Plain Words
Emergency's ugly children
Emergency has ended, but not before it had done its work: amended the constitution further; the president can do without the usual Indemnity Act to validate his illegal and unconstitutional acts; the judiciary has been purged, and at least one troublesome judge has probably been exiled. Such measures have completed the framework within which 2008 elections will be held.
One had occasion to suggest in this space that "agencies" have honed the art and craft of "managing" elections. All elections since 1970 were efficiently rigged. There is no reason to suppose that the January 8 elections will produce results that can surprise the powers that be. And which are these powers?
While there is no uncertainty about the locals' identity: one person and one institution, viz. ex-Gen Musharraf and the Pakistan army. There is now no pretence of sovereignty; all the shots are being called by the US and its friends in the Middle East and Europe, ably implemented by collaborators in Pakistan, Musharraf and the army.
And Americans have said it: speaking before a Congressional committee, the US Under Secretary of State Richard Boucher has declared: "The January 8, 2008, elections in Pakistan will not be perfect." Who should know better? Pakistanis, voters or abstainers, should expect the results desired by these powers that be.
The people will scarcely be convinced of the official results, or that they can lead to resolution of major problems. Who can miss the significance of Musharraf's November 3 actions? He wanted to sack an assertive judiciary, and he has all but succeeded. His other purpose of the November 3 actions was to browbeat and cow down the media, electronic and the press.
He has succeeded here, too. These are preparations for January 8 elections. He saw the Pakistani people to be politically unaware and docile, who regard the government as the ultimate power -- quite like fate.
The point that needs to be made is that times are changing even in Pakistan. Blind would be the man who cannot see the changes wrought by the 9 months' lawyers' and civil society's movement. The common people, poor and unlettered though they may be, have clearly shown their preferences.
They do understand why Musharraf tried to sack Mr. Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, and what he intends doing. The awe and fear of authority has not disappeared, but is distinctly less. The docility and ignorance are also considerably less than before. In many ways, it is a new Pakistan.
Powers that be must be told that the consequences of ignoring true popular wishes, and pretending that people would accept all schemes of retired Gen. Musharraf, is a dangerous delusion. An un-free election is a fraud, and nobody likes to be fooled. A price will have to be paid for defrauding the people: holding an election and producing results that voters did not want can only make them angry. They would listen to the opponents of Musharraf, and the parties that supported him will receive appropriate punishment.
Shouldn't authority be afraid of the disappointment and anger of the people? The military has dominated Pakistan's politics for 55 years. All variations on the theme have been seen: Martial laws, military-controlled civilian governments, and now Musharraf's regime that has finally showed where everyone stands: subjects of President Musharraf, who is the viceroy of the United States of America.
This is a clear, and perhaps final, reversion to the colonial period. The US-Pak army condominium is surely a slavery. One way or another, the lawyers' and civil society's movement is objectively a national liberation movement.
The country happens to be polarised between this semi-foreign, semi-comprador regime on the one hand, and a growing number of Pakistanis on the other. This is not a violent confrontation from people's side. It is the regime that is likely to instigate people to violence so they can be crushed with the greater state violence.
The leaders of civil society's movement can only ask the people to remain non-violent and use arguments. When this confrontation will mature and come to a head cannot be foreseen because much depends on Authority's behaviour.
But there are other considerations. The regime is likely to work out a deal with JUI in the hope that a modus vivendi can be evolved with the Taliban and other extremists through the good offices of Maulana Fazlur Rehman. The Americans and the Pakistan army are no strangers to Taliban; they have worked together before. Insofar as anyone can decipher, the immediate American aim in Afghanistan is bound to be to seek a deal with Taliban with the help of Pakistani generals and religious elements.
On that flickering hope depends the solution of the Pakistan army's problems in Fata and other NWFP areas. Whether this will succeed is hard to say. It is not easy after all the bloodshed and the pervasive anti-American sentiment not only in the Afghanistan and Pushtoon belts in Pakistan but also in Pakistan.
Pakistanis who do not share the military's illusions do not see Islamic extremism subsiding in Pakistan through such schemes. Islamic extremism is a distortion of certain ideas about Islam and cannot be removed or killed with guns. It can be replaced with other ideas. No gun has been invented that can kill an idea.
Behind the popularity of Islamic extremism lie social and economic conditions in which the people are forced to live amidst much backwardness and poverty. These conditions make them lose hope, and prone to accept extremist ideas. Is it too difficult to appreciate that popularity of extremist ideas can be countered or diluted with economic development that actually confers concrete improvement to the people's lives?
No one will ever cease to be Muslim. Only, he can, under favourable social and economic conditions, be more tolerant of other views and even of dissent. After all, these areas were once Buddhist. During the Islamic period, most of their thinking was heavily influenced by Sufi poets. Given a true democratic dispensation -- that delivers concrete benefits to citizens -- not only dissent will be tolerated but other religions and cultures will also be tolerated.
How to create a democratic dispensation where people matter and their problems are resolved through combined official and popular actions? Would the election that agencies will manage create a democratic dispensation? Insofar as anyone can see, Pakistan would get governments like those that followed the mysterious death of Gen. Ziaul Haq, in which the troika -- army chief, president and PM representing parliament -- ruled.
The prime minister's house's gate became a revolving door; five prime ministers marched in and out in 11 years. Every change was some kind of a putsch executed indirectly by the then army chief. That is not a thrilling prospect. This time around, Mr. Musharraf has written new constitutional measures to ensure his continuation in office. This prospect can only make the civil-military polarisation worse.
Meanwhile let's not forget the economic situation: the food inflation is playing havoc; other inflations are bound to increase. The economy is actually threatened with eventual meltdown. The export drive is fizzling out, with the manufacturing sector faltering and agriculture semi-stagnant and a victim of the private sector's racketeering.
Fiscal deficit is growing as much as the current account, and so is the foreign debts rising. All the old ills -- over-consumption, too small savings and fewer investments, and too low tax-GDP ratio are back. Direct taxation of the rich has been eschewed, while the state's entire burden has been put on poorer sections. This cannot go on.
Debt servicing burden is increasing despite the relief expatriate Pakistanis are providing. Unless these imbalances and deficits are rectified, the economic future is bleak. It will be far more conducive to political agitation that may arise from election results.
M.B. Naqvi is a leading Pakistani columnist.
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