The draft bill for anti-graft commission
How do we ensure that? The first safeguard of its independence lies in making the commission a constitutional or statutory body. The head of the state is to choose the chairman and two members of the commission from a panel of six prepared by a selection committee. The President is required to consult the Prime Minister before any appointment is made, except in the case of Chief Justice. Since the whole point about constituting such a body is to keep all kinds of executive levers at bay, the prerogative of a 'free' choice may vest in the President.
The key to the formation of the commission will be held by a selection committee comprising six members including finance and law ministers and representative from the Cabinet Division. We endorse the view of roundtable participants that 'the two ministers' should be dropped from the proposed body. For, there had been and could be allegations of corruption against government ministers. In theory, no functionary of the government, elected or not, should be outside the commission's writ. The draft bill has no provision for bipartisan representation in the selection committee. There must be an adequate slot for the opposition to strike a balance in the selection process.
Former chief justice Mostafa Kamal's view that chief justice should not be included in the selection committee resonates with us. He suggests that the judiciary has already been drawn into controversy due to the provision for outgoing chief justice to head the caretaker government. So, 'enough is enough', he added.
Let's reiterate in the end what we wrote in an earlier editorial on anti-graft commission: "Not merely structurally, it has to be also functionally independent and self-contained with delegated financial authority and the powers to investigate and grant sanction of trial".
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