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Suicide bombers: Why do they do it?
Why do certain individuals become suicide bombers? Experts say that when people think living or dying makes no difference in their situation, as they have been pushed to the wall, they act as suicide bombers.
In 2005, a very thought-provoking and analytical book was released. The book is titled
Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, and written by Robert Pape, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, where he teaches international politics, and the Director of the Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism.
Professor Pape has the advantage of being able to draw from a comprehensive international database developed by the Chicago project.
The project and the book are indicative of the value that can be gained from having well-supported academic terrorism research centres. They can do the kind of in-depth analysis that intelligence agencies do not generally have the time, inclination, or resources to undertake.
Pape's book looks at the growing suicide-terrorism that has plagued many countries in recent years, including the recent bombings on London's transportation system.
The author explains why suicide terrorism has come to be the chosen methodology, the strategic logic of suicide terrorism and those who commit it, and the individual logic and demographic profile of suicide bombers. He concludes by proposing a practical strategy for the future.
Pape believes that going into Afghanistan was the right thing to do for the Bush administration after 9/11, to deny al-Qaeda a sanctuary in Afghanistan, but he strongly believes that all the gains were squandered by the decision to invade Iraq.
Motive political, not religious
Pape does not engage in a partisan debate. Rather, he lays out the facts and evidence and draws obvious logical conclusions. He believes that it is difficult for a terrorist group to continue suicide attacks once it has attained its main objective, citing the example of Hezbollah not continuing suicide attacks against the US, France, or Israel once those countries withdrew from Lebanon. He believes that suicide attacks have political objectives, and that once the objectives are achieved, the attacks do not continue. Furthermore, he argues that when a weaker party, with not enough arms and ammunition against an opposing party, finds that injustice cannot be remedied through conventional means, it goes to the last resort of suicide attacks. He notes that, contrary to popular belief, today's suicide bombers are not mainly depressed, lonely individuals on the margins of society, nor are they religious fanatics. In fact, he says, most are socially integrated, productive members of their communities. That is why, ordinarily, neighbours are surprised that persons who looked normal and sensible in the community turned out to be suicide attackers. All the London attackers of July 7 were normal people who belonged to the middle class, some were students and one was a teacher. Most are walk-in volunteers, not long-time members of a terrorist organisation. They are often "cleanskins," as in the case of the London suicide attackers. Most join the cell only a matter of months before they conduct an operation. They don't necessarily hate Western values or Western society, but are angered by the West's strategic and foreign policies. Pape's thesis is that Bush's America has misread the primary motivation of suicide attackers. The faulty premise being that suicide terrorism, and al-Qaeda terrorism in particular, is mainly driven by an evil ideology based on Islamic fundamentalism. Tony Blair also came out with this belief after the London bombings and denied any link with the Iraq war, in which he took Britain along with the US to invade Iraq in March 2003. Pape asserts that, since 1980, more than half the suicide attackers have been secular, and nearly all have not been about religion (for example, Tamil Tigers or Irish Republic Army) but about a specific strategic purpose, namely to compel a country to withdraw its military forces or occupation from territories. He says that, until 2004, Tamil Tigers carried out 76 suicide attacks in Sri Lanka and outside, more than Hamas did in Israel (54). He has also showed that suicide attacks were not confined only to Islamic militants. US policy and suicide bombers
The author underscores that suicide terrorism today correlates with US military occupation of countries, or where the US supports dictators and one-party rulers. This is, in turn, frustrating for those seeking political change. They may come from the working class or from middle class, like the London bombers of July 7 or the 9/11 attackers. Ironically, almost all the suicide terrorists attacking the US or Britain come from countries that are allies of the West (it is reported that by far the largest proportion of suicide bombers by nationality in Iraq are Saudis, coming across the border from Saudi Arabia, not al-Qaeda fighters coming in through Syria). Iraq had no history of suicide attacks before the US invasion. Pape argues that a long-term solution in political terms is imperative, and military occupation should cease for the "spread of freedom and democracy." Democracy cannot be imposed on a country from outside. It has to grow from within a country, and it depends on the history, culture, societal structure, and presence of an educated class. Tribal loyalty is not an ideal basis for democratic values as the West understands them. Most of the countries in the Middle East belong to tribal-based societies, and it is difficult to forge strong bonds of nationalism disregarding tribal loyalty. He says that the best solution for the US is returning to a policy of "offshore balancing," while it works towards winning the hearts and minds of people in the Middle East. He believes that a return to the policy of "soft power," as distinct from "hard power," would secure US interests without spawning a new generation of suicide attackers. Professor Pape has shown with convincing evidence that the stereotype profiling of suicide bombers is wrong, and that the war on terrorism cannot be fought the way the US and Britain have been waging it. Pape argues against what President Bush and Prime Minister Blair have been saying about the mind-set and motivations of suicide attackers. He suggests that what is required is that political leaders should change their strategy and steer a bold new course for international peace and stability.
