Post Breakfast
EU gets more involved in the Balkans
A feeling of relief has swept across the EU after the recent signing of the Lisbon Treaty late last year. Apprehension still exists about the subsequent ratification process but it is now generally agreed that the last Council has been a "watershed" for the EU. A year ago, few observers would have predicted that, at the end of 2007, the EU would be ready to move on after having agreed on a new Treaty.
The European Council Summit in December 2007 brought to an end the cycle of institutional reforms initiated six years ago at Laeken, near Brussels, with the famous Declaration that launched the Convention on the Future of Europe. With the formal signing of the Lisbon Treaty, a chapter in the European integration process characterized by recurrent Intergovernmental Conferences aimed at revisiting and revising the EU Treaties has come to an end. The Presidency Conclusions agreed at the Council should enable "the Union to fully concentrate on addressing the concrete challenges ahead."
It is now being anticipated that if the ratification process can be successfully concluded, then EU institutions can focus their attention on more urgent and concrete policy issues, starting with the status of Kosovo (and its potential ramifications) and other topics already on the agenda for the March 2008 European Council.
The Kosovo conundrum has continued to be an area of interest for me as a former Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this context I have followed closely not only the report delivered by the troika (EU, US and Russia) on 10 December on the negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, but also the decision taken by the Speaker of the Serbian Parliament (in the absence of an agreement between the government coalition parties) to set the first round of the presidential elections for 20 January, with a run-off in early February. The Foreign Ministers of the EU-27 took stock of the situation on 10 December and, after that, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov asked once again for further negotiations.
The Presidency Conclusions delivered on 14 December after the Council Summit were articulated around four elements -- acknowledgements by the EU-27 -- (1) that the troika had achieved some results (commitments to restraint on both sides) but had also "exhausted" it function: in other words, there were no more margins for a negotiated and bilaterally-agreed solution to the problem; (2) that (a) the status quo in Kosovo was unsustainable; and that (b) there was a "need to move forward towards a settlement" that is "essential for regional stability," (3) that such a settlement would constitute "a sui generis case that does not set any precedent," and (4) that "the EU stands ready to play a leading role in strengthening stability in the region and in implementing a settlement defining Kosovo's future status".
Such a movement forward was strategically significant. The consensus achieved on these initial elements was not a foregone conclusion: it did not exist a few months ago, and it looked in doubt even a few weeks ago. In other words, the EU, which appeared to be reluctant to agree to some form of independence for Kosovo, have now accepted this common approach.
The second element in the changing landscape of Europe was the decision to launch the civilian mission in Kosovo in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This was a primarily political decision, with the operational and technical details to be finalized at the first 2008 meeting of EU Foreign Ministers on 28 January. It is understood that plans are afoot for recruitment of a 1,800-strong force (including policemen, judicial experts and custom officials). Interestingly, the Presidency Conclusions also stressed the autonomous dimension of the EU decision, without making it dependent on a preliminary deliberation either by the United Nations Security Council or UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon. The message was quite clear: the ESDP mission will be launched anyway, playing on the generic wording of UNSC Resolution 1244 (establishing a "civilian international presence") that still regulates the state of affairs in Kosovo; and deployment will begin in the first months of 2008, in parallel with the progressive downsizing and phasing out of UNMIK (already well under way too). In other words, the EU-27 have decided unanimously to proceed, after many months of preparations, without waiting for a formal decision at the UN level, which remains blocked by Russian opposition. The calculation is that this may eventually lead to some sort of ex-post facto recognition by the UN, thus facilitating the final handover to European Union Force (EUFOR) Kosovo and its appointed head, the Dutch EU Council official Pieter Feith.
The future prospects regarding Serbia was the third element in the complex agreement arrived at within the EU-27. This also underlined the growing assertiveness of the EU. After reaffirming that "the future of the Western Balkans lies within the European Union", the Presidency Conclusions insisted that Belgrade was a key factor for the stability and prosperity of the whole region. The European Council also encouraged Serbia "to meet the necessary conditions to allow the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) to be signed rabidly and, in the light of Serbia's considerable institutional capacity reiterated its "confidence that progress on the road towards the EU, including candidate status, can be accelerated". There was however reference to the December 2006 Conclusions, inserted at Dutch insistence at the last minute to reaffirm the conditionality still hanging over Serbia -- namely, the request for "full cooperation" with the International Tribunal (ICTY) in The Hague in the hunt for indicted war criminals, which has to be met before the SAA is formally signed and the candidate status eventually granted.
Such an approach has shown maturity on the part of the EU. This has also suggested balance and a two pronged strategy in the more or less veiled offer of fast-track candidate status (a 'sweetener' for Belgrade) on the one hand and the desire to avoid a likely clash between the EU and Serbia over Kosovo. Conditionality remains, in other words, but the emphasis is more on the visible rewards for compliance (which now include also a visa facilitation and readmission agreement) than on possible penalties for a lack thereof -- in the belief that overcoming the gridlock over Kosovo, one way or another, will eventually also be beneficial for Belgrade.
It is true that such a tentative roadmap will still be a hostage to a regional and international context, which might still disrupt the consensus achieved at the EU Summit. This consensus has however created some breathing space for the local authorities in Kosovo who appear to have accepted the need to avoid not only any unilateral declaration but also the need to coordinate with the EU and the US, and wait until at least after the presidential elections in Belgrade (in order not to play into the hands of the radical/nationalist camp).
The EU Foreign Ministers' meeting on 28 January is squeezed in between the two rounds of the presidential elections in Serbia, i.e. at a very delicate moment in domestic politics. This may force the postponement of some decisions to late February or even early March -- that is, until after the presidential elections due to be held in Russia. In the meantime, NATO has expressed its readiness to beef up its 16,000-strong military contingent in Kosovo if need be, to deter any possible escalation of violence on the ground, and a new General Prosecutor, the Belgian Serge Brammertz, is due to take over from Carla Del Ponte at the head of the ICTY in The Hague. These are all pieces that will certainly play a part in the intricate Kosovo puzzle in the weeks and months to come.
Since January 2008 it has been Slovenia's turn to be in charge of the EU Presidency. Slovenia is the first new Member State to take the EU helm since the 2004 enlargement. Its stint is coming at a delicate time, with the Kosovo 'file' high on the EU agenda. Less than two decades ago, Slovenia and Kosovo belonged in the same state structure, lying as they did at the opposite ends of the former Yugoslav spectrum in terms of economic and social indicators -- and Slovenia was also the first republic to secede from the Federation, in 1991. This will be a difficult test for Ljubljana, but at least Slovenia is familiar with the realities of the region and now has a tentative internal EU roadmap to follow.
Then comes France's Presidency, sandwiched between two new Member States. There is only one certainty-2008 will be a very interesting year for all Europeans.
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