Local-national power relations
THE Awami League (AL) government's effort to make law-makers advisers to the Upazila Parishads will disempower local government and further aggravate the already skewed power relations. This will create new debates, analyses and sharp criticism. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to analyse the debate concerning local-national relations and appeal for a strengthening of local bodies.
In the 2008 election, people voted in favour of the "charter of change" in the election manifesto of the AL, which unequivocally emphasised strengthening of local government (LG) institutions -- as envisioned by Articles 9, 11, 59 and 60 of the Constitution of Bangladesh.
Soon after the government was formed, it reversed its position by disempowering the LG. It made ineffective the initiatives of the immediate-past caretaker government. The Local Government Commission, created to work as a buffer institution between national and local government, is now defunct; the Upazila Parishad Ordinance 2008 has been revoked.
Why does the AL not want to decentralise power and strengthen LG as promised in its election manifesto? Why do the political elites not want to relinquish power to the local bodies? Why do the law-makers want to distribute public resources to their constituents, something that is not part of their job description? With regards to these questions we will refer to some theoretical and academic perspectives supported by empirical evidence.
Theoretically, the job of the members of parliament (MPs) is to make "the rules of the game," to be played out both at national and at local levels. The MPs, of course, are supposed to play by the rules they themselves devise at the national level. The locally elected representatives (as in upazila, union parishad, municipalities etc.) should be allowed to play at local level.
The MP's involvement in development activities at the local level is not only a breach of the rules they set out but also a blatant violation of the spirit of the Constitution of Bangladesh (there is a court verdict as well). The MPs often claim that (1) they have certain commitments to their constituents, and (2) if they do not implement development projects the people will not recognise them.
Referring to the first issue, may I humbly ask: what is that commitment? If you have a separate commitment to your electorate then what does your party-manifesto stand for? The second proposition only refers to an attitude, mindset and box-type thinking; something not based on facts and causality per se.
The MPs, in fact, want to create a power base by using public resources to get elected in the next election. Richard C. Crook, a professor from the London School of Economics who did extensive research in Bangladesh, rightly termed the situation as "draw-down of public resources to bolster power-base (Crook 2003, page 78)." They have legitimate power in the social, administrative and political spheres. However, they want power over local institutions, which will not only hinder efforts for eradication of poverty but also the setting up of good governance. This is anti-constitutional.
This article will provide empirical evidence drawn from the results of the 7th and 8th parliamentary elections in the constituency of Jhenaidah-1, parliamentary seat number 81 (Sailkupa). Soon after the 7th parliamentary election (2001) the MP belonging to AL was evicted from Sailkupa.
Throughout the 5 years of BNP-Jamaat regime he was forced away from his own constituency, depriving him of the right to implement so-called development projects. In reality, huge infrastructural development projects were implemented in the latter part of the regime.
However, in the 8th parliamentary election, the same AL candidate was victorious instead of the BNP.
The question logically arises: why did the people of Sailkupa vote for a person who was not at all involved in the development of Sailkupa? In my view, the answer to the question lies with the macro-economic success of the AL government in the late 1990s.
It was low inflation, affordable commodity prices, sustainable economic growth, together with a less corrupt image as compared to the BNP that brought the AL to power, and not the construction of bridges and culverts by a potential parliamentary candidate. Does the lesson from Sailkupa guide any political direction?
The current government is committed to reducing poverty. However, poverty can be defined as something more than just the absence of material means. It is a product of unequal power relations between the haves and have-nots. The successive electoral victories of the Left-front in West Bengal, India, are an example of poverty reduction by creating a synergic power relationship between central and local governments through devolution.
Unfortunately, however, we have not learnt anything, while a wave of democratic decentralisation has been sweeping over the developing countries, because strengthening of local government is anathema for the political elites.
To conclude, we will argue that Bangladesh needs synergistic, harmonious, win-win power relations rather than the highly skewed existing one to effectuate the "Charter of Change." It may be mentioned that Bangabandhu tried to introduce a radical local governance program like the district governor system in 1975. This system was adopted only to break the elite-capture of political power and bring it back to the local level. By devolving power to the local government, the prime minister can place herself next to Bangabandhu.
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