US must defuse Indo-Pak nuclear fear

The US role in the Subcontinent cannot be understood without reference to the old US-Pak relationship. It has seen many ups and downs. What is its current status? Probably an international commission of inquiry would be needed to do justice to the subject. For one's part, one takes Ambassador Nicholas Platt's, the Chief of New York's Asia Society's, recent enunciation of the major US concerns vis-à-vis Pakistan as the text. These are four: (a) Taliban remnants trying to undermine Afghanistan's reconstruction; (b) the possibility of Indo-Pak nuclear conflict; (c) the danger of Pakistan succumbing on political and economic fronts; and (d) the rising tide of Islamic extremism.

Platt's is a succinct summing up of the US view of this country. Many would agree with the prognosis, though not necessarily with what the Bush Administration proposes to do. The question arises that in view of the long sorry story of Pak-India relations, with many quasi and full wars and a year-long military eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation, with frequent exchange of threats of the use of nuclear weapons, what does the US propose to do in the region? Apart from persuading both sides not to go to war and advising them to talk --- a sort of fire fighting --- what are the concrete US actions?

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It can be briefly summed up, if we ignore the currently urgent US worries about al-Qaeda, Afghanistan and Iraq, as the effort to firm up a strategic alliance among itself, Israel and India --- and to help India 'arrive', both economically and militarily.

The expected major agreement between the US and India ---- mainly to permit Israel sell some of the high tech military equipment and its own policy regarding sales of dual use technology --- gives enough indication of the US desire to see India emerge as a major power in the region.

Vis-à-vis Pakistan, the recent US munificence --- a package of $ 3 billion in military and military-related economic assistance programmes, permission to help Pakistan spend $ 9 billion of its own money in American arms Bazaar and the declaration that the US intends to help maintain a balance of power between Pakistan and India --- is noteworthy. Doubtless the US values Pakistan's cooperation in catching the major al-Qaeda and Taliban fugitives. It probably expects that Pakistan would, out of gratitude, find a way of sending troops to Iraq, if not recognize Israel.

Let's relate the major US worries regarding Pakistan with the action it promises. Would the latter promote the achievement of what the US desires with reference to the four factors that constitute Pakistan's vulnerabilities? India does not need money from the US; it only needs US technology. The Bush Administration looks like obliging India very substantially. As for Pakistan, it needs American money as well as a resumption of old military relationship with the US. The latter involved permissions to buy military hardware, purchase of spares, training of personnel and American help in the maintenance of US-given equipment. The US, in pursuit of its balance of power design, is again giving Pakistan some money and permission to buy military equipment --- so long as India does not cry foul i.e. that it will disturb the balance of power.

The really serious concerns of the US are that Pakistan should not collapse for political or economic reasons; there should be no nuclear exchange on the Subcontinent; and of course the more imprecise and difficult task of saving Pakistan from Islamic extremism. Take the first: Why is Pakistan so brittle, unstable and politically divided? A few reasons are: its elites adopted a militarist view of Kashmir, thought it necessary and feasible to wrest it from India by military means. That led to the rise of the military and eventually it inherited the Pakistan state as a whole. That in turn caused multiple polarizations. The military elites reliance on Islamic rhetoric and alliance with the religious bigots led successively to ideological confusion, identity crisis, collapse of democracy, adoption of a militarist course of action and of course Islamic extremism flourished, a manifestation of which was the Taliban regime and the general fascination with terrorism by segments of society.

The question is would Pakistan's buying military equipment and training worth $ 10.8 billion help counter any of the foregoing tendencies? Remember that India in any case is embarked on a programme of military greatness and the signs are that it will now go for the cutting edge of technology. The Indian reaction to what the US is doing for Pakistan will be to render it ineffective by a greater and speedier build up. Which in turn will force Pakistan military to push for even greater acquisitions. Would its possible implosion not come nearer?

In plain words, the US permission to Pakistan to buy military goodies worth $ 9 billion in addition to $ 1.8 billion military aid is, in conjunction with what it is going to do for India, is the surest way to intensify the various arms races between these two states. It is optional to regard the American friendliness to Pakistan as a two-in-one strategy: while buying gratitude of Pakistani generals, Pakistan's unusual Monetary Reserves at $ 11 billion can be recycled to the profit of American arms manufacturers. One can be sure that if Pakistan were to spend $ 10 to 11 billion on arms, India will devote $ 50 or more to offset Pakistan's perceived gain --- all to the benefit of American arms Bazaar.

Let's ignore India. After noting that fires of the arms races are being stoked strongly and deliberately, there is the proposition: how this balance of power strategy will affect the likelihood or otherwise of Pakistan's going belly up for political or economic reasons? If militarism and arms build up, along with empty Islamic sloganeering, has brought Pakistan to the present pass, how can such a heavy military build up and support to the Musharraf regime can normalize, democratize and strengthen Pakistan? Pakistan economy's health is not robust enough; the present praises for its supposed stabilization hide an ugly reality: shorn of western largesse and if debt payment reschedulings do not remain available, Islamabad will be back to 1998 conditions. The possibility of default and worse may come closer.

How will the US goal of preventing an atomic war in South Asia be served by its plan to intensify Indo-Pak cold war and arms races? If it is true that civilian nuclear power generation is vitally linked to the country's plans for military uses of nuclear technology, if any, how then the American-Indian cooperation on that "trinity of issues" make the two countries move toward nuclear disengagement? Indeed, ordinary citizens are more likely to suspect that the US is moving toward filling the gaps in India's nuclear programmes with new dual use technology without directly assisting it in its purely military programmes. The US may end up giving impetus to nuclear arms races, as Pakistan will beg, borrow or steal to get similar technology.

Insofar as countering Islamic extremism is concerned, the course the US has adopted in South Asia can only worsen the situation. The short-term purpose of the Americans is to elicit stronger cooperation from Musharraf government in both fighting the Taliban remnants in Afghanistan, arresting the fugitive Taliban and al-Qaeda notables and to get him to adopt a more secular approach. The political course that Musharraf may be forced to adopt in sending troops to Iraq and possibly recognizing Israel will almost be like a lighted match near a powder dump. The Islamic extremists will cry 'sell out' and there will be echoes of these denunciations. Pakistan's greater integration into American schemes is sure to backfire and intensify its many divisive and debilitating trends. The US cannot do a greater disservice than to intensify the arms races between India and Pakistan.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.