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Evolving dimensions of US foreign policy

Muhammad Zamir
Judging from articles appearing recently in various American publications, most US political scientists seem preoccupied with the question whether the US stands at the threshold of empire. What is important is that the intellectual right and the intellectual left are split on the issue, while the vast political middle appear to be open but cautious. Intellectuals realise that the brew in the cauldron is simmering but they still cannot anticipate how things will be in a few years time.

Post 9/11 events have been taking on their own dynamics and public discourse has sometimes attempted to follow with their own pronouncements. The reality is that for the first time in more than two hundred years of its existence, American might is firmly planted in the 'Muslim hertland.' This has created its own aspirations. American expeditionary forces in the Middle East and Afghanistan have started raising questions as to whether the USA is moving 'inexorably' towards an era of unprecedented world hegemony that could also be construed as "imperial ambitions."

Supporters of this theory point out that America is the only nation that maintains five global military commands encompassing more than a million armed forces personnel on four continents. It is also stressed that it roams every ocean with major naval forces, guarantees the survival of client states round the world, assumes custodianship of global trade and commerce and declares its desires to be universally suitable.

Till now, patriotism, nationalism and the fervour for the flag have held things together but there is growing speculation that a continued involvement abroad will in all probability affect domestic politics. We need to remember that an election year is coming up in the United States.

At every opportunity the US Administration has been careful to point out that their actions abroad have not been inspired because of territorial ambitions. It is suggested that US actions are meant to foster democracy, peace and stability round the world. Critics however are equally quick to refer to President Bush's recent State of the Union speech where he declared that "the course of this nation does not depend on the decision of others." Recent pronouncements by several highly placed members of the US Administration also run on similar lines where there is a juxtaposition of moral certitude and strategic power. It is this blend which makes things more complex and less transparent.

I was in Boston recently attending a meeting at Harvard University. While there, a Professor drew a very interesting comparison. When asked to explain the recent trends in US foreign policy, he mentioned that America at the end of the Cold War found itself in much the same situation as Rome after its destruction of Carthage. The US like the Roman Empire of that time 'had emerged as the sole superpower capable of imposing hegemonic order upon a potentially chaotic world of vastly lesser states'. This view was also supported in an article I read there written by Robert W Merry. He claimed that America in the 1990s found itself as "a power with far-flung client states and military outposts supporting multitudinous commercial and diplomatic interests around the world; a naval force without peer anywhere upon the sea; a power proud of its democratic institutions and distinctive heritage as a republic in which the idea of the state superseded the importance of any governing individual or faction; and a budding imperial entity that wrapped its muscular body of self-interest in a finely embroidered cloak of idealism and self-perceived virtue." All these principals became the bedrock for eventual belief in UP primacy and entitlement to undertake unilateral action.

It will be harsh if one is critical of the United States for its active pursuit of self-interest. This philosophy is followed by most states, at least in idealism if not in reality. Restraints of different kinds, unfortunately, do not permit many to demonstrate the kind of independence that they might like to show.

What bothers many developing nations however is not this US drive towards looking after its own needs, but the emerging version where the ultimate goal will be "an open and integrated international order based on the principles of democratic capitalism, with the United States as the ultimate guarantor of order and the enforcer of norms" (as explained by Andrew J Bacevich). In the mind of many decision makers in Washington today, this brand will ensure freedom and democracy which in turn implies stability and security.

It would be proper to refer at this point to Paul Wolfowitz, the present US Deputy Defence Secretary and his views about American pre-eminence. In 1991, when he was Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, he supervised the preparation of a position paper which identified USA as a premier geopolitical reality in the post Cold War era and posited the notion that American foreign policy should be aimed at reflecting this reality. The paper also suggested that America should "sufficiently account for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order." It was further proposed that the country should "maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role." One needs hardly to look too far from such assertions, if one wants to discover the philosophical doctrine that led to the concept of pre-emption and America's right to protect itself from potential threats.

After the debacle in Mogadishu, Somalia, the US Administration policy makers learnt a valuable lesson. They understood that urban combats had to be avoided and that all armed engagements involving US troops has to be carried out in a manner that would drastically reduce possibilities of casualties. This new Clinton doctrine served as the matrix for the dramatic increase in the use of military force around the world. Military analysts have noted that in the decade since the end of the Soviet system, the USA has embarked on nearly thirty military interventions, as compared to only sixteen during the five decades of the Cold War. Bacevich suggests that this is the beginning of the militarisation of US foreign policy. Former Secretary of State Albright however drew a fine line of distinction between the use of military force and starting a war.

This antiseptic approach of intervention without suffering casualties was however most sorely tested during the open-ended Balkan conflict in 1999, when Serb Slobodan Milosevic with his unpredictable defiance almost created a situation that would have required US troops on the ground (with potential for heavy casualties) instead of US planes intervening from high altitudes. Fortunately for all concerned, Russia played a responsible role in persuading Milosevic to give in.

The central problem that we face today is the contrast of perception as to what will ensure freedom, peace and liberty. America believes that it is not only essentially a benign nation but that the world should embrace its habits and systems. However, many nations in the world do not subscribe to this notion and differ as to what constitutes the ideals political and economic system. It is this paradox that is creating conflicts and breeding terrorists.

Dispassionately, if one analyses US foreign policy today, one discerns three strains of thought. The first group may be broadly termed as being 'pragmatists,' as embodied in the current Secretary of State Colin Powell. They worry about America becoming militarily overextended and support the idea of US observing international norms and protocols to the fullest extent possible. The second group consists of the 'nationalists,' personified by Vice-president Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and White House National Security Adviser C Rice. They believe in the projection of American power to protect American interests and maintain global stability. They however stop short of trying to change the world in America's image. It is the third group -- the 'neocons' (neo-conservatives) that reflect a more extreme position. The unfortunate events of 9/11 have given them the handle to argue their case. They believe in a grand global vision of American dominance and relentless force on behalf of American values. Within the ambit of the current US Administration, several persons like Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith and Richard Perle actively pursue this trend of thought. The dislike for their beliefs by the liberal democrats in America was best exemplified in 'neocons' being referred to as "democratic imperialists" by Brookings Institution Fellow Ivo Daalder.

Right now, the star of the neocons appear to be ascendant. They appear to be receiving more attention from the US President who believes in an existing rationale for pro-active use of American power on a global scale being justified as a necessary protective measure.

Recently, there have been reports in the press (with expected denials) that Secretary Powell will not continue in his post if Bush wins a second term. There is also speculation that he will be replaced by either a 'nationalist' or a 'neocon'. If Powell leaves and there is such a change towards further right, the scenario will become even more inflexible, be it in matters of environment, trade, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine or other significant issues affecting US foreign policy decisions.

Even the most subtle change in directions of US foreign policy will affect the international scene in more ways than one given American involvement in each pie. Unfortunately or fortunately for America, that country has become enmeshed in being a global cop. We also know that the job of a policeman never ends. As is growing evident in Iraq and Afghanistan, it has been easy for her to get on top of a tiger but it is now difficult to get down from its back. The chaos in the wake of the Iraq invasion and the challenges of nation-building and peace-making will make things even more complex and difficult. The chances are that America will be drawn even deeper into the vortex of other conflicts and more contentious situations.

Hopefully, for the rest of the world it will not be a vicious cycle that will end in that country becoming more isolationist.

Muhammad Zamir is a former Secretary and Ambassador.