Plain Words
Now or never
FIVE crises engulf Pakistan: Firstly, a virtually new Islam wants to rule the polity -- while democracy moves many. Secondly, the ongoing struggle between civil society and the erstwhile military dictator is a growing polarisation; lawyers are striving to end Musharraf's, and the military's, control.
The third is the oldest crisis, over the respective powers of the centre and the provinces. The issue has never been tackled up front. The effort was always to push the issue under the carpet, but the trauma of 1971 led to a consensus; the 1973 Constitution. But it has never worked in its original spirit; the concurrent list survives long after it should have been killed.
The fourth is the economic difficulties faced by the people. The economic crisis is deepening, and unless Pakistanis find means to sharply reduce poverty through a new development paradigm, the state may be sunk in a morass of underdevelopment, unemployment, poverty and high inflation on top of it all. An economic meltdown is also possible; this is feeding the two insurgencies mentioned earlier.
Pakistan's participation in the US War on Terror has given birth to the fifth crisis: it was originally about foreign policy that is morphing into a domestic political problem.
Few seem to know the magic formula to pull out of these crises. Although friendly advice, and cooperation from friendly nations, is welcome the fact is that Pakistanis have to cut through these crises by themselves. Since no magic wand exists, the first thing to do is to purge minds of cobwebs.
The issues of Islamic extremism, Taliban and militancy in NWFP's tribal areas are linked to two problems; the first is Taliban-like Islam itself. The second is the war in Afghanistan, which has obviously spilled over into Pakistan; while earlier Afghan crises were also an input into Pakistan. The problem should be seen in an historical perspective.
This new Islam is a recent development. It grew out of international intrigue concerning Afghanistan since the early 1970s, centred in Peshawar specifically. American CIA, British MI6, ISI, and Saudi and Iranian spook agencies were all involved. The original purpose was to change Afghanistan's status as a buffer by pulling it into the Western camp, sitting as it does as the door to central and northern Asia.
Pakistan had hosted this intrigue. It was a carrot and stick policy. The Shah of Iran played a dominant role. He promised the carrot; economic aid worth about $ 2 billion to President Sardar Mohammad Daud, including a railway from Torkhum to Kabul, and beyond.
The first instalment was also paid, and Daud was willing to join the West but needed time. The Afghan president needed to put down the leftists before embarking on an active pro-west policy.
Pakistan was to provide the stick, if required, and had assembled seven recognised rightwing Afghan religious parties in Peshawar. They kept a military stick ready at Quetta. These rightwing Afghan religious parties were needed for eventual use.
Daud took his time and, by 1978, was about to start eliminating the Afghan left. But the latter got wind of what Daud was up to, and pre-emptively overthrew him in the Saur Revolution in 1978.
The west was incensed, and decided not to let this new pro-Soviet Afghanistan become a part of the East. It retaliated against the Saur Revolution, with "seven sisters" providing Mujahideen to overthrow the pro-Soviet Kabul government.
The West provided money, equipment and direction. Jihad had started. The Hafizullah Amin government invited the Russian army. The Russians, alarmed by Western designs, sent in their army at the end of 1979. The rest is history.
The Soviet Army was comprehensively defeated; like any professional army, it knew nothing about fighting well-armed non-state actors who offered no fixed targets. After the Soviets' departure, the Mujahideen made short shrift of President Najibullah by pulling him out of UN camp. His body was desecrated.
Afghanistan fell plum into the Western lap, and the US left it to Pakistan to nurture a pro-west government in Afghanistan. Pakistan manufactured an Islamic government and installed it in Kabul. The Pakistan Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, offered thanksgiving prayers in the Grand Mosque of Kabul that same day.
However, the course of love between Pakistan and the Afghan government did not run smooth; soon, there were hiccups and differences. The Afghan government's seven components soon fell out among themselves and started fighting one another.
This civil war led to the Afghan state's disintegration. The splintered country came to be ruled by so-called district commanders or warlords. Pakistan became anxious of its fallout inside Pakistan and brought its secret weapon into play; the Taliban, who quickly overran most areas by special tactics likely to appeal to Afghans in a little over two years, establishing themselves in Kabul in 1996.
Taliban's Islam in action was instructive. They sacked all women employees. Girls were sent home from co-educational institutions. Women were deprived of virtually all cognisable human rights. The minorities fared worse, including the sectarian minority of Shias; not forgetting the massacre of Hazaras.
The vandalism of cultural artefacts shocked the world. Their high-watermark of crusade against idol worshiping was the destruction of historic, giant-sized Buddha statues carved on a mountainside.
The Taliban in NWFP's tribal areas is now spreading that same Islam. No major urban centre is now free from this virus. Its foundation is, of course, orthodox Islam (of Deobandi Maslak) that is prevalent throughout the subcontinent. But Taliban fanatics are a small minority in South Asia.
Much of Islam that is met in all areas is a syncretic Islam, in which music, art, poetry and other art forms are practiced. Indeed, it was through such vehicles that Islam spread. It is mostly about love, tolerance and acceptance of all forms of worship by those who worship their gods differently. Only a few things were prohibited. You can offer your prayers and keep fast as much as you like, but accept others' right to worship whichever god they want to worship. Old Islam is largely an acceptance of diversity and pluralism; it preached tolerance and love.
The Taliban Islam is Deobandi Islam, with accretions of Saudi opinions. Since Saudi Arabia doled out a lot of money to Islamic parties and groups, its interpretation of Islam, specifically the Salafi and Wahabi ideas, has been developing after 9/11, with resonance elsewhere also.
After the American invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan for no convincing reason, the anti-western slant became strident under Saudi inspiration; Taliban Islam became more intolerant and extra austere. It accepted no diversity or pluralism.
The warm reception to Taliban's in Pushtoon areas has ethnic reasons. The Taliban, both Afghans and Pakistanis, exemplify puritanical Islamic piety and austerity. Ordinary Pushtoons respect and fear the Taliban, though they do not love them. But this respect and acceptance is also a matter of worry.
This is not the Islam South Asians know, and causes unending strife within the body politic of Pakistan or wherever religious or sectarian minorities exist. They pose a danger that is ideological, cultural and political to Pakistan.
Taliban triumphs in the Frontier's tribal areas represent the emergence of an alternative state that claims to be establishing true Islam by enforcing Shariah and Quran in a certain way. This new state intends to displace Pakistan, and will be modelled on the Taliban regime.
Are Pakistanis ready for it? This is against traditional Islam as it violates the subcontinent's Indo-Persian civilisation. It needs to be fought, though not with the US-recommended means. Pakistanis cannot accept the American methodology. They need a more sophisticated way of doing it.
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