Going Deeper

Possible aftermath of the elections

Kazi Anwarul Masud
There is little doubt that mankind's evolutionary journey for the most optimum ideological system of governance in the "universalisation of western liberal democracy" as the end point of history is yet to be arrived at. The inequity one sees, particularly in the least developed countries like Bangladesh, in people battered by poverty created by both man and nature, lends credence to some scholars' economistic (capitalism versus socialism) theory of democratic development whereby "the developmental principle of democracy is vitiated by the extractive principle of capitalism." One can argue that in the early stages of western industrialisation, human values were routinely sacrificed on the altar of economic needs. Extension of this argument can also lead us to the possibility of net transfer of power to a chosen minority by the larger populace as prescribed by democracy, albeit for a certain period, and the further possibility that the "chosen few" could choose to be unaccountable to the electorate and prefer to conduct public affairs for personal benefit. Paradoxically, if democracy is sacrificed due to fear of misgovernment that occurred in the past, the possibility still remains that power, if given to the unelected few, could be also be abused. Since it would be difficult to devise a system in developing countries where poverty reigns supreme yet in which only honest and dedicated politicians would lead the country, elections would continue to remain a gamble because voting would be done on the basis of promises that mostly had not been kept in the past. If economic development is given precedence over liberal democracy by opting for "bureaucratic-authoritarianism" or "developmental dictatorship" then the possibility of denial of social justice remains. But, then, if we look at Bangladesh, where, despite decades of democratic rule, minimum wages were not paid to the labourers till recently the payment was forced upon the employers by the interim government, then questions are bound to be asked whether, in situations where calls for "duty to protect" do not exist and where fundamental rights are not trodden upon at will, whether "illiberal" democracy should not be acceptable. There can be no debate on the right of the people to determine their fate as the optimum political course to be followed. The western liberal democracies, developed through stages of absolute monarchy, feudalism, and authoritarianism, have now reached the stage of liberal democracy, where the elected representatives remain accountable to the electorate because the people retain the ultimate power to re-elect or reject, or even recall, their elected representatives. Some scholars have identified factors that serve promotion of democracy, such as the level of economic development, culture of democracy in any given society, demonstrated effects of the practice of democracy in neighbouring countries and, most importantly, craving in the people for democracy, as necessary preconditions for the practice of democracy. But many of the developing countries, including Bangladesh, lack some of these qualities. And, given the inconceivable scale of corruption indulged in by the immediate past alliance government, many people in Bangladesh are wondering whether, through the coming elections, another band of rogues will capture power. The most recent referendum in Venezuela, denying President Hugo Chavez the opportunity to be elected president for life, has demonstrated that people would like to reserve their right to take the final decision when the time comes. The problem arises that, since direct participatory democracy by the people is impossible in the present day context given the size of the territory and the number of people involved in any election, a mechanism may have to be devised to ensure that the wishes of the people are faithfully implemented. In Bangladesh, reforms of the institutions supportive of democracy undertaken by the interim government is likely to ensure a degree of confidence in the people. One may, however, consider formation of a National Security Council to oversee the implementation of the projects undertaken by the government, even though it has been elected by the people. In the formation of NSC, one has to take the most expansive definition of national security, that would include food security, environmental security, economic security, health, education, etc besides the traditional definition of securing the sovereignty and integrity of the country, and its membership should not be confined to only elected representatives but should also include persons holding high official/constitutional posts and eminent personalities respected by the people in general. The logic of having unelected people in the NSC is that many eminent personalities prefer not to get involved in the hustle and bustle of politics, but have superb qualities to contribute to the welfare of the country. The logic of a supervisory role for the NSC can be supported on the ground that the people may want an insurance against 2001-2006 period of kleptocracy. Moon & Kim, in their study of South Korean economy (A Circle of Paradox: Democracy and Development), have demonstrated that economic concentration raised per capita income from $103 in 1963 to $7,435 in 1993 without seriously distorting equality, quality of life, and distributional effects of economic performance. These were achieved mainly during the regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hawn, both far from being democrats. One may, therefore, wish to ponder whether, after achieving electoral democracy, concentration should not be given to economic development even at some degree of cost to social welfare (social cost is defined as the opportunity cost to society of the resources it uses). Undoubtedly, with the third wave of democratisation that took place after the end of the cold war and the dissipation of USSR, any argument on constriction of western liberal thoughts instantly becomes unpopular, regardless of the vast differences existing between the North and the South and no less among the fast growing developing countries and the LDCs. Yet, the poverty in Bangladesh, exposed once again by the Sidr, cannot but make one wonder whether there is a choice between elimination from semi-starvation stage and the "privilege" of casting vote once every five years for an uncertain future. One can argue that both democracy and development may be achieved simultaneously, albeit at a slower pace. Bangladeshis, having won independence through blood and tears, are more likely to opt for popular sovereignty by reserving "the right of the people to alter or abolish governments and to institute new governments" than to give away this right to a chosen few, however impeccable their credentials may be. Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former Secretary and Ambassador.