Bottom Line
Why did he do it?
Former prime minister Nawaz Sharif showed his guts on September 10 by returning to Pakistan, where he was born 57 years ago. Some say that the irony is that General Musharraf, who was born in Old Delhi in 1943 and migrated from India in 1947 with his father, took the decision to deport Pakistan-born Sharif from his birthplace.
The deportation to Saudi Arabia within a few hours of arrival of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif demonstrates not only the fragility of President Musharraf's hold on power, but may also constitute contempt of court.
It was the Supreme Court of Pakistan which ruled that no Pakistani citizen could be barred from returning to his/her country, and that any understanding or agreement not to return by a citizen went against the constitutional guarantees of a citizen, and could not be legally tenable.
Supporters of Nawaz Sharif have reportedly filed a challenge against his deportation to the Supreme Court for its ruling. Let us await the verdict of the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, rule of international law does not permit such a scenario because the protection given by the government to a citizen abroad is not available to that citizen in the circumstances, and that citizen becomes stateless.
President Musharraf seems to have convinced the Bush administration that he is the safest bet for war against terrorism, both in Afghanistan and Iraq. Any change of government in Pakistan would escalate the activities of Talibans, both in the Pakistan tribal belt and in Afghanistan.
Observers believe that the Musharraf government could not have deported Sharif without the support of the US and Saudi Arabia.
Observers believe that the Bush administration has influenced Saudi Arabia and Lebanon to intervene in Nawaz Sharif's case. Two emissaries -- one from Saudi Arabia and the other from Lebanon -- went to London to impress upon Nawaz Sharif not to return to Pakistan. Such action was regarded by Sharif as direct interference in the internal matter of Pakistan, and he rejected it.
President Bush wants to sell his "surge plan" effective in Iraq to the Congress and to the American people and, at this point of time, the US supports President Musharraf's military government, although the administration talks about defending democracy and freedom for people in other countries.
That is why Nawaz Sharif's deportation is seen by the US administration as "an internal matter," while the EU took an appropriate stance saying that Nawaz Sharif should have been given the chance to defend himself before the court for the new charges of tax evasion and corruption.
By supporting a fragile military regime in Pakistan, the Bush administration has disappointed many people and leaders in South Asia. In the long run, it will prove counter-productive to the US influence in the region, especially in democratic Pakistan.
General Musharraf ousted Nawaz Sharif, an elected prime minister of Pakistan, through a military coup in 1999. It was Sharif who had appointed him as the army chief over other generals of the army. Musharraf owes his present position to Nawaz Sharif, and he does not want to meet Sharif face to face. And Sharif has to go.
The deportation manifests the extreme nervousness of the Musharraf government in allowing Nawaz Sharif to stay on in the country They do not want him in Pakistan because his presence in the country, even though in custody, may bring the downfall of Musharraf's rule. What a situation the "strong man" faces in Pakistan!
Why has Musharraf's government become fragile?
First, his tenure as army chief expired in August 2003, when he reached retirement age, but a special law was passed so that he could keep both the posts -- army chief and president -- until November 15, 2007. He wants to be re-elected for another term as president, retaining the post of army chief as well.
This could be challenged in the Supreme Court, and he may have to relinquish the army chief position. He knows very well that all his powers emanate from being the army chief, not as president.
Second, he became very unpopular with the ill-conceived act of suspending the chief justice of the Supreme Court in March this year. His moral standing was severely undermined when the chief justice was reinstated by his own peers to his position in July. The independent-minded chief justice could be a thorn in the attempts to legalise Musharraf's future actions. The Court might not approve his retention of two positions.
Third, Musharraf wants to be elected by the current parliament in which his supporters hold the majority. But there is a view that he should be elected by the new parliament. This issue may ultimately reach to the Supreme Court for a ruling and he may lose the case.
Fourth, with all his powers he has had no luck with the militants who are increasing in the country. Bomb blasts have become a regular feature in the towns and cities. Moreover Baloch nationalists are a big headache for the government. His standing as a successful fighter against terrorism is being diminished, both in the country and in the outside world.
If the Supreme Court rules contempt of court against the government, it would be another severe blow to the president's standing and credibility.
The deportation may prove to be counter-productive in the long run. It may de-rail the deal that Musharraf wants to make with another leader, former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, to become the president. Bhutto may withdraw from the deal because it would be unpopular for her party to make a deal with the military president under the changed circumstances.
When a leader becomes unpopular, he or she tries to survive by all devices and means, but ultimately none succeeds. It is the people whose sentiments are important, and once they lose confidence in a leader there is no way that that the leader can survive for long. A leader must know when he/she should depart from the political scene, but in South Asia that is a rarity.
Barrister Harun ur Rashid is former Bangladesh ambassador to the UN, Geneva.
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