Sharif taking part, the PPP may not have maximum seats in the National Assembly (NA), belying the perception of undisputed majority leader of Pakistan she has assiduously fed the west. It is in her personal interest, if not the PPP's, to scuttle the elections.
Wielding considerable political clout, with or without elections Ms. Benazir will remain a major political entity. The MMA is also less than enthusiastic about the elections, their seats in 2002 were won because of the concentration of votes of the religious parties as opposed to the internal divisions of PML(N), PPP and ANP in the Frontier and Balochistan.
This time around, incumbency will cause their numbers to diminish considerably, they will be wiped out in the NWFP plains but will retain their mountain strongholds in the North (JI) and the South, JUI(F).
In a day or two, the Supreme Court (SC) will allow the Election Commission (EC) to officially notify the results of the presidential elections, thus removing the last legal hurdle for Musharraf taking off his uniform and taking oath of office as a civilian president.
While there are extenuating circumstances the emergency was imposed for one reason and one reason alone, it can now be lifted. The post of COAS Pakistan army falling vacant, the VCOAS Gen Ashfaq Kayani will take over.
This will not ease the crisis; the political parties will then pressurise the new COAS to remove Musharraf. Kayani may be personally loyal to the man who handpicked him to be COAS, which brings with it unparalleled power (and responsibility thereof).
The incumbent will begin to feel this once he settles into his seat. The predicament of the COAS Pakistan army when there is an internal crisis in Pakistan is comparable to the loneliness of the long-distance runner.
The ruling PML(Q) continues to retain considerable political power and, along with its coalition allies such as MQM and the others, cannot be ignored.
And even civilian President Pervez Musharraf cannot be written off. He let a hundred flowers bloom in the electronic media thinking this would give him their loyalty, these turned into cacti.
Pilloried from pillar to post he has hastened to turn the spigot of media venom off, the freedom once taken will be defended to the death by the media. His die-hard faithful concede he has made mistakes but in the same breath argue that his achievements far exceed his failures.
To put it bluntly, even without the cloak of uniform, one cannot sweep aside the political forces aligned to Musharraf. Even though the army may not have the same reluctance to move against Musharraf when he was chief, it will certainly not stand by and see him humiliated; it would want him to have a graceful exit.
Out in the cold for nearly a decade, the opposition plans for a Musharraf shorn of authority are not forgiving, by extension their anger is also directed against the army, whose teeth they want to draw out permanently.
The army would be naïve to assume otherwise; would the military hierarchy put themselves voluntarily at the mercy of those they have reason to find wanting in integrity and competence?
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto died for one reason and one reason alone, judicial. His murder was a matter of sulf-survival for Gen. Ziaul Haq. Bhutto had promised that if he came to power he would hang Zia; since Zia had the power to do so he used it in an exercise in self-defence.
In their own interest, the opposition political parties need to engage with the Musharraf regime and get a genuine caretaker regime in place so that a free and fair electoral process can get them back into governance, albeit with checks and balances.
On his part, Musharraf should not take 2007 to be 2002, he will not be able to confront the disparate militant forces without compromise. If negotiations fail, one can expect the 1993 solution, duly modified to reflect the realpolitik obtaining today in 2007.
In 1993 Gen. Waheed Kakar created history by refusing the open invitation to take over. As COAS he sent both the president and PM home but supported a neutral caretaker. PM Moeen Qureshi held general elections.
Barring elections on schedule, in a best-case scenario the president will have a graceful exit while a genuinely neutral caretaker regime on the "Bangladesh model" carries out accountability so that the political parties are cleansed of the corrupt, something Musharraf promised in 1999 but compromised in 2002.
In any event, the black law, the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) must go! During this period, electronic media may remain deprived of the absolute freedom they enjoyed until the last few weeks of the Musharraf regime.
Are we ready for such a "cooling-off" period of 18-24 months? On the other hand, if the impasse persists, and if possible anarchy looms, the army will have no option but reluctantly take recourse to the worst-case scenario, imposition of martial law.
If the army has learnt any lessons from the Musharraf period and the present crisis the next period of military rule may not be as benign as Musharraf's has been.
Ikram Sehgal is an eminent Pakistani political analyst and columnist.
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