A method in the dragon's moods
The helmsman must guide the boat by using the waves, otherwise the waves will sink it.
--Old Chinese Proverb
China no longer regards herself as the "Middle Kingdom" as she once did. However despite changing global scenarios since the Peoples' Republic came into being in 1949, there has been a discernible consistency in the manner she has viewed the world and acted. Her rise in recent times, politically, economically, and militarily, has been inexorable. Through this process she has been making nuanced adjustments of her tactical postures within the parameters of broad and abiding strategic goals. Earlier in the decade there was an internal debate within the Chinese system as to whether the concept of heping juequi or "peaceful rise" should constitute a major doctrine. Ultimately, by late 2004, it was settled in favour of the less ambitious "peaceful development".
The policy framework was laid down by Mao Zedong, "great helmsman" himself. He had analyzed the globe being divided into three worlds: the first comprising the two superpowers, the US and the USSR; the second having for its members Europe, Canada, and Japan: the rest, including China, belonging to the third world. He identified the first world as the source of "all instability". Later in 1974 Deng Xiaoping declared that China would join "the oppressed peoples and nations" in their "just struggle" against the "oppressors". Since then the rhetoric have been downplayed and tactics have vastly altered. Nonetheless, the overall behaviour-pattern of China still emanates from those "original principles"
Mao had once said to the American journalist Edgar Snow that China had no troops outside her own borders and had no intention of fighting anybody unless her territories were attacked. It is true that China did not then, as it does not now, have troops beyond her borders. She initiated hostilities only when in her perception her territorial integrity was directly threatened as with India in 1962, and with the USSR along the Ussuri river. Conversely when she faced no such direct threats during the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965, or over Bangladesh in1971, she did not "militarise" her strong verbal support to her staunchest ally, Pakistan.
But can Mao's words be taken literally when we know the Chinese can be incredibly subtle in terms of language and diplomacy? One recalls Kissinger's admission that Chinese subtleties often went over Washington's heads. As for having no troops outside the borders, there will soon be no need for that as China rapidly develops the capability to project military power overseas quickly. The navy is the fastest growing force in her military. She intends to procure four to six aircraft carriers in the medium term. Their current defence budget at US $ 70 billion is the second largest in the world. Her missiles have the capability of hitting any target anywhere. While encroachment on her territory is a red line, as is any declaration of independence by Taiwan, it is unclear whether it is extended to cover her overseas 'interests' such as in energy and other resources in Africa, Central Asia, and more recently , in Latin America.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the strategic decline of Europe, China and America remain the principal protagonists on the globe. Harvard historian Niall Ferguson coined the term "Chimerica" to describe the duo, and Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski floated the concept of the "group of two". During the current financial crisis the World Bank has predicted that China will be the first country to experience a "rebound". Goldman Sachs has calculated that China would overtake the US as the world's largest economy by 2041.No wonder Hillary Clinton had said: "Our relationship with China will be the most important bilateral relationship of this century."
As current global politics evolve China has behaved with extreme circumspection. She has improved her working links with India, but keeping her powder dry, and building a network of connections with friends around potential adversaries that some have called "a string of pearls." She has suggested the replacement of the Dollar with the Yuan as the global reserve currency, then "soft-pedalled" it at the same time beginning to take steps to make this possible eventually. At the United Nations her principled position has been "no interference in internal affairs." Therefore in the Security Council she bars action against Myanmar, Sudan, Sri Lanka and Iran, but this is largely due to ramifications of the principle for herself. China is, however, said to be quietly pressuring Myanmar to change. Her traditional relationship with some Muslim countries might be subject to some strain due to recent events in Xinjiang, but if past is any indicator, China will soon endeavour to put it back on the rails.
Deng once metaphorically remarked that, "it matters little if the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice." This largely explains China's world-view. Beijing will formulate and follow policies consciously directed towards her goals, with implementation tempered by realism. Andre Gunder Frank had once quipped that the only thing to fear about a rising China is America's response to it! The Bush Administration's March 2002 Nuclear Posture Review reportedly identified China, among some others, as a potential target for nuclear weapons. China appears to take a mature view of these facts as she moves to position herself pivotally in the globe, which is her principal strategic aspiration.
Thus the mood of the Chinese dragon, even when at times shifting, conforms to a method. This must be clearly understood, if the world wishes to, as it must, accommodate and engage China in the decades to come. China's external policy resembles a river that slowly meanders, but does not suddenly change course. Time is on her side, and is not necessarily of the essence. Once asked about the impact on history of the French Revolution, Premier Zhou En-lai famously replied: "it is too soon to tell !" That says it all.
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