The Praful Bidwai Column

Political endgame in Pakistan

Praful Bidwai writes from New Delhi
Ms. Benazir Bhutto has reportedly struck a deal with President Pervez Musharraf, under which corruption cases filed against her between 1985 and 1999 will be dropped, and she will tacitly support his election as Pakistan's president. Although details aren't available at the time of writing, the understanding has all the makings of a collusive agreement which promotes the narrow self-interest of two individuals, but does nothing to limit the role of the military in public life, or restrain the president from sacking elected governments and even parliament. Nothing now stands between Gen. Musharraf and the presidency (which he can win only by violating democracy's spirit) barring Pakistan's Supreme Court, which is hearing petitions challenging his candidature. If the court acts like it did on September 28 by dismissing similar petitions, it will let down many democratically-minded Pakistanis who came to trust it after it reinstated Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and affirmed the right of exiled former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to return. Yet, its verdict can go either way. The court's earlier judgment upheld the Election Commission's flagrant manipulation of rules which forbid anyone who holds an office of profit from contesting elections for two years. This was manifestly bad in law. Evidently, the All Parties' Democratic Movement (APDM), led by the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), put all its eggs in the court's basket. It should have understood that its Chaudhry case judgment was driven less by respect for democracy than a concern to defuse the lawyers' agitation for his reinstatement. The court failed to give effect to its own judgment on Mr. Sharif's right to return, avoiding a confrontation with the army. It may not be unfair to conclude that Pakistan's democratic institutions are too compromised by prolonged military interference to be relied upon to uphold constitutional principle. Its mainstream parties aren't strong or willing to complete the process of full democratisation. This raises what might be called a "chicken-and-egg" problem. How can Pakistan make a much-needed transition to full democracy while its political and juridical institutions are weak? And yet, how can its institutions facilitate (or at least not obstruct) that transition in the face of authoritarian pressures to compromise themselves -- just to survive? The moral-political pressure of a mass mobilisation for democracy alone can cut this Gordian knot. But the APDM hasn't generated such pressure. Had the PML(N) sustained its mass campaign in support of Sharif's right to return after he was deported to Saudi Arabia, things would have evolved differently. But this didn't happen. At any rate, another round in the fight for democracy has been lost. But this isn't the last round. A new one may have begun with the Benazir-Musharraf deal and the announcement that Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani will succeed Gen. Musharraf as army chief. How the fight for democracy is played out will be decided by four factors: the political parties' tactics, the higher judiciary's role, the masses' mood, and the United States' calculations. Among Pakistan's parties, the APDM alone seems determined to try to discredit the presidential election by getting its lawmakers to resign. It wants to dissolve the NWFP Assembly. However, the PML(Q) has moved a no-confidence motion against the government to prevent this before October 6. How this plays out remains to be seen at the time of writing. A potential spoiler is the Jamiut-ul-Ulema's Maulana Fazlur Rahman, who plays both sides of the street. Perhaps an even greater negative may be Ms. Bhutto. Pakistan's higher judiciary, its image burnished, can assert greater independence. But this, as of now, is an open question. Pakistani public opinion has decisively turned against the army. Recent surveys say Gen. Musharraf's approval ratings have dipped to just 34 percent from 60 percent in mid-2006. Fifty-eight percent of respondents give his government "poor" or "very poor" marks; 56 percent say they feel less safe than a year ago. The US role could become overwhelmingly important. Washington favours the Pakistan army strongly over civilian leaders. The presence in Islamabad of senior State Department officials as Mr. Sharif was being deported showed their approval of Gen. Musharraf. Gen. Musharraf's latest overtures to the US, and Gen. Kiyani's appointment, will strengthen this relationship. Newsweek says Gen. Kiyani is "smart, tough, talented, and pro-Western" --the preferred choice of "Western military officials." Ms. Bhutto too has been wooing Washington with offers of allowing international agencies to interrogate Dr. A.Q. Khan and letting US troops conduct an attack within Pakistan targeting Osama bin Laden. By making a shady, US-brokered deal with Gen. Musharraf, Ms. Bhutto would violate the Charter of Democracy she recently signed with Mr. Sharif: "We shall not join the military regime or any military-sponsored government. No party shall solicit the support of the military to come into power." If the PPP cuts such a dishonourable deal, as seems to be happening, it could split. Worse, that would help the army entrench itself aggressively in public life just as it's losing its credibility. This would weaken the pro-democracy momentum. Regrettably, no external agencies or forces appear willing to restrain Gen. Musharraf. The three nations that matter the most to Pakistan -- the US, China, and India -- seem resigned to supporting a dominant role for the Pakistan army. This remains true of India after National Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan certified that that "the worst is over" for Gen. Musharraf; there's "no major dent" in his influence after his "graceful" acceptance of the chief justice's reinstatement. This tails the US view of Gen. Musharraf's indispensability, and is deeply cynical towards the Pakistani public's democratic aspirations. As this column has argued, India has a long-term stake in a democratic, stable Pakistan which reins in the military. A democratic Pakistan is indispensable to South Asia's future as a peaceful, prosperous, and harmonious region. Democratisation will help India and Pakistan demilitarise mutual relations and contain communal and sectarian forces in both countries. The Benazir-Musharraf deal may have set back that prospect at least for some time. Praful Bidwai is an eminent Indian columnist.