Perspectives
The rumpus over Indo-US nuclear deal
ACCORDING to US under-secretary of state, Nicholar Burns, the United States and India reached an agreement on July 27 on the terms and conditions of a civil nuclear cooperation accord known as 123 Agreement. The Americans have called it "the symbolic centerpiece of a global partnership between our two countries." The negotiating skill and tenacity of the Indian officials earned India everything it wanted, and more. The US counterparts wrapped it up with the convoluted language to give the appearance of an agreement perfectly in line with the letter and sprit of current American law.
The Americans have promised under the agreement to help India build a strategic fuel reserve so that India's nuclear activity could continue, even if there was disruption in supply.
American law requires that all nuclear cooperation must cease with any country that carries out a nuclear explosion. This law will be applicable even if it is not specifically mentioned in the agreement. But the Americans gave an undertaking of working with India to find it an alternate fuel if, under American law, they are at all required to stop fuel supply themselves and ask for the return of fuel and technology supplied earlier.
The agreement states that "consistent with the July 18, 2005 joint statement, the United States has reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary condition for India to have assured and full access to fuel. As part of its implementation of the July 10, 2005 joint statement, the United States is committed to seeking agreements from the US congress to amend its domestic laws, and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market."
After reading between the lines of the text, it appears that even American law may not apply to Indo-US nuclear agreements.
As regards the termination of agreements -- the party seeking it must give reasons for such action and be prepared to hold consultation on the subject. It is an indication that there may not be an immediate cessation, and American law may well be amended to delay or stop the cessation even if India resorts to nuclear testing -- say, in response to resumption of such tests by Pakistan or China. The Indians have been circumspect enough to guard against the possibility and insisted on having American help in negotiating an India-specific agreement with the IAEA, which would allow them to withdraw the civilian reactors from safeguard if there is an interruption in fuel supply, rather than retaining the "perpetuity" safeguard provision.
The Indians are already building a reprocessing facility, and want to place it under IAEA safeguards. The Americans seem prepared to amend the 123 Agreement in future to provide the equipment and technology for the state-of-art reprocessing facility in India. For the Indians, the Indo-US deal is a sweetheart accord, while it largely reflects also the Bush administration's desperate need to chalk up at least one foreign policy success in its record of disastrous failures.
Also inherent in it is a strategic vision. This will help cement the alliance that the US is seeking to build in "containing China." A part of the mission of the controversial naval exercise participated by NSG countries in Bay of Bengal last month aimed at unstated encirclement of China. For all the concessions given to the Indians, there is latent US expectation to have India on her side in also isolating a recalcitrant Iran.
Most of the Indian establishment is solidly behind the agreement, which requires ratification only by the cabinet and not the Parliament. This process has been completed, even though a grim atmosphere appears to prevail in New Delhi and a raucous debate can be expected over it. But the question that is gaining primacy now is whether the Indian people, represented by the Lok Sabha, will accept it. Although, in the Indian system, the parliament is not required to endorse such agreements, questions do arise as to whether the parliament, representing billion-plus Indians, can be by-passed in taking the momentous decision redrawing the contour of the country's geo-political profile, reversing the basic premise of the nation's world view, and marking a tectonic shift in India's foreign policy. After this deal, India is no longer a non-aligned power. It will no longer be the champion of a multi-polar world. New India wants to emerge as a global power and enjoy the fruits that go with that status. It is no longer concerned with ethics and morality in matters of policy.
The Indian government seems to the implementing the U-turn despite strong opposition from many popular and political quarters, including many of its own allies in the ruling United Popular Alliance (UPA). But the ruling elite in determined through this major change of course in India's principled foreign policy, hoping to latch on the sole superpower. The current deal is denounced even in India by several quarters as a sellout, and as acceptance of Uncle Sam's supremacy. It also remains to be seen if Bush's waning presidency will be able to muster enough political support to sell this deal to the US Congress.
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