As I See It
The promise of October 12, 1999
THE February 18 election is supposedly meant to provide a transition from an autocratic government to a more welcome democratic one. What a turnaround from October 12, 1999, when an autocratic regime was welcomed with great enthusiasm by the people of Pakistan on the overthrow of a democratic one. Less than a week before February 18, one should analyse why the expectations of the people in the great promise of October 12 were dashed, and what the future holds for Pakistan.
The seven-point agenda ennunciated by Pervez Musharraf, on assuming power, included accountability of all those responsible for the economic and political straits Pakistan was in. Even with all the personality flaws in its senior hierarchy, the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) became an instant success in public perception.
Keeping the judiciary and military outside NAB's purview was a major mistake; it undermined the credibility of this great initiative; selective targeting further derailing the accountability process. Even after the political compromises of 2002, NAB's success story remains a mixed bag.
Its real problems started with the plea-bargaining (PB) concept. Other than the sheer immorality of letting a thief go scot-free if he gave back part of the loot, PB was misused as blackmail by some in NAB to line their own pockets.
Very correctly NAB turned to "living beyond means" as the modus operandi to NAB the guilty; someone, someday should bring to book those former NAB officials living way beyond their means. The National Reconciliation Order (NRO), an open invitation to loot and plunder at will, hobbles NAB badly.
NAB's effectiveness could be further diminished after February 18. What is it's future if the elected representatives set about dismantling the mechanism that targets their misdeeds and exists, even in shackles, as a deterrent against widespread corruption?
What about unmasking and prosecuting the corrupt in the military and the judiciary? The law must be fair in being applied equitably to all and sundry. While the fate of the superior judiciary will be decided by a future government, the judiciary itself has to put into place a self-cleansing process to restore its credibility.
Similarly, the armed forces must also carry out accountability within its ranks, a credible process being a dire necessity to restore its image. Evidencing of white-collar crime requires unearthing of hidden off-shore companies and bank accounts, secret investments, and real-estate holdings in different names, and of money "invested" in stock exchanges and Dubai, through whom, etc.
The Manual of Pakistan Military Law (MPML) caters for prosecuting corruption, and professional (particularly forensic) help can be sought from NAB for bringing the culprits to justice. The anti-corruption campaign can be in phases; in the first phase the prosecutors must target only those in the period October 12, 1999 till date, those involved in crimes earlier than October 12, 1999 can wait their turn in later phases.
All developed countries require lobbyists to be registered, if their motives for lobbying are acceptable for good governance. But, if they are not known to the public they may be cause for harm. In one well-known case post-1999, a senior minister actually pressurised a financial institution that his lobbyist friend (who was bankrupt) not only be paid a heavy retainer but also be assured of re-scheduling/writing off all his debts.
Military procurement in every country requires, by law, that agents (or lobbyists) have to be registered by their principals, their commission (or service charge) being included and declared in the prices quoted. Any money received beyond that, and if received abroad, constitutes illegality.
The acid test for the present military hierarchy will be to apply the scalpel to the influential as a deterrent against bribery. Corruption in military purchases is not Pakistan-specific; it is rampant all over the world. The "Tehelka" scam in India saw military officials being video-recorded while taking bribes.
However, in Pakistan not one arms or equipment agent has been successfully prosecuted, even with a wealth of evidence available. Influential agents (and their kith and kin in government) ensure that it is taboo to talk about the siphoned-off millions of dollars in commissions.
Look at the F-16s and the French submarines deals; even though there is a wealth of documented evidence, those living on the French Riviera and Tuscany in Italy off the fat of our land enjoy government patronage.
Defence Housing Authorities (DHAs) afford a clean, respectable, secure environment for our children to grow up in, providing for both education and leisure. Honest men like Maj Gen (Retd) Hedayetullah Khan (HUK) Niazi, the architect of what DHA Karachi is today (even though no one gave him the credit for the recently inaugurated power/desalination plant he initiated as far back as 1989), were an example to all, but what about "the untouchables" who give the DHAs (and by extension the whole military) a bad name by plot manipulations?
Some individuals have made billions in real estate transactions, it is well known! While Ashfaq Pervez Kayani is distancing the army from politics (and from the bureaucracy), he might also give priority to distancing the army from the undeserved perception of pervasive corruption. A stroke of the pen will "de-link" those (serving and retired) in proximity to Musharraf who still occupy semi-military offices of profit and are living symbols of corruption.
Our major problem is that intelligence reports are mostly fabricated and/or exaggerated. All those making false reports on motivated basis, either by official sanction or because of personal grudge and/or jealousy, must be prosecuted for their accusations and given the commensurate punishment their victims would have got if the reports were true.
Those who have served in the senior hierarchy of Frontier Works Organisation (FWO), National Logistics Cell (NLC), and other semi-military departments, where white-collar crime is rumoured to be endemic, need to be cleared of accusations (even though most of it is undeserved).
FWO and NLC have done magnificent work in difficult areas where others could not even dare to go, but this is tarnished because of commercial activity in areas other than their primary mission.
The corruption of a few reflects their lifestyles, is it fair that because of those individuals the public deems the whole military rank and file to be corrupt? More than 99% of the hard working, honest and highly professional cadre of the Pakistan army live and work in adverse conditions, but take the hit in public perception because of the avarice and greed of a handful. Why should the yoke of "military business" label be stuck around the neck of the army because of those who deserve to go to jail? Why should ammunition be given to our enemies, and those on their payroll, to embellish fact with fiction and convert fantasy into truth in public perception?
The army excels in "Lessons Learnt." Hopefully, it can take to heart what October 12 promised, and why we are on the edge of the precipice 100 months later, on February 18. There are significant indications of change, and it is not all in the air.
One must concede that in the last 3 months we are seeing a transformed army set on a course that gives us lingering hope that there is light at the end of the tunnel.
Comments