Pape does not engage in a partisan debate. Rather, he lays out the facts and evidence and draws obvious logical conclusions. He believes that it is difficult for a terrorist group to continue suicide attacks once it has attained its main objective, citing the example of Hezbollah not continuing suicide attacks against the US, France, or Israel once those countries withdrew from Lebanon. He believes that suicide attacks have political objectives, and that once the objectives are achieved, the attacks do not continue. Furthermore, he argues that when a weaker party, with not enough arms and ammunition against an opposing party, finds that injustice cannot be remedied through conventional means, it goes to the last resort of suicide attacks. He notes that, contrary to popular belief, today's suicide bombers are not mainly depressed, lonely individuals on the margins of society, nor are they religious fanatics. In fact, he says, most are socially integrated, productive members of their communities. That is why, ordinarily, neighbours are surprised that persons who looked normal and sensible in the community turned out to be suicide attackers. All the London attackers of July 7 were normal people who belonged to the middle class, some were students and one was a teacher. Most are walk-in volunteers, not long-time members of a terrorist organisation. They are often "cleanskins," as in the case of the London suicide attackers. Most join the cell only a matter of months before they conduct an operation. They don't necessarily hate Western values or Western society, but are angered by the West's strategic and foreign policies. Pape's thesis is that Bush's America has misread the primary motivation of suicide attackers. The faulty premise being that suicide terrorism, and al-Qaeda terrorism in particular, is mainly driven by an evil ideology based on Islamic fundamentalism. Tony Blair also came out with this belief after the London bombings and denied any link with the Iraq war, in which he took Britain along with the US to invade Iraq in March 2003. Pape asserts that, since 1980, more than half the suicide attackers have been secular, and nearly all have not been about religion (for example, Tamil Tigers or Irish Republic Army) but about a specific strategic purpose, namely to compel a country to withdraw its military forces or occupation from territories. He says that, until 2004, Tamil Tigers carried out 76 suicide attacks in Sri Lanka and outside, more than Hamas did in Israel (54). He has also showed that suicide attacks were not confined only to Islamic militants. US policy and suicide bombers
The author underscores that suicide terrorism today correlates with US military occupation of countries, or where the US supports dictators and one-party rulers. This is, in turn, frustrating for those seeking political change. They may come from the working class or from middle class, like the London bombers of July 7 or the 9/11 attackers. Ironically, almost all the suicide terrorists attacking the US or Britain come from countries that are allies of the West (it is reported that by far the largest proportion of suicide bombers by nationality in Iraq are Saudis, coming across the border from Saudi Arabia, not al-Qaeda fighters coming in through Syria). Iraq had no history of suicide attacks before the US invasion. Pape argues that a long-term solution in political terms is imperative, and military occupation should cease for the "spread of freedom and democracy." Democracy cannot be imposed on a country from outside. It has to grow from within a country, and it depends on the history, culture, societal structure, and presence of an educated class. Tribal loyalty is not an ideal basis for democratic values as the West understands them. Most of the countries in the Middle East belong to tribal-based societies, and it is difficult to forge strong bonds of nationalism disregarding tribal loyalty. He says that the best solution for the US is returning to a policy of "offshore balancing," while it works towards winning the hearts and minds of people in the Middle East. He believes that a return to the policy of "soft power," as distinct from "hard power," would secure US interests without spawning a new generation of suicide attackers. Professor Pape has shown with convincing evidence that the stereotype profiling of suicide bombers is wrong, and that the war on terrorism cannot be fought the way the US and Britain have been waging it. Pape argues against what President Bush and Prime Minister Blair have been saying about the mind-set and motivations of suicide attackers. He suggests that what is required is that political leaders should change their strategy and steer a bold new course for international peace and stability.
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