As I See It
The end of the tunnel
Pakistan's future is being played out this week in a courtroom drama in the Supreme Court (SC). With the "doctrine of necessity" now an evil phrase in Pakistani legal lexicon, how will SC interpret the laws, will technicality triumph or will pragmatism?
We are familiar with two extremes; dictatorship without accountability and democracy without check, what Pakistan really needs is an in-between genuine "power-sharing" arrangement.
When stray rumours about Musharraf-Bhutto "power-sharing deal" started to circulate from early this year, Mian Nawaz Sharif became apprehensive about being left as the odd man out in "the eternal triangle."
The last time around he had explored the possibility of becoming Amir-ul-Momineen, for the "born-again" democrat political survival was the prime motive behind his trying to bring all the political parties together in London on one platform.
Inadvertently Musharraf helped the Opposition coalesce by attempting to sack the Chief Justice (CJ), Mr. Iftikhar Chaudhry. To quote my article of May 10, 2007: "At the crossroads, […] there is seething resentment among the masses at the attitude of some among the ruling clique, particularly the agencies, that they can get away with anything. As for president's close advisors the less said the better. Every time he listens to them and their advice is usually motivated, he gets into trouble, and the country along with him gets into a crisis. The president has been inadvertently placed at a critical crossroads only a few months before his re-election as president. The honourable CJ's defiance will make power-sharing come about sooner than later, in this arrangement one believes Pervez Musharraf still has a role to play."
The manhandling of the CJ galvanised the lawyer community. In the cover of their struggle the political parties discovered that their voice started to matter, force-multiplied manifold by the media joining the wolf-pack of those literally baying for Musharraf's blood.
When the political parties finally met in London, PPP played coy. Ms. Benazir, who was in London at that time, did not head the PPP delegation. When the Abu-Dhabi meeting between Musharraf and Ms. Benazir became a public knowledge, Nawaz Sharif's situation became desperate in regards to his political future; the SC forcing his hand further by holding that he had every right to return.
With that hurdle gone and colleagues and followers urging him on, he had no real excuse to stay in exile without making public knowledge the arrangement that led to his exile in the first place.
Denying "ad nauseam" to the masses that any agreement existed with the government, the Sharifs also denied this before the SC. The "technicality" of an agreement brokered by Saad Hariri and guaranteed by the Saudis was glossed over.
When the truth came out later it damaged Sharif's credibility. Mian Nawaz Sharif's option became limited to only one; announcing the date of his return to the country. While in his heart of hearts Sharif knew he would be deported, he would have been politically dead if he had not attempted to return.
The "unarmed combat" principle, to use the enemy's strength against him is generally known as the "judo ploy," former commando Pervez Musharraf is adept at this. The attempted return to Pakistan of Mian Nawaz Sharif became a defining moment for Musharraf, any sign of weakness would have caused a meltdown of his support, some had already deserted, and many were ready to switch sides.
The international media in attendance gave a set-piece opportunity to the "boss" to display his power, contempt of the SC notwithstanding. Musharraf's "show of force" in packing the former PM off back to Saudi Arabia was a deliberate and a clear signal to friend and foe alike that he was not going to roll over and play dead. Many wavering on the fail-safe line became "born-again" Musharraf supporters.
The ball is now in the SC's court. Mr. Akram Shaikh's attempt to get a full Bench to hear the case indicated that he felt that the 8-member Bench announced by the CJ was weighted in Musharraf's favour. That plea, despite "discussion," was rejected, confirming the apprehensions of the Opposition.
In the meantime the election commission "cleared" the technicalities of the uniform, what will the SC do? In a sudden move Musharraf made the issue of the uniform almost infructuous by a categorical filling before the SC about doffing the uniform before he takes oath of office as president.
He follows the teachings of Germany's Commando Extraordinary Col Otto Von Skorzeny: "If man be the weapon, the bullet the weapon fires must be surprise." A mixed verdict is perhaps in the offing, re-election in uniform will be out but he would be eligible to do so without it.
The president is using the uniform as a bargaining ploy; concerns about legitimacy within and outside the country will ensure that he will fight the election without the uniform.
One expects he will doff the uniform on or before October 8, 2007. Election from the present Assemblies is in fact the real issue other than the time-bar, Musharraf has succeeded in his strategic objective using diversionary tactics embroiling the Opposition in extraneous issues.
Except for the National Assembly (NA), none of the other Assemblies make up the Electoral College, their members do. If the NWFP Assembly is dissolved as threatened by the Opposition, the presidential elections can still proceed.
Paraphrasing Mark Twain's reaction when he was told about news of his death being circulated, I had written: "The rumours of Musharraf's departure are greatly exaggerated. This man is at his best when he is in a corner, this soldier may have been politically wounded but it is when he is seemingly down when he can be quite lethal. Musharraf is not going anywhere, at least not yet! Neither is Shaukat Aziz." This observation stands true six months later.
To quote my article of June 18, 2007, in an article "master of the game," "The president should head the armed forces and the national intelligence board (with all intelligence agencies reporting to the board), this will prevent intelligence agencies being used for political purposes.
The Office of the president should not be a political one; this is easier said than done given that he (or she) must be elected by exercise of adult franchise. The Chief Justice should administer a financially independent judiciary and the national accountability board (Nab on the Pakistani pattern but under the superior judiciary) under his authority with powers to target the functionaries of the judiciary and the Armed Forces."
While the usual classic mistakes of governance in an enduring search for survivability scar his otherwise benign rule, Musharraf's successes still far outmatch his failures.
Musharraf has recently said that the "Elections 2007" will decide Pakistan's destiny, one believes it is the way the elections are conducted that will decide the country's destiny. Musharraf has both the vision and courage to fulfil this "destiny," one might add, while he is still the master of the game!
Even though the light at the end of the tunnel reveals a sign-board reading "power-sharing is a must for Pakistan," it will be useless if the power players in Pakistan choose to ignore it.
Ikram Sehgal is an eminent Pakistani political analyst and columnist.
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